

435. Estimate of the Situation - Red and Tentative
Joint Basic Plan - Red. (J.B. No. 325)
Original B-May-30

W.D. No. 316
(Serial No. 485)

THE JOINT BOARD
WASHINGTON



MAY 8 - 1930

SECRETARY
ARMY AND
NAVY DEPARTMENT BUILDING
325

325
325

To: The Secretary of War.

SUBJECT: Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Red.

The Joint Board has agreed upon the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Red, which is forwarded herewith with recommendation for its approval.

2. This approved this Plan will constitute the basis upon which all Army Plans - Red, all Navy Plans - Red, and all Joint Plans - Red, shall be formulated and developed.

O. F. HUGHES

O. F. HUGHES,
Admiral, U.S.Navy,
Senior Member.

Re 325
May 16/30 41 P.M.
Rev. 7/1/34 - Annex
May 4/35 - Annex

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE...4-7-74

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RETURN TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
RECORDING SECTION, ROOM 5005
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING

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J.3.3.3. 325
(Serial No. 486)

SECRETARY
ROOM 2740
NAVY DEPARTMENT BUILDING

128

THE JOINT BOARD
WASHINGTON

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Red.

The Joint Board has agreed upon the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Red, which is forwarded herewith with recommendation for its approval.

2. When approved this Plan will constitute the basis upon which all Army Plans - Red, all Navy Plans - Red, and all Joint Plans - Red, shall be formulated and developed.

C. F. HUGHES

C. F. HUGHES,
Admiral, U.S.Navy,
Senior Member.

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE: 4 Feb 74

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DATE 4/26/74

JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - RED

JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - RED

SECTION I

DIRECTIVE

1. This JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - RED shall constitute the basis upon which all Army Plans - RED, all Navy Plans - RED, and all Joint Plans - RED, shall be formulated and developed.

SECTION II

GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

1. This Plan is for a war in which only the UNITED STATES and RED are involved, except for certain closely affiliated nations of little military strength.
2. RED is defined as the whole RED Empire. CRIMSON is defined as all of RED territory located north of the northern boundary of the UNITED STATES. No part of the RED Empire will declare neutrality.
3. Upon the declaration of war, the military strength of the UNITED STATES and RED will be approximately the same as at present.
4. The international situation will be such as will permit each country to use its full power against the other, except such forces as may be required for normal preparedness against possible aggression by other nations.
5. The major portion of the United States Fleet will be in the Atlantic on or before M-Day.

SECTION III

TIME OF EXECUTION

1. M-Day is the first day of open mobilization and is the Time Origin for the execution of this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - RED. M-Day may precede a Declaration of War. Note. Different terminology at present is employed by the Army and the Navy in plans subordinate to this Joint Plan for days subsequent to M-Day; for example, 2 M (Army) is the same as M + 1 (Navy).
2. Mobilization applies alike to all activities of the Army, the Navy, and all other Departments and Agencies of the Government, ashore and afloat.

SECTION IV

CONCEPT OF THE WAR

1. A war of long duration, involving the maximum effort of the armed forces and civil power of the UNITED STATES, directed initially toward the isolation of CRIMSON from RED and the defeat of RED armed forces in North America and the Western North Atlantic, including the Caribbean Sea and West Indian waters, and finally toward the economic exhaustion of the RED United Kingdom.

SECTION V

MISSIONS

1. NATIONAL MISSION: To undertake and prosecute the measures, military, naval, political, financial, and economic, required to win the war.

2. MISSION FOR THE ARMED FORCES: While protecting UNITED STATES territory and interests, to destroy RED armed forces in North America and the Western North Atlantic, including the Caribbean Sea and West Indian waters; to isolate CRIMSON from RED; to deny to RED the use of bases in the Western Hemisphere; to occupy such territory in CRIMSON and other RED possessions as may be necessary; and to gain and exercise such control of sea communications as will contribute toward RED'S economic exhaustion.

a. MISSION FOR THE ARMY: To provide for the defense of UNITED STATES territory and industries; to destroy RED armed forces in North America; and, ultimately, to occupy such territory in CRIMSON and other RED possessions in the Western Hemisphere as may be necessary.

b. MISSION FOR THE NAVY: To gain and exercise control of the sea in the Western North Atlantic, including the Caribbean Sea and West Indian waters, and in the Pacific adjacent to CRIMSON, preventing supply and reinforcement of CRIMSON; to protect essential trade routes; and, ultimately to extend such control of sea communications to areas necessary to effect economic exhaustion of RED.

3. MISSION FOR THE CIVIL POWER: To support the armed forces in their operations and to take such action through financial, economic, and political agencies as will most seriously damage RED interests throughout the world, while strengthening those of the UNITED STATES.

SECTION VI

THEATERS OF OPERATIONS

1. Principal Theaters of Operations will be -

a. For the Army: All CRIMSON territory, the UNITED STATES water areas of the Great Lakes and such other UNITED STATES territory adjoining CRIMSON as may be required for Army operations.

b. For the Navy: The Western North Atlantic, including the Caribbean Sea, the West Indian waters, and the Gulf and River St. Lawrence as far west as Cornwall Island, inclusive.

2. Secondary Theaters of Operations will be -

a. The ASIATIC THEATER, which will comprise the area included between the Meridians of one hundred fifty (150) and one hundred (100), East Longitude, and between the Parallels of zero (0) and forty (40), North Latitude.

b. The HAWAIIAN THEATER, which will comprise the area included within the circumferences and the tangents connecting such circumferences of circles drawn with Midway Island, Honolulu, Hilo, and Johnston Island as centers, with radii of three hundred nautical (300) miles.

c. The PANAMA CANAL THEATER, which will comprise the Panama Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, the coastal waters on the Caribbean and Pacific Coasts therof, and the area of the High Seas included within a distance of two hundred (200) nautical miles of the boundaries and coasts of the Republic of Panama.

d. The ALASKAN THEATER, which will comprise the territory of Alaska and outlying islands.

e. The PACIFIC THEATER, which will comprise the sea areas adjacent to the Pacific Coast of the UNITED STATES, Alaska, and CRIMSON, not included in any other Theaters.

3. In addition to the above Theaters of Operations, there is defined for naval purposes only the NAVAL GREAT LAKES THEATER, which will comprise the water areas of the Great Lakes, and of the St. Lawrence River eastward to Cornwall Island, exclusive; the Naval Commander being also designated as the Naval Commandant of the Great Lakes Coastal Frontier. The Army Commander and the Naval Commandant of the Great Lakes Coastal Frontier will assume their respective commands on M-Day, with headquarters in Detroit.

4. Initially, the defense of all coastal frontiers will be conducted in accordance with the plans formulated under Chapter V, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy". As parts of coastal frontiers become included in specific Army theaters of operation after M-Day, the Army and Navy defense forces in these parts will pass to the control of the Army Commander of the specific Army theater of operations.

SECTION VII

JOINT DECISIONS

AND

OPERATIONS REQUIRED THEREUNDER

1. TO INITIATE, AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE, OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO SEPARATE CRIMSON FROM RED.

(Changes No. 2, J.B. No. 325 (Serial No. 549)

b. For the Navy: The Western North Atlantic, including the Caribbean Sea, the West Indian waters, and the Gulf and River St. Lawrence as far west as Cornwall Island, inclusive.

2. Secondary Theaters of Operations will be -

b. The ASIATIC THEATER, which will comprise the area included between the Meridians of one hundred fifty (150) and one hundred (100), East Longitude, and between the Parallels of zero (0) and forty (40), North Latitude.

b. The HAWAIIAN THEATER, which will comprise the area included within the circumferences and the tangents connecting such circumferences of circles drawn with Midway Island, Honolulu, Hilo, and Johnston Island as centers, with radii of three hundred nautical (300) miles.

c. The PANAMA CANAL THEATER, which will comprise the Panama Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, the coastal waters on the Caribbean and Pacific Coasts thereof, and the area of the High Seas included within a distance of two hundred (200) nautical miles of the boundaries and coasts of the Republic of Panama.

d. The ALASKAN THEATER, which will comprise the territory of Alaska and outlying islands.

e. The PACIFIC THEATER, which will comprise the sea areas in the Pacific adjacent to CRIMSON and adjacent to the Pacific Coast of the UNITED STATES and ALASKA, exclusive of the waters of the Naval Districts of the PACIFIC and ALASKA Coastal Frontiers.

3. In addition to the above Theaters of Operations, there is defined for naval purposes only the NAVAL GREAT LAKES THEATER, which will comprise the water areas of the Great Lakes, and of the St. Lawrence River eastward to Cornwall Island, exclusive; the Naval Commander being also designated as the Naval Commandant of the Great Lakes Coastal Frontier. The Army Commander and the Naval Commandant of the Great Lakes Coastal Frontier will assume their respective commands on D-Day, with headquarters in Detroit.

4. Initially, the defense of all coastal frontiers will be conducted in accordance with the plans formulated under Chapter V, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy." If parts of coastal frontiers become included in specific Army theaters of operation after D-Day, the Army and Navy defense forces in such parts will pass to the control of the Army Commander of the specific Army theater of operations.

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SECTION VII

JOINT DECISIONS

AND

1. TO INITIATE, AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE, OPERATIONS DESIGNED TO SEPARATE CRIMSON FROM RED.

The carrying out of this decision will include:

a. By the Army - A maximum Army concentration in the Northeast section of the UNITED STATES, with forces so disposed as to facilitate:

(1) An early joint overseas expedition against Halifax in case the situation at the outbreak of war justifies such an operation.

(2) An early operation to secure the Montreal-Qubec area.

(3) Immediate air operations on as large a scale as practicable, in support of one or both of the operations contemplated in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) above, or in lieu of that contemplated in sub-paragraph (1).

(4) An operation to cut CRIMSON rail connections in the Winnipeg area.

b. By the Navy -

(1) The establishment of the United States Fleet in the Western North Atlantic in strength sufficient to destroy all RED naval forces in that area and to control sea communications between RED and CRIMSON.

(2) Control of the Straits of San Juan de Fuca and blockade of the Pacific Coast of CRIMSON.

c. Jointly by Army and Navy - preparations for a joint overseas expedition against Halifax.

2. TO INITIATE, AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE CONSISTENT WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE OPERATIONS REQUIRED BY THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH, OPERATIONS TO SEIZE RED BASES IN THE WESTERN NORTH ATLANTIC, THE WEST INDIES, AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. By the Navy - operations to seize and to hold

(1) Jamaica, (2) the Bahamas, and (3) Bermuda at the earliest practicable date.

b. By the Army - relief, as soon as forces become available, of the naval forces in the above islands.

c. Operations, when forces become available to seize and to hold (1) Trinidad, (2) St. Lucia, and (3) other RED West Indian and Central American possessions.

3. TO INITIATE, AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE, OPERATIONS TO COMMAND THE GREAT LAKES WATER ROUTES.

(Changes No. 2, J.B. No. 325 (Serial No. 549)).

The carrying out of this decision will include:

a. By the Army - A maximum Army concentration in the Northeast section of the UNITED STATES, with forces so disposed as to facilitate:

(1) An early joint overseas expedition against Halifax in case the situation at the outbreak of war justifies such an operation. If not, then an operation to secure the Moncton Area, with Halifax as the ultimate objective.

(2) An early operation to secure the Montreal-Quebec area.

(3) Immediate air operations on as large a scale as practicable, in support of one or both of the operations contemplated in sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) above, or in lieu of that contemplated in sub-paragraph (1).

b. By the Navy -

(1) The establishment of the United States Fleet in the Western North Atlantic in strength sufficient to destroy all RED naval forces in that area and to control sea communications between RED and CRIMSON.

(2) Control of the Straits of San Juan de Fuca and blockade of the Pacific Coast of CRIMSON.

c. Jointly by Army and Navy - preparations for a joint overseas expedition against Halifax.

2. TO INITIATE, AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE CONSISTENT WITH THE EXECUTION OF THE OPERATIONS REQUIRED BY THE PRECEDING PARAGRAPH, OPERATIONS TO SEIZE RED BASES IN THE WESTERN NORTH ATLANTIC, THE WEST INDIES, AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. By the Navy - operations to seize and to hold

(1) Jamaica, (2) the Bahamas, and (3) Bermuda at the earliest practicable date.

b. By the Army - relief, as soon as forces become available, of the naval forces in the above islands.

c. Operations, when forces become available to seize and to hold (1) Trinidad, (2) St. Lucia, and (3) other RED West Indian and Central American possessions.

3. TO INITIATE, AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE, OPERATIONS TO COMMAND THE GREAT LAKES WATER ROUTES.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. Joint preparations for the defense of the Great Lakes Coastal Frontier in accordance with the Categories of Defense prescribed in Section X of this Joint Plan.

b. By the Army - immediate measures for the defense of all sensitive points along the Great Lakes waterways, including operations in adjacent CRIMSON territory as may be necessary, with special emphasis on the following localities:

- (1) St. Mary River and Sault Ste. Marie Canals.
- (2) St. Clair and Detroit Rivers.
- (3) Niagara River and Welland Canal.

c. By the Navy - support of Army operations indicated in paragraph 3b of this section and the prompt seizure and control of the water areas of the Great Lakes.

4. TO HOLD INVIOLENTE THE PANAMA CANAL.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. By the Army - the reinforcement of the Army garrison in the Panama Canal Zone to bring it to the strength provided for in the Army Panama Canal Defense Project.

b. By the Navy - reinforcement of the Naval local defense forces to the maximum extent practicable.

c. Execution of the Local Defense Plans, Army, Navy and Joint.

5. TO PROTECT THE FRONTIERS OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN AREAS OF MAJOR OPERATIONS.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. Joint preparations for the defense of coastal frontiers in accordance with the Categories of Defense prescribed in Section X of this Joint Plan.

b. By the Army - adequate disposition of covering forces for the protection of the land frontiers.

6. INITIALLY, TO DEFEND THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, THE PHILIPPINES, AND ALASKA WITH FORCES THERE AVAILABLE AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

The execution of this decision will require:

The execution of this decision will require:

a. Joint preparations for the defense of the Great Lakes Coastal Frontier in accordance with the Categories of Defense prescribed in Section X of this Joint Plan.

b. By the Army - immediate measures for the defense of all sensitive points along the Great Lakes waterways, including operations in adjacent CRIMSON territory as may be necessary, with special emphasis on the following localities:

- (1) St. Mary River and Sault Ste. Marie Canals.
- (2) St. Clair and Detroit Rivers.
- (3) Niagara River and Welland Canal.

c. By the Navy - support of Army operations indicated in paragraph 3b of this section and the prompt seizure and control of the water areas of the Great Lakes.

4. TO HOLD INVIOLENTE THE PANAMA CANAL AND TO PROVIDE, AT THE EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE, ADEQUATE DEFENSE FOR THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, SO AS TO HOLD THESE ISLANDS FOR USE AS A MAIN OUTLYING NAVAL BASE IN THE PACIFIC.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. By the Army - the reinforcement of the Army garrisons in the Panama Canal Zone and Hawaii to bring them to the strength provided for in the Army Panama Canal and Hawaiian Defense Projects.

b. By the Navy - reinforcement of the Naval local defense forces to the maximum extent practicable.

c. Execution of the Local Defense Plans, Army, Navy and Joint.

5. TO PROTECT THE FRONTIERS OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH ARE NOT INCLUDED IN AREAS OF MAJOR OPERATIONS.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. Joint preparations for the defense of coastal frontiers in accordance with the Categories of Defense prescribed in Section X of this Joint Plan.

b. By the Army - adequate disposition of covering forces for the protection of the land frontiers.

6. INITIALLY TO DEFEND THE PHILIPPINES AND ALASKA WITH FORCES THERE AVAILABLE AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. Initially -

(1) Putting into effect the Local Defense Plans, Army, Navy and Joint.

(2) Increasing the existing forces, Army and Navy, by the utilization of all locally available man-power and resources.

b. Ultimately these possessions will be reinforced from the continental UNITED STATES with priority of an Army division to the Hawaiian Islands.

7. ULTIMATELY, TO GAIN COMPLETE CONTROL OF CRIMSON.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. By the Army - extension of operations to include all CRIMSON vital areas not occupied by the initial operations.

b. By the Navy - control of sea areas adjacent to both coasts of CRIMSON.

8. TO PROVIDE SUCH SECURITY FOR UNITED STATES VITAL SEABORNE TRADE AS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES FLEET TO DESTROY THE RED MAIN FLEET.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. By the Navy -

(1) Control of the Coastwise Sea Lanes of the Intercostal Trade Routes via the Panama Canal, and of Seaborne Trade between the Pacific Coast and Hawaii.

(2) Operations to safeguard UNITED STATES shipping to both coasts of South America; and

(3) Such protection as it may be practicable to afford to UNITED STATES Trans-Pacific shipping.

9. ULTIMATELY, TO EXTEND NAVAL OPERATIONS TO ASSIST IN EFFECTING ECONOMIC EXHAUSTION OF RED.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. By the Navy -

(1) The attainment of naval superiority by the destruction of RED naval forces where and when met, and

(2) Operations against RED seaborne commerce.

b. Joint Operations, when forces become available, to seize and hold RED territory necessary to carry out this decision.

(Changes No. 2, J.B. No. 325 (Serial No. 549).)

a. Initially -

(1) Putting into effect the Local Defense Plans, Army, Navy and Joint.

(2) Increasing the existing forces, Army and Navy, by the utilization of all locally available man-power and resources.

b. Ultimately these possessions will be reinforced as necessary by forces from continental UNITED STATES.

7. ULTIMATELY, TO GAIN COMPLETE CONTROL OF CRIMSON.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. By the ARMY - extension of operations to include all CRIMSON vital areas not occupied by the initial operations with priority to the occupation of the Winnipeg and Vancouver Areas.

b. By the NAVY - control of sea areas adjacent to both coasts of CRIMSON.

8. TO PROVIDE SUCH SECURITY FOR UNITED STATES VITAL SEABORNE TRADE AS IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRIMARY MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES FLEET TO DESTROY THE RED MAIN FLEET.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. By the NAVY -

(1) Control of the Coastwise Sea Lanes of the Intercoastal Trade Routes via the Panama Canal, and of Seaborne Trade between the Pacific Coast and Hawaii.

(2) Operations to safeguard UNITED STATES shipping to both coasts of South America; and

(3) Such protection as it may be practicable to afford to UNITED STATES Trans-Pacific shipping.

9. ULTIMATELY, TO EXTEND NAVAL OPERATIONS TO ASSIST IN EFFECTING ECONOMIC EXHAUSTION OF RED.

The execution of this decision will require:

a. By the NAVY -

(1) The attainment of naval superiority by the destruction of RED naval forces where and when met, and

(2) Operations against RED seaborne commerce.

b. Joint Operations, when forces become available, to seize and hold RED territory necessary to carry out this decision.

11. "TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY PREPARATIONS FOR THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE FROM THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE, INCLUDING THE USE OF TOXIC AGENTS, FROM THE INCEPTION OF HOSTILITIES, IS AUTHORIZED, SUBJECT TO SUCH RESTRICTIONS OR PROHIBITIONS AS MAY BE CONTAINED IN ANY DULY RATIFIED INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION OR CONVENTIONS WHICH AT THAT TIME MAY BE BINDING UPON THE UNITED STATES AND THE ENEMY STATE OR STATES." (Amendment of 7 November 1954 - J.B. No. 325 (Serial No. 542).)

10. TO EMPLOY SUBMARINES AGAINST RED COMBATANT VESSELS AND AGAINST RED SEABORNE COMMERCE UNDER THE SAME RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS GOVERN THE ACTION OF SURFACE VESSELS UNLESS AND UNTIL THE ACTION OF RED IN THIS RESPECT NECESSITATES OTHER ACTION.

11. TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY PREPARATIONS FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR DUE TO EMPLOY TOXIC CHEMICAL WEAPONS ONLY IF AND WHEN RED ADopts THEIR USE. Amended by J.B. No. 325 (5 Nov. 1954).

12. TO DECLARE CONTRABAND EVERYTHING THAT CONTRIBUTES IN ANY WAY TO SUCCESS IN J.W.R.

SECTION VIII

COMMAND IN JOINT OPERATIONS

1. Except as indicated herein, command within the Army and the Navy PRINCIPAL THEATERS OF OPERATIONS shall be exercised by the Army and Navy respectively. Command of Naval (including Marine Corps) forces operating within the Army PRINCIPAL THEATER OF OPERATIONS shall be exercised by the Army under the Principle of Unity of Command, except that command of Naval Operations on the Gulf and River St. Lawrence which are not in the nature of a support of specific Army Operations shall be exercised by the Navy. Command of Joint Operations within the Navy PRINCIPAL THEATER OF OPERATIONS, including a joint overseas expedition against Halifax, shall be exercised by the Army under the Principle of Paramount Interest.

2. Command within Secondary Centers of Operations shall be exercised as follows:

a. The ATLANTIC THEATER, the HAMILTON THEATER, and the P.M.L.C.M.L THEATER, under the Principle of Paramount Interest, effective on 1 January, and vested initially in the Army.

b. The ALASKA THEATER, by the Army.

c. The PACIFIC THEATER, by the Navy.

3. Command of Joint Operations not provided for in this Plan will be decided by joint agreement of the War Department and Navy Department when such operations are planned.

SECTION IX

FORCES TO BE MADE AVAILABLE

1. The War Department shall mobilize for the maximum effort and shall make available for active operations all Army forces, including the air components therof, required under the War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1928, which provides for the mobilization of approximately 4,600,000, from which shall be provided:

(Changes No. 1, J.B.No. 325 (Serial No. 542))
(Changes No. 2, J.B.No. 325 (Serial No. 549))

10. TO EMPLOY SUBMARINES AGAINST SEA COMBATANT VESSELS AND AGAINST SEA BORNE COMMERCE UNDER THE SAME RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AS GOVERN THE ACTION OF SURFACE VESSELS UNLESS AND UNTIL THE ACTION OF SEA IN THIS RESPECT NECESSITATES OTHER ACTION.

11. TO MAKE ALL NECESSARY PREPARATIONS FOR THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE FROM THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. THE USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE, INCLUDING THE USE OF TOXIC AGENTS, FROM THE INCEPTION OF HOSTILITIES, IS AUTHORIZED, SUBJECT TO SUCH RESTRICTIONS OR PROHIBITIONS AS MAY BE CONTAINED IN ANY DULY RATIFIED INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION OR CONVENTIONS WHICH AT THAT TIME MAY BE BINDING UPON THE UNITED STATES AND THE ENEMY STATE OR STATES.

12. TO DECLARE CONTRABAND EVERYTHING THAT CONTRIBUTES IN ANY WAY TO SUCCESS IN WAR.

SECTION VIII

COMMAND IN JOINT OPERATIONS

1. Except as indicated herein, command within the ~~ARMY~~ and the ~~NAVY~~ PRINCIPAL THEATERS OF OPERATIONS shall be exercised by the Army and Navy respectively. Command of Naval (including Marine Corps) forces operating within the ~~ARMY~~ PRINCIPAL THEATER OF OPERATIONS shall be exercised by the Army under the Principle of Unity of Command, except that command of Naval Operations on the Gulf and River St. Lawrence which are not in the nature of a support of specific Army Operations shall be exercised by the Navy. Command of Joint Operations within the ~~NAVY~~ PRINCIPAL THEATER OF OPERATIONS, including a joint overseas expedition against Halifax, shall be exercised by the Army under the Principle of Paramount Interest.

2. Command within Secondary Theaters of Operations shall be exercised as follows:

a. The ASIATIC THEATER, the HAWAIIAN THEATER, and the PANAMA CANAL THEATER, under the Principle of Paramount Interest, effective on D-Day, and vested initially in the ~~ARMY~~.

b. The ALASKAN THEATER, by the ~~ARMY~~.

c. The PACIFIC THEATER, by the Navy.

3. Command of Joint Operations not provided for in this Plan will be decided by joint agreement of the War Department and Navy Department when such operations are planned.

SECTION IX

FORCES TO BE MADE AVAILABLE

1. The War Department shall mobilize for the maximum effort and shall make available for active operations all Army forces included under the War Department Mobilization Plan - 1933, from which shall be provided:

a. A force of approximately 25,000 organized as one Army corps of three divisions, units at M-Day strength with thirty (30) days' supplies, ready for embarkation at Boston by M+2 Day. This force will be the army contingent of a joint overseas expedition to capture Halifax, in case such an expedition is directed. If a joint overseas expedition be not dispatched against Halifax, the army contingent will be released for such other operations as the War Department may direct. An Army air force, concentrating in the New York - New England area, shall be prepared to operate against Halifax, either to assist in its capture by a joint overseas expedition or to neutralize Halifax in case such an expedition is not directed.

b. A concentration in the New York - New England area, with a primary mission of offensive operations on a large scale in the Montreal - Quebec area.

c. Covering forces disposed upon the declaration of war for the defense of the northern border by Corps area Commanders concerned. ✓

d. Concentrations beginning M-day of forces to establish bridgeheads in CRIMSON as indicated below:

(1) West of the Niagara River; to protect UNITED STATES hydro-electric plants and to gain control of CRIMSON hydro-electric plants along the Niagara River; to insure the use of the Welland Canal by the UNITED STATES; and to protect Buffalo and vicinity.

(2) East of the Detroit and St.Clair Rivers; to insure the use of the water route through these rivers and Lake St. Clair by the UNITED STATES; and to protect Detroit and vicinity.

(3) Northeast of the Sault Ste. Marie Canals; to prevent damage to the canal locks and to insure the use of the canals by the UNITED STATES.

e. Concentrations of the necessary forces required for the defense of coastal frontiers, in accordance with the Categories of Defense stipulated in Section X.

f. Necessary forces to initiate immediately upon the declaration of war, offensive operations within the Winnipeg area to secure the railroad bottleneck at Winnipeg and, thus, to isolate western CRIMSON.

g. A concentration, for embarkation at Gulf ports, of the necessary reinforcements to bring the Panama Canal Garrison to a strength of approximately 40,000. If practicable, all or part of this reinforcement will be accomplished prior to M-Day by the Army, using Army transports; the remainder, on M-day or shortly thereafter. See Section XII, paragraph 1 o.

(Changes No. 2, J.B.Lo. 325 (Serial No. 549))

b. A force of approximately 25,000 organized as one Army corps of three divisions, units at N-Day strength with thirty (30) days' supplies, ready for embarkation at Boston by " + 2 Day. This force will be the Army contingent of a joint overseas expedition to capture Halifax, in case such an expedition is directed. If a joint overseas expedition be not dispatched against Halifax, the Army contingent will be released for such other operations as the War Department may direct. An Army air force, concentrating in the New York - New England area, shall be prepared to operate against Halifax, either to assist in its capture by a joint overseas expedition or to neutralize Halifax in case such an expedition is not directed.

b. A concentration in the New York - New England area, with a primary mission of offensive operations on a large scale in the Montreal - Quebec area.

c. Covering forces disposed upon the declaration of war for the defense of the northern border.

d. Concentrations beginning " - Day of forces to establish bridgeheads in CANADA as indicated below:

(1) West of the Niagara River; to protect UNITED STATES hydro-electric plants and to gain control of CANADA hydro-electric plants along the Niagara River; to insure the use of the Welland Canal by the UNITED STATES; and to protect Buffalo and vicinity.

(2) East of the Detroit and St. Clair Rivers; to insure the use of the water route through these rivers and Lake St. Clair by the UNITED STATES; and to protect Detroit and vicinity.

(3) Northeast of the Sault Ste. Marie Canals; to prevent damage to the canal locks and to insure the use of the canals by the UNITED STATES.

e. Concentrations of the necessary forces required for the defense of coastal frontiers, in accordance with the Categories of Defense stipulated in Section X.

f. Necessary forces to initiate, when the situation permits, offensive operations to secure the Winnipeg and Vancouver Areas.

g. A concentration for embarkation at GULF Ports, of reinforcements sufficient to raise the Army garrison in the PANAMA CANAL ZONE to the strength called for in the PANAMA CANAL Defense Project. If practicable, such part of these reinforcements as are available will be despatched prior to N-Day by the Army, using Army transports and such commercial vessels as can be obtained. The remainder on N-Day or shortly thereafter. Naval escort will be provided. See Section XII, paragraph 1 e.

h. The concentration, for embarkation at PACIFIC coast ports, of reinforcements sufficient to raise the Army garrison in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the strength called for in the HAWAIIAN Defense Project. If practicable, such part of these

b. Such dispositions of forces within the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippine Islands, and Alaska, at the outbreak of war, as will best facilitate their defense. Ultimately, reinforcements will be sent from continental UNITED STATES, with priority of one infantry division to the Hawaiian Islands.

c. Forces disposed for the protection of the southern land frontier, of approximately the strength so employed on M-Day.

d. A concentration of approximately one Army corps as a general reserve.

e. When available and upon request of the Navy Department, forces to relieve Marine garrisons in Red possessions which have been captured by purely Naval Operations.

2. The NAVY Department shall mobilize for the maximum effort and shall make available for active operations all Naval forces, active and inactive, Regular and Reserve, including the Marine Corps components thereof and the Coast Guard forces, aggregating a total personnel strength of approximately 438,000, from which shall be provided:

a. A concentration, on M-Day, or as soon thereafter as possible, within the Western North Atlantic, of a force of Naval units approximating in strength, as nearly as may be practicable, the combined RE Atlantic, Mediterranean, North Atlantic, and West Indies forces, with provision for the rapid expansion of such force to the maximum practicable extent.

b. A concentration, beginning on M-Day, within the ASIATIC THEATER, of all units of the Asiatic Fleet and of such other Naval forces as can be made available.

c. A mobilization and concentration, beginning on M-Day, within the NAVAL GREAT LAGES THEATER, of the Naval forces required to seize and exercise control of the water areas of the Great Lakes, and to cooperate with and assist the Army in its operations.

d. A concentration, beginning on M-Day, within the PACIFIC THEATER, of the Naval forces required to control the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and to establish a blockade of the Pacific ports of CRIMSON.

e. Concentrations of the necessary Naval local defense forces required for the defense of Panama and Hawaii.

f. Provision of the necessary Naval local defense forces required for the defense of coastal frontier areas, in accordance with the Categories of Defense stipulated in Section X.

(Changes No. 2, J.B.NO. 825 (Serial No. 549))

reinforcements as are available will be despatched prior to I-Day by the Army, using Army transports and such commercial vessels as can be obtained. The remainder on and after I-Day as forces become available. Naval escort will be provided.

1. Such disposition of forces within the Philippine Islands and Alaska at the outbreak of war as will best facilitate their defense. Ultimately, such reinforcements will be sent from continental UNITED STATES as the situation demands.

2. Forces disposed for the protection of the southern land frontier, of approximately the strength so employed on I-Day.

3. A concentration of approximately one Army corps as a general reserve.

4. When available and upon request of the Navy Department, forces to relieve Marine garrisons in Red possessions which have been captured by purely Naval Operations.

5. The NAVAL Department shall mobilize for the maximum effort and shall make available for active operations all Naval forces, active and inactive, Regular and Reserve, including the Marine Corps components thereof and the Coast Guard forces, aggregating a total personnel strength of approximately 438,000, from which shall be provided:

6. A concentration, on I-Day, or as soon thereafter as possible, within the Western North Atlantic, of a force of Naval units approximating in strength, as nearly as may be practicable, the combined RED Atlantic, Mediterranean, North Atlantic, and West Indies forces, with provision for the rapid expansion of such force to the maximum practicable extent.

7. A concentration, beginning on I-Day, within the ASIATIC THEATER, of all units of the Asiatic Fleet and of such other Naval forces as can be made available.

8. A mobilization and concentration, beginning on I-Day, within the NAVAL GREAT LAKES THEATER, of the Naval forces required to seize and exercise control of the water areas of the Great Lakes, and to cooperate with and assist the Army in its operations.

9. A concentration, beginning on I-Day, within the PACIFIC THEATER, of the Naval forces required to control the Strait of Juan de Fuca, and to establish a blockade of the Pacific ports of CRIMSON.

10. Concentrations of the necessary Naval local defense forces required for the defense of Panama and Hawaii.

11. Provision of the necessary Naval local defense forces required for the defense of coastal frontier areas, in accordance with the Categories of Defense stipulated in Section X.

g. Provision of the necessary Naval forces for the seizure of Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Bermuda.

h. The Navy Department shall further be prepared:

(1) To transport and protect the Army Expeditionary Force in case an overseas expedition against Halifax is directed.

(2) To transport and protect any Army expeditionary forces which may be sent to Jamaica, the Bahamas, Bermuda, and other HED West Indian and Central American possessions.

(3) To furnish the vessels required on M-Day and thereafter for the transportation of Army reinforcements to Panama, Hawaii, Porto Rico, and other outlying possessions, and to safeguard the overseas movements of such forces.

SECTION X

DEFENSE REQUIREMENT

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans will be based on the following Categories of Defense for the frontiers in question:

a. North Atlantic Coastal Frontier: Category D, possibly subject to major attack.

b. Great Lakes Coastal Frontier: Category E for air, probably subject to major attack; for land and water Category B, possibly subject to minor attack, but with the defense extended to include offensive operations in adjacent CRIMSON territory as envisaged in paragraph 3 of Section VII.

c. Southern Coastal Frontier: Category B, possibly subject to minor attack.

d. Pacific Coastal Frontier: Category F for Alaska, may be subject to minor attack, but cannot be provided with defense forces; otherwise Category B, possibly subject to minor attack.

2. The local defense practicable for Guam and Samoa will be only that locally available on M-Day. The local defense initially practicable for the Virgin Islands - Porto Rico area will be only that locally available on M-Day. The Army will prepare to reinforce Porto Rico by a 155 mm. gun regiment when mobilization has progressed sufficiently to make a unit available.

(Changes No. 2, J.B.No. 325 (Serial No. 549))

a. Provision of the necessary Naval forces for the seizure of Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Bermuda.

b. The Navy Department shall further be prepared:

(1) To transport and protect the Army Expeditionary Force in case an overseas expedition against Halifax is directed.

(2) To transport and protect any Army expeditionary forces which may be sent to Jamaica, the Bahamas, Bermuda, and other ~~and~~ West Indian and Central American possessions.

(3) To furnish the vessels required on D-Day and thereafter for the transportation of Army reinforcements to Panama, Hawaii, Porto Rico, and other outlying possessions, and to safeguard the overseas movements of such forces.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans will be based on the following Categories of Defense for the frontiers in question:

a. North Atlantic Coastal Frontier: Category D, possibly subject to major attack.

b. Great Lakes Coastal Frontier: Category E for air, probably subject to major attack; for land and water Category B, possibly subject to minor attack, but with the defense extended to include offensive operations in adjacent CRIMSON territory as envisaged in paragraph 2 of Section VII.

c. Southern Coastal Frontier: Category B, possibly subject to minor attack.

d. Pacific Coastal Frontier, including Alaska: - Category B, possibly subject to minor attack.

2. The local defense practicable for Guam and Samoa will be only that locally available on D-Day. The local defense initially practicable for the Virgin Islands - Porto Rico area will be only that locally available on D-Day. The Army will prepare to reinforce Porto Rico by a 155 mm. gun regiment when mobilization has progressed sufficiently to make a unit available.

SECTION XI.

ARMY PLANS - RED

1. The War Department shall have prepared the Army Plans necessary for carrying out all the provisions of this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - RED, which in any way apply to Army activities, and such Plans shall include:

a. The mobilization, organization, equipment, supply and concentration of the forces stipulated in Section IX of this Plan.

b. Making completely effective the provisions of the War Department General Mobilization Plan, with such provisions as the War Department may direct for the use of forces not required by the provisions of this Joint Plan, in carrying out the Army Mission and Joint Decisions and Operations required thereunder.

c. The establishment, maintenance and operation of all Ports of Embarkation for Army personnel, animals, equipment and supplies.

d. The maintenance at, or near, Ports of Embarkation of adequate reserves of equipment and supplies for such Army forces as may form a part of joint overseas expeditions.

e. The construction and maintenance at such bases as may be established in CRIMSON and other RED territory, of necessary Ports of Debarcation, Army Supply Depots, Army Personnel Depots, and Hospitalization for Army troops.

SECTION XII.

NAVY PLANS - RED

1. The Navy Department shall have prepared the Navy Plans necessary for carrying out all the provisions of this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - RED, which in any way apply to Navy activities, and such Plans shall include:

a. The mobilization, concentration, equipment, supply and maintenance of the forces stipulated in Section IX of this Plan.

b. Provision for all other Naval Operations that are considered by the Navy Department necessary to accomplish the Navy Mission and the Joint Decisions and Operations required thereunder.

c. Provision for the augmentation of the Navy, including Naval aviation, and of the Merchant Marine by the maximum effort in new construction.

SECTION I

ARTICLE I

1. The War Department shall have prepared the Army Plans necessary for carrying out all the provisions of this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - RED, which in any way apply to Army activities, and such Plans shall include:

a. The mobilization, organization, equipment, supply and concentration of the forces stipulated in Section IX of this Plan.

b. Making completely effective the provisions of the War Department Mobilization Plan - 1933, with such provisions as the War Department may direct for the use of forces not required by the provisions of this Joint Plan, in carrying out the Army Mission and Joint Decisions and Operations required thereunder.

c. The establishment, maintenance, and operation of all Ports of Embarkation for Army personnel, animals, equipment and supplies.

d. The maintenance at, or near, Ports of Embarkation of adequate reserves of equipment and supplies for such Army forces as may form a part of joint overseas expeditions.

e. The construction and maintenance at such bases as may be established in GREECE and other RED territory, of necessary Ports of Debarkation, Army Supply Depots, Army Personnel Depots, and Hospitalization for Army troops.

SECTION II

NAVY PLANS - RED

1. The Navy Department shall have prepared the Navy Plans necessary for carrying out all the provisions of this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - RED, which in any way apply to Navy activities, and such Plans shall include:

a. The mobilization, concentration, equipment, supply and maintenance of the forces stipulated in Section IX of this Plan.

b. Provision for all other Naval Operations that are considered by the Navy Department necessary to accomplish the Navy Mission and the Joint Decisions and Operations required thereunder.

c. Provision for the augmentation of the Navy, including Naval aviation, and of the Merchant Marine by the maximum effort in new construction.

d. The procurement, operation and protection of all vessels required for the Halifax overseas expedition, in case this expedition is directed, and of all other joint overseas expeditions, including the movement overseas of all supplies and reinforcements therefor and the evacuation to the UNITED STATES of Army personnel.

e. The procurement, operation and protection of all vessels required on and after May for the supply and reinforcement of Army overseas garrisons, including the evacuation to the UNITED STATES of Army personnel.

SECTION XIII

ALLOCATION AND PROCUREMENT OF MATERIALS AND SUPPLIES

1. The requirements of the Army and of the Navy in equipment, supplies, munitions and other material necessary to support this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - HED, shall be determined for each Service by its own appropriate agency or agencies. When determined, these requirements shall be forwarded to the Army and Navy Munitions Board for coordination.

2. Based upon the requirements so determined, each of the various procurement agencies of the War Department and of the Navy Department shall prepare suitable plans for the procurement of the equipment, supplies, munitions and other material for whose supply it is responsible, and shall ascertain the industrial plants or other facilities which it requires, or whose output it requires, for the successful execution of its plans. Application will then be made to the Army and Navy Munitions Board for allocation to the Department to which the planning agency belongs of the plants, facilities or output which the agency has ascertained that it requires. In making this ascertainment the agencies of the two Departments shall consult freely with each other and shall endeavor by mutual agreement to make such a division of plants, facilities and output between the War Department and the Navy Department as will avoid conflict between the procurement plans for the Army and for the Navy and reduce to a minimum the difference presented to the Army and Navy Munitions Board to be harmonized.

3. In the preparation of procurement plans, or of provisions for procurement in other plans, and in the allocation of facilities and the output of industrial plants, or of industrial plants if necessary, to the Army and Navy for a RED war, the logistic support of the forces stipulated in this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - RED, shall govern.

4. The primary consideration in the preparation of these procurement plans, or of provision for procurement in other plans, and in the allocation of facilities and the output of industrial plants, or of the industrial plants if necessary, shall be to meet the requirements of the War Department and of the Navy Department for the mobilization, equipment, supply, maintenance and security of the forces stipulated in this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - RED, at the times specified therein.

5. If the aggregate demand for any item of delivery at any specified time is greater than the quantity which the industry can furnish at that time, then the less important part of this aggregate must yield and accept a later delivery. In such a contingency, the essential initial requirements for the Principal Theaters of Operations shall be met first.

6. In the allocation of facilities and the output of industrial plants, or in the allocation of industrial plants if necessary, there shall be allocated to the Navy such facilities and the output of such industrial plants as are necessary for the successful execution of the plans of the Navy for the conversion, alteration, repair, construction and equipment of all types of vessels. The Navy shall furnish the Army with such vessels as are required by the Army to make effective approved Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans, and for other necessary purposes.

SECTION XIV

SUPPORTING LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

1. During the preparation of the Army Plans - RED, and the Navy Plans - RED, the War Department and the Navy Department shall have prepared by the appropriate agencies, drafts of legislation, Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders, affecting both the Army and Navy, deemed necessary at any time, in order to make effective the provisions of this JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - RED, and of any and all Plans, or Programs, based upon or supporting this Joint Plan. These drafts shall be transmitted through official channels to The Joint Board for consideration in connection with the Supporting Legislative Program for a RED war.

2. After coordination, all such drafts as relate in any way to the allocation and procurement of material and supplies shall be further transmitted by The Joint Board to the Army and Navy Munitions Board for formulation into a suitable legislative program which will enable the allocation and procurement program for a RED war to be put into effect. Such of these drafts as do not relate to the allocation and procurement of material and supplies will be formulated by The Joint Board into a legislative program.

3. Upon the completion of the legislative program formulated by the Army and Navy Munitions Board it shall be referred to The Joint Board before submission to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, and shall be returned by The Joint Board to the Army and Navy Munitions Board with such recommendations as are considered pertinent from a military viewpoint.

4. Each Board in submitting recommendations for the Supporting Legislative Program shall include recommendations as to the assignment of responsibility to the War Department and to the Navy Department for securing the enactment or promulgation of each item of the legislative program.

5. The items approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy shall constitute the Supporting Legislative Program. The Army and Navy Munitions Board and the Joint Board shall each be notified of the approval of each item of this Program. The Supporting Legislative Program shall consist of two parts:

PART ONE, containing drafts of legislation, Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders, the enactment of which should be sought during peace;

PART TWO, containing drafts of legislation, Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders, the enactment or promulgation of which will be necessary when mobilization is ordered, or when war is declared.

SECTION IV

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW

1. It is assumed that a Selective Service Act, embodying the fundamental principles of the Selective Service Act passed during the World War and included in the proposed Selective Service Act approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, will be enacted on M-day and that the Selective Service organization will have to be completed and the personnel instructed after the Act is passed; and that the Selective Service System will begin to deliver men by M + 30 Day.

2. Until the first call under the Selective Service Law is issued, each Service shall procure recruits through voluntary enlistment. To avoid unnecessary interference with each other and with essential industry, the following general principles will govern recruiting:

a. The Army will not accept recruits from the maritime and ship building trades.

b. Neither Service will accept recruits from the airplane building industry.

c. A Board, which shall consist of one Army officer, one Naval officer, and one civilian or official of another Department of the Government, to be designated by the President, will, beginning on M-Day, coordinate the recruiting programs of both Services and the needs of essential industries. This Board will be discontinued after the beginning of the operation of the Selective Service Law.

SECTION XVI

MEASURES REQUIRING COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

1. There are a number of important subjects which require active measures to be undertaken in cooperation with other Departments of the Government before and during war. While all of these subjects

are of interest to the Army and Navy as necessary for the successful prosecution of a war, there are certain ones in which the War Department and the Navy Department have a paramount interest, while some one or more of the other Government Departments will necessarily have a greater amount of activity, and consequently a closer interest, in certain other subjects.

2. In order that the necessary cooperation may be possible of attainment immediately when required, and that plans or programs for the initiation of active measures by all the Government Departments concerned may be available upon an emergency, the War Department and the Navy Department jointly:

a. Shall have studies made, and plans or programs developed and prepared therefrom for the initiation of active measures to be made effective during a period of strained relations with RED, or upon the outbreak of and during a war with RED, of the following subject in which they have a paramount interest in time of war, and shall include in these plans or programs the measures necessary and which shall be requested to be undertaken by all other Government Departments or Agencies whose cooperation is essential or desirable:

- (1) The Intelligence Service required throughout the war, including espionage and counter-espionage;
- (2) The censorship of communications and the press;
- (3) The regulations for declaration of contraband;
- (4) The mobilization of the resources of the UNITED STATES to an extent sufficient to prosecute the war from the beginning of hostilities, or the declaration of war; the legislation necessary to empower the President to mobilize and control those resources; and the organization required to make such legislation effective.

b. Shall have studies made, and tentative plans or programs developed and prepared therefrom as proposed bases for the initiation of active measures by other Departments or Agencies of the Government concerned therein to be made effective during a period of strained relations with RED, or upon the outbreak of and during a war with RED, of the following subjects in which some one or more of the other Government Departments would normally have a considerable interest in time of war, and which require initial action as well as cooperation by such Departments:

- (1) The exertion of economic and financial pressure, including exclusive purchase, against RED in all parts of the world;
- (2) The exertion of pressure upon neutral nations to prevent the supply to RED of any means of waging war;
- (3) The stoppage of all RED-UNITED STATES trade;

- (4) The maintenance of UNITED STATES essential foreign trade;
- (5) The treatment of enemy merchant vessels in UNITED STATES ports upon the outbreak of war;
- (6) The control of enemy aliens and of enemy property in UNITED STATES territory;
- (7) The publicity measures required in support of the war at home and abroad, especial attention being devoted to Latin-America.
- (8) Such additional measures as study may indicate as necessary or desirable.

3. The plans or programs required by the preceding paragraph will, when approved by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, be placed in the custody of the War Department or the Navy Department in accordance with the following list, and the Department having such custody will be responsible for the proper presentation of such plans or programs to the Chiefs of the other Government Departments concerned, for their consideration, approval and action, at such time or times as the Secretary of the respective Department in whose custody they rest may consider advisable:

- a. In the custody of the War Department:
 - (1) The Intelligence Service required;
 - (2) The censorship;
 - (3) The mobilization of resources;
 - (4) The exertion of economic and financial pressure;
 - (5) The control of enemy aliens;
 - (6) The publicity measures required.
- b. In the custody of the Navy Department:
 - (1) The regulations for the declaration of contraband;
 - (2) The exertion of pressure upon neutral nations;
 - (3) The stoppage of all BLD-UNITED STATES trade;
 - (4) The maintenance of UNITED STATES essential foreign trade;
 - (5) The treatment of enemy merchant vessels.

SECRETARY
FROM 1745
Navy Department Building

THE JOINT BOARD
JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

JNB-CD

~~SECRET~~

4 February 1969

DECLASSIFIED BY:
NOS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 4-3-67-74

From: Navy Members, Joint Planning Committee
To : The Joint Board
SUBJECT: The Red Estimate of the Situation and Red Plan.

1. The Navy Members of the Joint Planning Committee have read over the Red Estimate of the Situation and the Red Plan as prepared by the Army Members of the Joint Planning Committee, but have not had the requisite time for proper consideration of the subject.

2. Due to the priority given the Orange Plan and to the fact that all the Navy Members of the Joint Planning Committee have been continually occupied in completing the Navy Basic Plan, Orange, it has been impracticable for any constructive comment or recommendations to be submitted by the Navy Members to the Joint Board.


W. J. HORNE,
CAPTAIN, U. S. NAVY.

455
FEB 4 1969

J.B. No. 325 (Serial No. 486).

SECRETARY
JOINT BOARD
JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON

THE JOINT BOARD
JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~


December 18, 1929.

From: Joint Planning Committee.
To: The Joint Board.

1. There is submitted herewith a Joint Estimate of the Situation BLUE - RED and based on that Estimate a Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - RED.

R. S. Pratt
R. S. PRATT,
Lieut. Colonel, U. S. Army.

W. T. Tarrant
W. T. TARRANT,
Captain, U. S. Navy.



DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 4-3-84

REAR ADMIRAL STANDLEY

SECRETARY
JOINT STAFF
NAVY DEPARTMENT BUILDING

THE JOINT BOARD

WASHINGTON

J.B.No. 325
(Serial No. 435)

APR 18 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE:

The Red Plan (Serial No. 435) is returned for further consideration in accordance with the action of The Joint Board at its last meeting as follows:

"The Red Plan (Serial No. 435) was next taken up for consideration. The Chief of Staff drew attention to paragraph 12 on page 55 relative to declaration of contraband. After discussion it was agreed that this paragraph should stand as written. The Chief of Staff then questioned the necessity for the provision of 70,000 Marine Corps Forces (Paragraph 2, page 57). Rear Admiral Taylor questioned paragraph 2-2, page 52, and suggested the omission of the word "joint", as relating to operations. After discussion the Board directed that the Red Plan be returned to the Joint Planning Committee for further study and recommendation upon these points."

JANVIS BUTLER,
Secretary.

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 4-7-74

~~SECRET~~

SECRETARY
PAGE 1740
NAVY DEPARTMENT BUILDING

THE JOINT BOARD
JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON

*May 3
April 3*, 1930.

From: The Joint Planning Committee.
To: The Joint Board.
Subject: Joint Basic Plan - Red.

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE *4/26/74*.....

1. As directed by The Joint Board, the Joint Planning Committee has reconsidered certain phases of Joint Basic Plan - Red, and recommends that:

a. Paragraph 8 g, Section VII (Page 68) be changed to read:

"g. Operations, when forces become available, to seize and to hold (1) Trinidad, (2) St. Lucia, and (3) other RHD West Indian and Central American possessions."

b. Paragraph 8, Section IX (Page 67) be changed to read:

"8. The Navy Department shall mobilize for the maximum effort and shall make available for active operations all Naval forces, active and inactive, Regular and Reserve, including the Air and Marine Corps components thereof and the Coast Guard forces, aggregating a total personnel strength of approximately 425,000, from which shall be provided:"

c. Paragraph 8 g, Section IX (Page 68) be changed to read:

"g. Provision of the necessary Naval forces for the seizure of Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Bermuda."

435-1

THE JOINT BOARD

MAY 3 1930

WAR & NAVY DEPARTMENTS

~~SECRET~~

4. Paragraph 3 a (2), Section II (Page 28)
be changed to read:

"(2) To transport and protect any
Army expeditionary forces which may be sent to
Jamaica, the Bahamas, Bermuda, and other R&D
West Indian and Central American possessions."

5. The change recommended in Paragraph 1 a changes
"Joint Operations" to "Operations". This is in accordance with
a suggestion made at the last meeting of The Joint Board, and
makes this provision more flexible. The operations contemplated
in this paragraph may not be joint operations; their character
will depend upon the situation at the time.

5. The change recommended in Paragraph 1 b deletes
the provision for a 70,000 Marine Corps force and provides a
total Naval force which is 26,000 greater than the 400,000 originally
allocated the Navy when the Marine Corps was carried separately.
This 38,000 represents the present actually authorized war strength
of the Marine Corps as follows:


Authorized enlisted strength,	
Regular Marine Corps	27,400
Officers.	1,100
Reserves.	9,600
Total.	<u>38,100</u>

4. The change recommended in Paragraph 1 c makes this
subparagraph agree in form with the other subparagraphs of Paragraph
2, Section II, and leaves it to the Navy Department to determine the
character of operations in case it is decided that the Navy shall con-
duct operations against R&D in this area.

5. The change recommended in Paragraph 1 d makes this
provision more flexible, in line with the change recommended in Para-
graph 1 a. The decision as to the character of all possible operations
in the Caribbean area cannot be made prior to the outbreak of war.



R. S. PRATT,
Lieut. Colonel, U. S. ARMY.



W. T. TARANT,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

OCS 15205-115

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 13, 1930.

The Secretary, The Joint Board,
room 2743, Navy Building,
Washington, D.C.


1. The Acting Secretary of War, Mr. Davison, approved
on May 10, 1930, the following proceedings of The Joint Board:

J. R. No. 326 (Serial No. 435) Subject: Joint Army
and Navy Basic War Plan - Red.

2. These proceedings have been forwarded to The Adjutant
General of the Army for file, through the War Plans Division,
General Staff.

3. It is requested that this office be advised of the
action taken by the Secretary of the Navy on these proceedings.

W. B. Wallace
W. B. WALLACE
Lieut. Colonel, Infantry
Secretary, General Staff.



In reply refer to letter
and No.

(SC) A/6 (R) A+N
Op-120-40

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

25 May 1960

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 4 JULY 74

To: Secretary, War Plans Division
Secretary, The Joint Board
Subject: Action on Joint Board Reports.
1. The following Joint Board Report has been
approved by the Secretary of the Navy:

<u>Serial No.</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Date of Approval</u>
400	Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Rev.	25 May 1960

C. E. C. G.

THE JOINT BOARD

MAY 16 1960

WAR & NAVY DEPARTMENTS

~~SECRET~~
J.B.No. 325
(Serial No. 488)
~~SECRET~~

SECRETARY
FROM 2740
NAVY DEPARTMENT BUILDING

220

THE JOINT BOARD
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1930.

From: Secretary The Joint Board;
To: The Secretary of War.

Subject: Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Red.
Reference: (a) Joint Board report J.B.No. 325 (Serial No. 488)
SECRET of May 8, 1930.

The recommendations of The Joint Board contained in its report of May 8, 1930, reference (a), on the above subject were approved by the Acting Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy on May 10, 1930.

JANVIS BUTLER

JANVIS BUTLER.

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 4 Feb 74

~~SECRET~~
J.B.No. 125
(Serial No. 485)

THE JOINT BOARD
WASHINGTON

SECRETARY
FROM THE
JOINT BOARD
125

May 16, 1930.

To: Secretary The Joint Board;
To: The Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Red.
Reference: (a) Joint Board report J.B.No. 125 (Serial No. 485)
SECRET of May 9, 1930.

The recommendations of The Joint Board contained in its report of May 9, 1930, reference (a), on the above subject were approved by the Acting Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy on May 10, 1930.

W. H. BUTLER

WALTER BUTLER.

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JOB DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 4/30/74

In reply refer to Initiatives
and No.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON

Op-125-CTB
(SC)A16(R)(M&N)
Serial 144.

~~SECRET~~

MAY 22 1955

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Joint Board.
SUBJECT: Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Red,
Change No. 2.
Enclosure: (A) Two copies of Change No. 2, Joint Army
and Navy Basic War Plan - Red.

1. One copy is forwarded for incorporation in
Joint Board copy of basic document; the other, for retention
in the files of the Joint Board.

J. K. TAUCSIG
J. K. TAUCSIG
Acting



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The Secretary of War.

SECRET Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - ~~1940~~, Estimates of the Situation.
Reference (a) Joint Board report J.B.Re. 386 (Serial No. 400) **SECRET** of May 5, 1940, forwarding complete final ~~copy~~ of the War plan as approved.

The Joint Board forwards herewith for the information of the War Department a copy of the Estimates of the Situation, Red. The Estimates comprise statements of fact joined to statements of opinion upon which the decisions in reference (a) are based.

G. L. BUCHER

C. V. MORSE,
Admiral, U.S.Navy,
Retired Member.

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RETURN TO JOINT CHIEFS
RECORDS SECTION, ROOM
NEW WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING

~~SECRET~~
S.B.Re. 282
(Serial No. 435)

~~SECRET~~
THE JOINT BOARD
WASHINGTON

SECRETARY
FROM THE
NAVY DEPARTMENT BRANCH

100

May 18, 1950.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

SUBJECT: Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan--Red. Estimates
of the Situation.
Reference: (a) Joint Board report S.B.Re. 282 (Serial No. 435)
SECRET of May 8, 1950, forwarding complete final copy
of the Red plan as approved.

The Joint Board forwards herewith for the information of
the Navy Department a copy of the Estimates of the Situation,
Red. The Estimates comprise statements of fact joined to state-
ments of opinion upon which the decisions in reference (a) are
based.

G. F. HUGHES
G. F. HUGHES,
Admiral, U.S.Navy,
[Signature]

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DATE 4/24/74

JOINT ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

BLUE - RED

JOINT ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, BLUE - RED.

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JOINT ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION. BLUE - RED

RED SITUATION.

JOINT REVIEW OF THE SITUATION, BLUE-RED.

RED SITUATION.

I. GEOGRAPHIC.

1. The RED Empire in extent of territory and population is the greatest in the world. It is distributed in all quarters of the globe. Its land frontiers are nowhere contiguous to those of a strong military power, except in the case of CRIMSON. The United Kingdom is the heart of the RED Empire and the existence of this Empire depends upon the maintenance of sea communications between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, Colonies, Protectorates and Mandates which make up the Empire. To protect such sea communications RED has established a system of naval bases and protected harbors along almost every important trade route throughout the world. This makes it possible for RED to concentrate naval forces to threaten the sea frontiers and the commerce of any probable enemy, while at the same time safeguarding its own. However, the wide distribution of the RED Empire and its seaborne trade tend to demand a considerable dispersion of naval forces to protect them.

2. The United Kingdom is itself vulnerable to attack by aircraft based on the European Continent, but, without an ally in Western Europe, this fact would be of no advantage to BLUE in a war with RED.

3. In a war between BLUE and RED, the Dominions of SCARLET are not subject to attack, and the military and naval forces of those Dominions would be available, in combination with other Empire forces, to attack BLUE possessions in the Pacific and BLUE commerce therein.

4. RED maintains large military and small naval forces in India and other RED possessions and mandates in the Middle East. Since these portions of the RED Empire are secure against attack by BLUE, these forces, except such as are necessary to guard the frontiers and to provide internal security, would be available to undertake operations against BLUE, particularly the Philippine Islands and Guam.

5. RED further maintains relatively large Naval forces and small military forces in Far Eastern waters and possessions. These would also be available to attack BLUE possessions and commerce.

6. The RED Dominions and possessions in Africa also are so situated as to be secure against BLUE attack, and their forces would be available to assist other RED forces. On account, however, of their relatively small white populations, such contribution would not be of great importance.

7. In a war of long duration where the bulk of the BLUE Naval forces would have to be retained in the Atlantic, the Hawaiian Islands might be subjected to serious attack by SCARLET and Indian forces or by Allied forces in case ORANGE should intervene in the war on the side of RED.

8. In the Caribbean Sea and in West Indian waters, RED has potential advanced naval bases at Jamaica (Port Royal), Trinidad, and St. Lucia. In addition RED has an outlying subsidiary naval base at

Bermuda. There are suitable harbors elsewhere within RED North American possessions (exclusive of CRIMSON) which are capable of serving as bases for small craft, particularly submarines. Notable among these are the Bahamas and the RED Leeward Islands. These harbors are important not only for the protection of RED seaborne trade, but as sally points from which to attack BLUE commerce.

9. Jamaica constitutes a serious menace to the security of the Panama Canal and to all BLUE trade routes passing through the Caribbean Sea and is the most important West Indian submarine cable communications center. Bermuda is well located to interfere with BLUE seaborne trade to the West Indies and along the BLUE South Atlantic coast. In addition it is capable of serving as bases for aircraft carriers designated to conduct air raids against BLUE vital areas. The Bahamas are so situated as to afford bases from which to control BLUE trade through the Straits of Florida and to Cuba.

10. Trinidad, St. Lucia and the RED Leeward Islands lie on the flank of BLUE trade routes to the East Coast of South America and constitutes serious threats to the integrity of BLUE commerce engaged therewith.

11. Of the RED North American possessions, exclusive of CRIMSON, only Jamaica and Bermuda are at present defended, although the defenses are neither extensive nor modern and the present garrisons are small.

12. Geographically, CRIMSON affords RED admirable bases for Naval, Military and Air Forces close to the vital area of BLUE and so situated as to provide a comparatively short line of sea communications to the RED United Kingdom, which line is not flanked by BLUE territory which could be used as a naval base. Due to the eastward projection of CRIMSON relative to the BLUE coast, a concentration of the RED Battle Fleet in CRIMSON waters, particularly in the Halifax area, would permit RED to transfer forces to CRIMSON with such freedom as to require only small detachments to safeguard such line of communications. This relative location of Nova Scotia, Cape Breton Island, and Newfoundland would render it difficult for BLUE Naval forces to attack successfully the RED line of sea communications. Ports of the Maritime Provinces of CRIMSON afford strong points from which to initiate invasion of BLUE territory, by joint Army, Navy and Air Force operations. Naval raids may be launched from these bases against BLUE commerce and BLUE vital areas. The eastward projection of these Provinces also facilitates the rapid transfer of RED air units to CRIMSON, even should BLUE have control of the St. Lawrence Valley.

13. RED also has a sea route to Hudson Bay which is easily secured as soon as RED has established naval superiority in the Western Atlantic. Port facilities are being constructed at the terminus of the single track railroad now in operation. During the short season when this route is open to navigation RED forces would be enabled to reach Central CRIMSON with greater ease and facility, provided transportation through the railroad bottle neck at Winnipeg was uninterrupted. This

route would be particularly valuable for the transfer of air units from other portions of the RED Empire to CRIMSON.

14. There are harbors with well developed port facilities on the Pacific Coast of CRIMSON, notably at Victoria-Vancouver and at Prince Rupert. These harbors have good rail communications eastward, and would afford base facilities for naval operations against BLUE Pacific commerce, especially that passing through the Straits of Juan de Fuca and with Alaska. They would be available as ports of debarkation for SCARLET forces or for ORANGE forces should ORANGE eventually intervene in the war on the side of RED.

15. Geographically, while CRIMSON provides the RED Empire as a whole with advantageous bases at such widely separated points as to invite an initial dispersion of BLUE armed forces, CRIMSON itself occupies an extremely weak position with respect to BLUE. While its territory is of great extent, all well developed parts thereof lie close to the BLUE border; hence, they are especially vulnerable to attack from BLUE. In Eastern CRIMSON, Montreal is the principal city and it is particularly vulnerable to an attack launched from BLUE territory. The reinforcement of CRIMSON forces in this region by strong RED contingents requires free use of the St. Lawrence River and of the rail lines having terminals in the ports of the Maritime Provinces. On account of the severe winter climate of this portion of CRIMSON, the St. Lawrence River and Gulf are closed to navigation for several months of each year. The great salient into Eastern CRIMSON formed by the State of Maine would provide BLUE with a base from which to conduct operations to cut communications between the Quebec-Montreal area and the Maritime Provinces, or to initiate land or air offensives against Halifax and St. John, New Brunswick, the ports best fitted for use by the major units of the RED Fleet.

16. a. The Ontario Peninsula southwest of the line Midland-Oshawa, inclusive, is the principal manufacturing area of CRIMSON and contains approximately one-third of CRIMSON'S present munitioning capacity. The denial to the Ontario Peninsula of the Niagara power and the coal imported from BLUE and the western provinces of CRIMSON would produce an immediate strangulation of its manufacturing and munitioning industries. Approximately ninety per cent of CRIMSON'S present munitioning capacity is confined to CRIMSON territory bordering and adjacent to Lake Ontario, and the Ottawa and St. Lawrence Rivers. The self-destruction of this munitioning capacity would be effected by the isolation of the Ontario Peninsula from its industrial power sources and an offensive which controls the St. Lawrence River Valley from Ottawa to Quebec. Pending the expected development of the hydro-power in the James Bay area, which development is indicated in the near future by the present rapid growth of the metallurgical operations from Sudbury toward James Bay and the interconnection of this power with the lines from the Niagara Falls area, the Niagara power is considerably more vital to CRIMSON than to BLUE. The destruction of the Niagara power facilities would have but slight effect on BLUE'S munitioning capacity.

b. For the industrial life and munitioning capacity of BLUE, the Great Lakes, except Lake Ontario, and the waterways connecting them are of the greatest importance as routes of transportation. In a war of long duration the possession of the Great Lakes transportation

routes west of the Welland Canal would be of vital importance to BLUE'S munitioning capacity. The narrow defiles of the St. Clair River, the Detroit River, the St. Mary's River, including the Sault Ste. Marie Canals, and the Straits of Mackinac along these routes are extremely vulnerable to attack both by air and by mobile artillery. The Welland Canal is of no industrial use to BLUE, therefore its disposition would be determined entirely from military considerations.

17. Winnipeg constitutes a rail bottle neck which connects eastern and western CRIMSON. SCARLET or other forces landing on the Pacific Coast of CRIMSON or on the southern shore of Hudson Bay would require the uninterrupted use of this railroad center in order to reinforce eastern CRIMSON. The vital supply of coal from the western provinces of CRIMSON passes through this bottle neck in reaching the Ontario and Quebec Provinces munitioning areas; as does also the supply of wheat and other grains raised in western CRIMSON and required in the eastern part of that country. The Winnipeg railroad center is particularly vulnerable to attack from BLUE.

18. The details of terrain and of transportation routes must be carefully studied with respect to each possible local theater of operations in CRIMSON. It seems sufficient here to mention the following:

a. Nova Scotia particularly, and New Brunswick to a less extent, contain so many lakes and rivers that successive defensive lines can be organized by CRIMSON or RED forces to cover important localities such as Halifax and St. John. Rail and road communications in these Provinces are entirely inadequate for the operation of large forces.

b. The southern shores of Newfoundland, Cape Breton Island and Nova Scotia have a much milder climate than the remainder of Eastern CRIMSON and the harbors and anchorages are rarely frozen over during the winter. In the Gulf of St. Lawrence fogs are very prevalent, and the Gulf is blocked by ice to navigation for about five months of the year. The Straits of Belle Isle are open even a shorter period of the year. In the Bay of Fundy the tidal range is extreme and the currents are so strong that the landing of troops and supplies for operations in Nova Scotia would involve unusual difficulties and would require special provisions. The coastline of the Maritime Provinces presents a continuous succession of harbors and sheltered anchorages which might be employed by RED Naval forces should Halifax or St. John not be available to them. Rail communications to such harbors are however, few in number.

c. There are three possible routes of invasion of the Montreal-Quebec area from BLUE, as follows: from Jackson, Me., to Quebec; the Connecticut River Valley from St. Johnsbury, Vt., to Sherbrooke, and thence by three routes to vital points on the St. Lawrence River; and the Hudson River-Lake Champlain-Richelieu River Valley from Ft. Ethan Allen, Vt., Plattsburg and Malone, N.Y., through Farnham and St. Johns, Quebec. These routes each contain a primary highway and a railroad. The Richelieu River is navigable for small steamers and connects by Lake Champlain and canal

to the Hudson River.

1. The country in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie is sparsely populated, and that north of the border is generally poorly developed.

2. On the Pacific Coast, Vancouver, and, to a less extent, Prince Rupert, have adequate water and rail communications with the other parts of CALMSON and would be available for use as ports of disembarkation for any reinforcements which CRIMSON might receive by way of the Pacific Ocean.

II. POLITICAL.

NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS.

19. The RED race is essentially homogeneous, more or less pliant, but determined and persistent when once committed to a policy, and is noted for its ability to fight to a finish.

20. On the other hand, the RED Empire is essentially heterogeneous, being composed of peoples of nearly every color, race and religion. Dissident factions are numerous and revolutionary groups are known to exist. Some of the colored races however come of good fighting stock, and, under white leadership, can be made into very efficient troops.

NATIONAL POLICIES.

21. The government of RED is well suited for war making, the cabinet ruling the state in the name of the Sovereign by virtue of its control of Parliament. The government is subject to change as a whole only through failing to command the support of Parliament or by defeat in a general election of the party to which it belongs. In future wars, as in the World War, it is probable that the Prime Minister will be advised on all war policies by a small group of the cabinet known as the "War Cabinet". It is believed that in war, there is no greater likelihood of a major change in the government than there is in the case of BLUE. The Prime Minister and the cabinet of the United Kingdom to all intents and purposes dictate the policy of the RED Empire as a whole, although, in certain major foreign policies the self-governing Dominions are consulted.

22. Based upon the fundamental understanding by all RED citizens of the vital character of RED trade and the necessity for its protection and of the evident necessity for keeping the war away from RED territory, the cabinet is unlikely to find any difficulty in obtaining appropriations for making preparation for a foreign war should it be deemed vital to RED commercial interests. Propaganda to such ends would be intensive and thorough. The solidarity of the RED race in cases dealing with national interests is proverbial where a foreign government is concerned.

23. While there has been no act of Parliament since the World War designed to produce national plans for war, it is believed that the lessons of the War have been digested and the Chiefs of Staff of the three fighting services may be assumed to have well considered war plans for the conduct of any probable war ready at any time to present to the Prime Minister.

24. It may be taken for granted that no RED government will undertake to commit the Empire to a major war unless it is assured of the full support of the labor elements of the United Kingdom. Since the laboring class constitutes four-fifths of the population, its support is essential to success in war.

25. In the Irish Free State, while the irreconcilable elements are no longer in position to interfere with the policy of the State, it is believed that Irish support of RED in a war with BLUE will be far from unanimous and the internal security of this Dominion will be a matter of concern to RED. On the other hand, on account of the economic situation it is believed that this Dominion will remain loyal to the Empire.

26. In the Dominions of SCARLET, while feeling against BLUE is not likely to be pronounced, it is believed that the principle of Empire solidarity will prevail. However, in case ORANGE should intervene in the war on the side of RED, these Dominions will probably insist upon guarantees of their paramount interests in the South Seas and their participation in any territorial readjustments that may take place after the conclusion of the war.

27. In the Dominion of South Africa, Imperial feeling is divided; however, support of RED in a war with BLUE by this Dominion will probably be of small importance.

28. In India, and, generally, throughout RED possessions, protectorates and mandates in the Near and Middle East, unrest is always prevalent, but it is believed that RED will be able to maintain sufficient forces in these regions to suppress promptly any uprising as well as to repel attacks on the frontiers by the warlike tribesmen.

29. In CRIMSON, Imperial feeling is strongest in British Columbia, and quite strong in the Maritime Provinces, Newfoundland and Ontario. It is weakest in the Prairie Provinces (exclusive of Manitoba). In Quebec Province, CRIMSON feeling, rather than Imperial feeling, is strong. However, it is estimated that in the event of war between RED and BLUE, local feeling would have little effect and the CRIMSON Provinces would take united action.

30. The possibility that CRIMSON may declare neutrality, which under the rather loose constitution of the RED Empire (or, rather, RED Commonwealth of Nations), the Dominion is in a position to do, should receive careful consideration. Such action on the part of CRIMSON would necessarily involve permanent or temporary secession from the Empire, but there are several reasons why such step appears to be advantageous to CRIMSON. Not only is this Dominion more closely bound by commercial, financial and cultural ties to BLUE than to any part of the RED Empire, but it appears inevitable, in case CRIMSON does not declare neutrality, that large parts of CRIMSON territory will become theaters of military operations with consequent suffering to the population and widespread destruction and devastation of the country as well as almost total suppression of normal trade and industry. Such action, moreover, might be considered advantageous to RED, as it would relieve the Empire of the moral obligation to defend this far-flung Dominion against the full

military strength of BLUE, and would permit concentration of RED military and naval strength against BLUE commerce and overseas possessions. On the other hand, it would deprive RED of the best suited base from which to conduct war against BLUE and would thereby bring about a limited war, chiefly maritime in character, of prolonged duration, and leading to no decisive result.

31. From the standpoint of BLUE it would appear to be advantageous for CRIMSON to be allied with RED. In this case BLUE would be free to employ her greatly superior man-power in overrunning CRIMSON and holding that Dominion to offset such losses as BLUE might suffer elsewhere. CRIMSON neutrality would be of little military advantage to BLUE, since the duration of such neutrality would always be a matter of doubt, and might be employed to protect CRIMSON during the period when the Dominion was weakest. In any case large BLUE military forces would have to be retained in readiness to advance into CRIMSON should that country enter the war on the side of RED. It appears to be almost certain that CRIMSON will not ally herself with BLUE, unless in the highly improbable event that RED fails to respect neutrality declared by CRIMSON. Unless CRIMSON goes so far as to declare her independence of RED and to ally herself with BLUE, it would appear to be advantageous not to accept such neutrality unless accompanied by guarantees. Among such guarantees BLUE should demand and insist upon occupation, until the end of the war, by BLUE military forces, of the ports of Halifax, Victoria, and St. John, New Brunswick, and of bridgeheads, in CRIMSON territory, in the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie, the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers, and of the Ontario Peninsula along the line of the Sault Canal.

32. However, it is believed that CRIMSON is more likely to remain loyal to RED and that there will be no local differences of sufficient strength to assume importance to BLUE.

33. Aside from the fact of having a common King-Emperor, the RED Empire is bound by common commercial, financial, cultural, racial and political interests and these would probably be strong enough to hold it intact in case of war with BLUE, although such war is not likely to be so unanimously supported as in the case of the Empire in the World War.

34. Because of the probability that the self-governing Dominions will be reluctant to take part in a war against BLUE, especially if initiated by RED without their consent, it is estimated that a decision to engage in such a war will be reached by the Empire as a whole, the views of the Dominions having received full consideration.

35. When it becomes apparent that war with BLUE is possible, it may be expected that RED will begin secretly to increase her military, naval and air forces in her American possessions and in Northwestern Atlantic waters, although such increase will be gradual at first. Among the first of these possessions to receive consideration will probably be Jamaica, Bermuda and Trinidad. It is likely that the garrisons in these islands will be augmented by the recruitment of local forces.

36. While, during a period of strained relations, RED would be unlikely to precipitate hostilities by the open movement of considerable land, sea or air forces to North American possessions, RED light naval forces basing on Halifax will be increased. The land elements of the defense of that base will probably be provided by CRIMSON contingents, and while it is unlikely that RED will send Air force combat units to CRIMSON at this time, CRIMSON may be expected to provide the base troops and facilities required for their reception with a view to beginning operations immediately on landing. CRIMSON may also be induced to expend her own air forces.

FOREIGN POLICY AND EXTERNAL CONDITIONS.

37. RED foreign policy is continuous and is designed to protect and advance the commercial, financial, and economic interests of the RED Empire and particularly of the United Kingdom and its seaborne trade. It is actively exerted in favor of acquirement of, or unrestricted access to, the world's supply of raw materials, and to expansion of RED commerce. RED international commitments are kept to the minimum consistent with the demands of policy. There commitments have been made, such as the Locarno Treaties, they are designed to perpetuate a status quo that is favorable to RED.

38. So far as known RED at the present time has no military alliances or agreements with any other strong power that would be of importance in a war with BLUE. As it has never been the policy of RED to enter into any major war without allies or associates, it is probable that RED will endeavor to gain such allies before engaging in a war with BLUE. On account of the many purely continental questions with which the European Powers are mainly concerned, and the opposing, and frequently hostile, groups into which these Powers are arrayed, it is unlikely that RED will be able to obtain a strong European ally which will initially be of much service to her in a war with BLUE. The most probable ally of RED is ORANGE. It would not be difficult for RED to induce ORANGE to enter the war against BLUE in view of the apparent advantages which ORANGE would gain if the war were successful in eliminating BLUE as an important political and commercial factor in the Far East. The most apparent reason that would deter RED from concluding such alliance would be the opposition on the part of the SCARLET Dominions to further ORANGE encirclement. The eventual intervention of ORANGE in the war on the side of RED is, however, always to be regarded as a possibility.

39. It may be expected that RED, prior to undertaking a war against BLUE, will make such arrangements and agreements with other Powers as will provide for the security of RED interests in Europe and will permit concentration of the bulk of RED military, naval and air forces in or about the United Kingdom, including the major portions of naval forces now stationed in the Mediterranean.

40. On the other hand, since a BLUE-RED war is bound to involve a struggle for maritime supremacy, and RED will be obliged to adopt and carry out measures of blockade involving severe restrictions on neutral commerce, it is probable that RED will soon be involved in diplomatic difficulties with other Powers. However, on account of the financial benefits likely to accrue to neutrals through supply of RED war requirements, and of RED propaganda which may be expected to be very effectively exerted against BLUE, it is unlikely that any strong Power will, in the early stages of the war, intervene on the side of BLUE.

WAR CAUSES AND WAR AIMS.

41. The most probable cause of war between RED and BLUE is the constantly increasing BLUE economic penetration and commercial expansion into regions formerly dominated by RED trade, to such extent as eventually to menace RED standards of living and to threaten economic ruin.

42. The war aim of RED in a war with BLUE is conceived to be the definite elimination of BLUE as an important economic and commercial rival in international trade. This objective is to be accomplished by destruction of BLUE merchant marine and foreign trade, and by acquisition of BLUE overseas possessions, including control by RED of the Panama Canal.

III. ECONOMIC.

GENERAL.

43. The RED Empire may be regarded as a great economic unit represented on the one hand by the United Kingdom, highly organised industrially, importing the major portion of the foodstuffs and raw materials required, and producing a large exportable surplus of manufactured goods and refined materials, which are exchanged for these imports. On the other hand are the Dominions, Colonies, protectorates and mandates which are chiefly characterized as producers of exportable surpluses of food stuffs and raw materials which they exchange for manufactured articles and refined materials. This great politico-economic unit is tied together by great Empire banking organizations, a most comprehensive system of cable and radio communication and by a gigantic merchant marine which not only carries the greater portion of the products of the Empire, but a large part of the products of the other countries of the world. To assist this mercantile system, fueling stations and ports of call under the RED flag have been provided in almost every part of the globe.

DOMESTIC.

44. The United Kingdom is almost entirely deficient in food production, being self-sustaining only in fish and certain vegetables. About 75 per cent of the wheat and 50 percent of the meat consumed, as well as a large proportion of the other grains, butter, cheese, eggs, sugar and tea are imported, the larger part of which come from other parts of the Empire although much is obtained from foreign sources.

Cereals, pork and pork products are heavily imported from BLUE, and cereals, chilled and frozen beef, mutton and lamb are imported from the Argentine. The other parts of the Empire, especially the great self-governing Dominions, are, in the main, entirely self-sustaining in food-stuffs.

FOOD MATERIALS.

45. With the exception of coal and a portion of the iron ore, practically all the raw materials required by the industries of the United Kingdom must be imported. The most important deficiencies are cotton, wood, jute, copper, iron ore, nitrates, petroleum, mercury, manganese, nickel and rubber. Of these raw materials, all except cotton, petroleum, iron ore and nitrates are produced within the Empire in sufficient quantities to meet war needs. It is believed that, through production within the Empire from sources not now economically profitable, the Empire can be made self-sustaining in war, except for cotton, for which the utilization of inferior substitutes might be forced for non-military uses.

46. Of more importance, perhaps, are those foodstuffs and raw materials required in war in quantities too large to permit storage of war reserves, and which must be obtained over sea routes most subject to interruption by BLUE. Such are wheat and nickel from CRIMSON and meats from the Argentine. With reference to nickel, over ninety per cent of the world's supply is produced by the mines at Sudbury in Ontario Province. It is believed that all other important imports can be obtained from sources and over sea and land routes not ordinarily subject to interruption by BLUE.

FINANCIAL.

47. It may be reasonably expected that RED will expand the present tendency toward the organization and support of monopolies and trade agreements designed to counter the economic competition of BLUE, and will so organize these as to stand the test of war. The RED financial structure is strong and independent of any BLUE banking interests. BLUE investments in Europe at present have comparatively little effect in neutralizing RED financial influence in that field, and the contingency that they may some time do so, is considered remote. The necessity which many European nations are now under to pay interest on large loans to the BLUE government and to BLUE private banking interests, will probably be utilized by RED to mobilize sentiment in these nations in her favor in a war with BLUE.

48. RED is financially solvent, her currency is at par, and, although heavily burdened by taxation (much of which is due to unemployment, which would not prevail in war) and by foreign debt (the greater portion of which is owed to BLUE), it is believed that RED could finance a war with BLUE. However, on account of the lack of ready capital in other European countries, foreign loans would be difficult to secure.

MERCHANT MARINE.

49. The RED Merchant Marine has a gross tonnage of 23,116,147, in 10,679 ships of 100 gross tons or over. Of these totals 22,841,639 gross tons are in 9,860 steam or motor propelled vessels. There is a total of 3,463 steam or motor propelled vessels of 2,000 gross tons or over. There are 427 tankers of 1,000 gross tons or over, having a total tonnage of 2,393,177 tons. Of the total tonnage of steam or motor vessels of 2,000 gross tons or over, 756 with a total tonnage of 4,519,121 are not over 5 years of age. Speed classification of steam and motor vessels of 2,000 gross tons and over follows:

Having a speed of 20 knots or over	42
Having a speed between 17 and 20 knots	78
Having a speed between 14 and 17 knots	370
Having a speed between 12 and 14 knots	603
Total	1,393

50. Shipbuilding is a major industry in the United Kingdom, although considerably depressed at the present time. During the year 1928, the United Kingdom and Ireland launched a total of 238 steel steam or motor propelled vessels of 2,000 gross tons or over, as contrasted with a total of 170 vessels launched in all the rest of the world, including the RED Dominions.

51. It is estimated that, in the event of war with BLUE, shipping tonnage requirements of the RED Empire would aggregate:

For Economic requirements	10,000,000
For RED Naval forces	3,500,000
Undergoing repairs and otherwise unavailable	1,500,000
Total	15,000,000

Thus leaving available for the transportation and supply of overseas expeditions, a total of slightly over 8,000,000 tons. This is considered sufficient for all probable needs.

RED TRADE ROUTES.

52. RED overseas trade routes must be maintained and safeguarded in case of war with BLUE, but no single trade route is of such importance as to require a major effort of the RED Navy to protect it, so long as RED maintains control of the Eastern Atlantic and the waters adjacent to the United Kingdom. The surest method of safeguarding all vital overseas trade routes would be for RED to gain and exercise control of the Northwestern Atlantic.

53. Of the many overseas trade routes of RED, those lying wholly or in part in the Northwestern Atlantic and the North Pacific are the only ones initially subject to attack by BLUE naval forces.

Those passing through The Panama Canal and, generally, along the coasts of Continental United States are the only ones subject to control by BLUE, but these are of comparatively minor importance. It is estimated that RED trade with the West Coast of South America can be diverted to use the Straits of Magellan which may be controlled by RED naval forces based on the Falkland Islands. This trade route is of importance for the purpose of obtaining Chile nitrates. RED overseas trade routes with China and Japan are initially subject to attack by BLUE Asiatic Naval forces. As these routes are of considerable importance to RED their protection will require a considerable diversion of naval effort until all BLUE naval forces are destroyed or effectively contained. For such operations RED naval forces have satisfactory bases at Hong Kong and Singapore.

54. The most vulnerable points along RED vital overseas trade routes are at the points of convergence, such as the English Channel, Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Cape of Good Hope, the River Plate, Colombo and Singapore, but these focal points are initially secure from BLUE attack.

55. It is probable that, in order to protect RED overseas trade routes, as well as to control BLUE seaborne trade, RED will endeavor, at the earliest practicable stage of the war, to establish naval superiority in the Northwestern Atlantic including West Indian waters, and in the Western Pacific, especially the China Sea. If successful in such operations RED trade routes could probably be protected by minor naval forces for the purposes of escort and patrol of areas adjacent to the focal points.

COMMUNICATIONS.

56. Of the total of 327,000 nautical miles of overseas telegraph cables in the world, RED owns 163,000 miles, as against 77,000 miles owned by BLUE. Of the BLUE mileage, 27,707 are laid between the United Kingdom and CRIMSON, and are therefore subject to control by RED. In addition, RED controls the world output of gutta percha which is essential to cable manufacture. By such ownership and control RED is able to dominate the world overseas telegraph cable situation. The RED-owned system provides communication between the United Kingdom and all principal parts of the Empire, including the principal outlying naval bases, and with Europe, South America, Asia, Africa and the East and West Indies.

57. RED also has provided an extensive radio communication net to include all portions of the Empire, special provision for such communications between the United Kingdom and CRIMSON, SCARLET, South Africa, and India, being made by beam radio systems.

58. Through RED'S virtual cable monopoly and world wide radio, RED is able to insure coordination of Empire effort, maintenance of economic life and efficient control of naval and air forces. At the

same time these systems, coupled with the great newspaper and press associations of the Empire, would permit RED to initiate and sustain a world wide propaganda system for the purpose of enlisting public support for RED and hostility toward BLUE in all neutral countries.

59. The interruption of the RED cable net would be difficult, but may be attempted by severing the cable between CRIMSON and SCARLET, the RED cable system in the West Indies, and as many as possible of the cables between CRIMSON and the United Kingdom. However, on account of the numerous lines, and the alternative method of communication provided by radio, the effectiveness of such operations would be questionable.

MUNITIONING CAPACITY.

60. Granted sea control and maintenance of essential sea routes without serious interruption by BLUE, RED'S ability to provide munitions required by the fighting forces cannot be seriously questioned in view of her high industrial development. During the World War RED not only provided in the main for her own effort, but made huge contributions to her Allies and Associates.

61. Reserves of munitions are not definitely known, but it is believed that they are sufficient to provide for the essential requirements of the fighting forces until such time as quantity production becomes available.

62. The RED ship and marine engine building industry is the most extensive in the world. It is efficient, well equipped, and highly organized and is capable of rapid expansion to meet RED requirements in naval and merchant ship construction and repair. In the United Kingdom and Ireland, there are a total of 143 naval and commercial dry docks capable of docking vessels over 350 feet in length. Of these 45 will take a ship 600 or more feet in length.

63. The RED Aircraft industry, particularly in the United Kingdom, is well established and could readily be expanded to meet war requirements of the RED Air Forces in airplanes, engines and accessories. Reserves of aeronautical material are believed to be adequate to meet demands until such time as the aircraft industry reaches quantity production.

IV. MILITARY.

STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION.

64. The strength and distribution of the RED Empire Army forces as of November 11, 1929, were as follows:

	<u>At Home</u>	<u>Colonies</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Note</u>
Regular Army (Excl. India)(a)	110,148	24,648	134,796	(a) Includes 5,236
Colonial and Native Ind. Cps.		2,137	2,137	Chine in excess of
Territorial Army	138,011		138,011	normal garrison.
Militia		2,140	2,140	Jamaica Detach-
Regular Army Reserve	90,906		90,906	ment numbers 827;
Supplementary Reserve	14,061		14,061	Bermuda Detachment
Reg. Army Reserve of Officers	13,983		13,983	numbers 273. Brit-
Totals	367,109	28,925	396,034	ish Army in India
				is included in
				Indian Establishment.

Australia:
 Permanent Force
 Citizen Force
 Total

New Zealand:
 Permanent Force
 Territorial Force
 Total

Union of South Africa:
 Permanent Force
 Non-Permanent Force
 Total

Irish Free State:
 Regular Army (being reduced
 to 5,000)
 Reserve
 Total

India:
 Red Army
 Aden and elsewhere
 Indian Army
 Auxiliary Force
 Territorial Force
 Indian State Forces
 Reservists
 Total

CRIMSON:
 Permanent Force
 Non-Permanent Force
 Reserve of Officers
 Reserves (Estimated)
 Total

10,000
 16,976 Aggregate Red Empire 936,441

65. CRIMSON is divided into eleven military districts, each designed to support a division and quota of auxiliary troops in war, organized as follows:

<u>Dist:</u>	<u>Area:</u>	<u>Headquarters:</u>	<u>Troops (as of Feb. 1928):</u>
No. 1	Western part Ontario Peninsula between Lakes Huron and Erie.	London, Ont.:	4,802
2	Toronto and vicinity; extends west almost to Fort William and Port Arthur; also comprises small section of Ontario opposite Buffalo.	Toronto, Ont.:	9,226
3	That part of Ontario east of District No. 2	Kingston, Ont.:	5,902
4	Montreal and vicinity	Montreal, Que.:	5,439
5	Quebec and vicinity and that part of Province of Quebec east of District No. 4.	Quebec, P.Q.:	3,844

<u>Dist:</u>	<u>Area.</u>	<u>Headquarters: Troops (as of Feb. 1928)</u>
No. :		
6	Province of Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.	Halifax, N.S.: 3,890
7	Province of New Brunswick.	St. John, N.B.: 2,273
10	Province of Manitoba; part of Province of Ontario west of and including Fort Arthur and Fort William	Winnipeg, Man: 4,376
11	Province of British Columbia; Yukon Ter.	Vancouver, B.C.: 3,862
12	Province of Saskatchewan	Regina, Sask.: 4,220
13	Province of Alberta and Territory of Mackenzie	Calgary, Alb.: 3,841
	Total actual peace strength (CRIMSON)	52,175

66. The strength and distribution of the R.E.D Empire Naval Forces at the present time are as follows:

a. Ships.

	<u>Atlantic Fleet</u>	<u>Mediterranean Fleet</u>	<u>China Station</u>	<u>America and West Indies</u>	<u>East Indies</u>
Battleships	4	8			
Battle Cruisers	4				
Cruisers	5	10	6	5	3
Destroyer Leaders	2	5	1		
Destroyers	19	36	8		
Mineslayers	1				
Minesweepers		9	2		
Submarines		7	6		
Aircraft Carriers	2	2	1		

	<u>African Station</u>	<u>New Zealand</u>	<u>Australia</u>	<u>Canada</u>	<u>Home Waters and Res.</u>	<u>Total</u>
Battleships					4	16
Battle Cruisers						4
Cruisers	2	3	4		14	52
Destroyer Leaders			1		7	16
Destroyers		11		2	64	140
Mineslayers						1
Minesweepers				4	18	33
Submarines			2		35	50
Aircraft Carriers					1	6

b. Personnel.

<u>BRANCH</u>	<u>REGULAR</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Totals</u>
Royal Navy		7,536	81,029	88,564
Royal Marines		430	9,319	10,249
Royal Canadian Navy		76	450	526
Royal Australian Navy		497	4,764	5,261
New Zealand Division of the Royal Navy		66	905	971
South African Naval Service		15	121	136

b. Personnel cont'd.

BRANCH	Officers	Enlisted	Totals
Royal Air Force assigned to Royal Navy	300	2,800	3,100
Civilian Crews of Naval Auxiliaries	255	3,900	4,155
Totals	9,174	103,788	112,962
<hr/>			
RESERVES			
Special Reserve of Engineer Officers	124	---	124
Emergency Officers	225	---	225
Royal Fleet Reserve	---	21,914	21,914
Royal Naval Reserve	1,878	7,855	9,534
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve	420	3,616	4,036
Royal Navy Auxiliary Sick Berth Reserve	---	1,275	1,275
Australian Naval Reserve	815	8,452	9,267
Canadian Naval Reserve	126	931	1,033
New Zealand Naval Reserve	45	488	531
South African Naval Reserve	60	653	703
Totals	3,458	45,174	48,632
Grand Totals	12,632	152,420	161,594

In addition to the above there are a total of 7,584 officers and 19,526 enlisted carried on the retired list and as pensioners of the Royal Navy. These would be capable of limited usefulness.

In estimating the strength of RHD Naval Reserves it must be remembered that the vast merchant marine and the large seafaring population of the RHD Empire constitute an immense potential naval reserve. In this respect RHD has a great superiority over BLUE.

67. Under an agreement which now exists between the RHD Air Force and the Navy, all floating based aviation is to be controlled by the Navy. This force is called "The Fleet Air Arm" and includes the air complement of airplane carriers and those airplanes carried on battleships and cruisers. It can be used by the Air Force only by an order of the cabinet. The RHD Navy can be considered to include the Fleet Air Arm. No force is assigned to the Army although it is the duty of the Air Force to provide observation airplanes for the Army. Such units are called Army Cooperation units. The strength and distribution of the Red Empire Air Forces are as follows:

a. RHD Air Force. (Regular)

(1) Squadrons of 10 to 12 airplanes each:

	Bombing	Fighter	Army Cooperation	Communication	Total
Home	13	12	5	1	31
Middle East	4		1		5
Iraq	4		1		5
India	2		4		6
Aden	1				1
Totals	24	12	11	1	48

(2) Flights (5 to 6 planes each) for naval operations.

Home	18
Mediterranean	4
China Station	5
Total	27

b. ND Reserve Air Force

Squadrons (10-12 planes each)

Special Reserve (Bombers) at Home	3
Auxiliary Air Force (Bombers) at Home	5
Total	8

c. Squadrons consist of 10 planes each for the twin-engine types and 12 each for the single-engine types. Naval flights consist similarly of from 5 to 6 planes each. There is a reserve of 620 planes in addition to training and experimental planes.

d. Personnel consists of 3,136 officers, 118 cadets and 25,860 airmen in the Regular Air Force. Of this total 2,762 are pilots. The Reserve consists of 1,119 officers and 10,952 airmen, of which total 1,089 are pilots. Civil aviation supports 455 pilots.

e. CRIMSON Air Force.

(1) The CRIMSON Air Force comprises 68 officers and 307 airmen and a reserve of 67 officers and 130 airmen. This force can man the four squadrons now organized but partially manned.

(2) The numerous lakes and rivers in CRIMSON have emphasized the development of seaplanes. The CRIMSON Government conducts a school for seaplane pilots at Vancouver; and one for landplane pilots at Camp Borden, sixty miles north of Toronto, where the personnel consists of 30 officers, 250 enlisted men and 100 student pilots at all times. A school for combined training of land and seaplane pilots is being organized at Trenton, Ontario, on the Bay of Quinte, to which the Camp Borden activities and installations will be moved.

(3) Air installations in CRIMSON are located as follows:

Military installations and land plane airdromes at St. Huberts and Chicoutimi, P. Q., including an airship tower at the former; Camp Borden, Toronto; Trenton, Hamilton, and London, Ont.; Brandon, Man.; High River, Alb.; and Vancouver, B. C.

Airdromes for land planes and for sea planes at: Fredericton, N.B.; Roberval, Quebec, Three Rivers, Grandmere, Montreal and Lake Osisko, P. Q.; Timagami, North Bay, Sudbury, Ottawa, Renfrew, Birch Lake, Como, Sault Ste. Marie, Orient Bay, St. Francois, Sioux Lookout, and Minaki, Ont.; Virden, Man.; Yorkton, Regina, Moosejaw, and Saskatoon, Saskatchewan; and Lethbridge, Alb.

Land plane airdrome at Winnipeg, Man.

Seaplane airdromes at: Dartmouth, N.S.; St. Huberts and Chicoutimi, P. Q.; Halifax, Camp Borden, Toronto and Trenton, Ont.; Edmonton and High River, Alb.; and Vancouver, B. C.

(4) CRIMSON is establishing an airplane industry with factories at Montreal and Cateerville, P. Q.; Ottawa and Toronto, Ont., and Winnipeg, Man. Such factories would assist materially in maintaining the air force and might allow of secret preparation for military operations under the guise of commercial development.

~~EMPIRE MOBILIZATION RATE~~

68. The following is the estimated mobilization rate of the ~~HED~~ Empire Army Forces:

<u>Date</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>Empire Except CRIMSON</u>	<u>CRIMSON</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>plus</u>	<u>days</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Divisions</u>	<u>Strength</u>
	15	537,928	27	50,000
	30	617,699	30	126,796
	60	686,899	31	161,698
	90	727,747	31	167,095
	120	739,776	31	167,095
	150	757,701	31	171,057
	180	1,279,733	44	237,119
	210	1,514,627	44	304,365
	240	1,774,384	48	351,869
	270	2,040,284	54	424,585
	300	2,307,891	60	498,408
	330	2,581,004	66	572,739
	360	2,859,208	72	649,676
	390	3,141,620	78	728,625
	420	3,434,207	84	809,705
	450	3,732,035	90	893,383
	480	4,334,439	96	893,383
	510	4,658,815	103	893,383
	540	4,974,867	109	893,383
	570	5,306,365	115	893,383

69. Under an agreement entered into at the Imperial Conference of 1926 for the purpose of defense, ~~HED~~ undertakes to mobilize seven infantry divisions and one cavalry division of the Regular Army in two weeks, and thirteen divisions of the Territorial Army in six months, while the Dominions and India obligate themselves to mobilize each their quota of the equivalent of thirteen divisions to bridge the gap between the mobilization of the Regular Army and the Territorial army. It is estimated that under this agreement CRIMSON and India would each mobilize four divisions; Australia, two divisions; and New Zealand, the Union of South Africa and the Irish Free State, one each. Due to the special situation of CRIMSON in a BLUE war, her mobilization continues to the extent of her military manpower involving the organization of eleven divisions initially.

70. RED maintains a so-called "Expeditionary Force" consisting of four infantry divisions, two cavalry brigades and a proportion of corps, army and line of communication troops of an approximate strength of 100,000 men capable of being mobilized in one week and designed for minor emergencies within the Empire. This force is included in the forces mentioned in the preceding paragraph and also has been merged into the forces mobilized under the table.

71. The Table is based upon the early mobilization of the existing forces of the Empire of all categories and the raising of additional armies at the rate of 50,000 monthly by CRIMSON and 200,000 monthly by the remainder of the Empire, these forces beginning to appear at M plus 180 Day. Both CRIMSON and Empire figures include replacements. Mobilizations as indicated in the Table show initially 27 divisions in the Empire, exclusive of CRIMSON, which, it will be noted, is in excess of the mobilization agreement, and is accounted for by additional troops in India actually mobilizable into divisions.

72. Of the white population of the Empire, 66,000,000, about 8,600,000 comprise her military manpower. Of the colored races it is estimated that not more than 2,000,000 will be utilized, thus making her total military manpower 10,600,000. Of this total, 400,000 will be needed for the naval forces, thus leaving available 10,200,000 for the Army and the Air Force.

NAVY MOBILIZATION RATE

73. It is estimated that the RED Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleet and the North American and West Indies Squadron will be concentrated, upon mobilization, into a Grand Fleet. It is further estimated that the Australian, New Zealand, China, and South African Squadrons will be concentrated, upon mobilization, into an Asiatic Fleet. Assuming Grand Fleet concentration at Channel Ports and Asiatic Fleet concentration at Singapore, the following table shows the estimated mobilization rate of the RED Naval Forces:

A. GRAND FLEET:

Date (Note)	BB	CG	CV	CL	DL-DD	SS	CM	
M-Day	6	3	3	5	19	28	1	NOTE (1) Additional destroyers if laid
M-Plus 5 Day	13	3	5	15	55	28	1	
M-Plus 10 Day	13	3	5	20	82	35	1	down on M-Day, will
M-Plus 15 Day	13	3	5	26	86	41	1	begin to be complete
M-Plus 20 Day	13	3	5	26	86	42	1	on M-Plus 240 Day.
M-Plus 30 Day	14	3	5	36	90	44	1	
M-Plus 45 Day	14	3	5	37	135	44	1	NOTE (2) Additional
M-Plus 60 Day	15	4	5	37	139	46	1	cruisers, if laid
M-Plus 75 Day	15	4	5	38	139	46	1	down on M-Day will
M-Plus 90 Day	16	4	5	38	143	52	1	begin to be complete
M-Plus 105 Day	16	4	5	39	143	52	1	on M-Plus 450 Day.
M-Plus 120 Day	16	4	5	39	144	52	1	NOTE (3) Additional
M-Plus 150 Day	16	4	5	40	144	52	1	submarines, if laid
M-Plus 180 Day	16	4	5	40	155	52	1	down on M-Day, will
								begin to be complete
								on M-Plus 480 Day.

Date	CL	ATLANTIC FLEET.				
		CV	DL-DB	BS	AV	
M-Day	1	5	1	9	6	0
M-Plus 5 Day	1	8	1	9	6	0
M-Plus 10 Day	1	10	1	9	6	0
M-Plus 15 Day	1	12	1	12	6	1
M-Plus 20 Day	1	14	1	12	8	1
M-Plus 25 Day	1	15	1	21	8	1
M-Plus 40 Day	1	16	1	21	8	1

On account of the vital bearing which the mobilization rate of the RED Navy has upon the probable employment of the RED Army and RED Air Force, a detailed analysis of the probable mobilization of the RED Naval Forces is appended to this estimate, marked ANNEX "B".

NOTE: See ANNEX "A" for explanation of nomenclature of vessels and aircraft.

AIR FORCE MOBILIZATION RATE

74. The following is the estimated mobilization rate of the RED Empire Air Forces.

Date M plus days	Land-based Squadrons	Fleet Air Arm	
		Flights	
0	42	1	27
15	52	1	27
30	59	1	27
60	74	1	35
90	92	1	43
120	92	1	44
150	92	1	44
180	107	1	44

75. The Regular Air Force is maintained in readiness for war and stands mobilized. This force is augmented by the mobilization of the Special Reserve and Auxiliary Air Force Squadrons on M plus 30, by the organization of the Air Force Reserve into squadrons on M plus 60 and M plus 90 and by the organization of new squadrons the first appearing on M plus 180 days. Four squadrons appearing on M plus 15 days are CRIMSON. A number of squadrons and flights have peace-time duties which will continue in war. These units will therefore not be available for combat.

76. The above estimate for the mobilization of the Red air power is believed to be very conservative. A monthly average rate for plane production was used in the table as follows: M to M plus 180 days, 296; M plus 180 days to M plus 360 days, 725; after M plus 360 days, 1500. The following table shows some factors governing RED's capacity to organize new air forces:

	Present	M plus 180	M plus 360
	days	days	days
Monthly plane production	232	1	1
Expanded war production normal (monthly)	620	1	1200
Preference given to aircraft production (monthly)	1600	1	3000

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING RED CONCENTRATIONS.

77. On account of the necessity of affording internal and external security for the whole of the RED Empire, including RED overseas trade routes, even under the most favorable political conditions that are likely to exist, it will be impracticable for RED to concentrate and maintain all of the above listed Empire military, naval and air forces upon the North American Continent, or within Northwestern Atlantic Waters.

78. It is however estimated that RED will not feel compelled to maintain such large forces within the United Kingdom, Ireland, India and Egypt as were kept in these regions during the World War. A small proportion only of the RED Naval Forces will have to be maintained in European Waters to safeguard trade routes and to protect against BLUE naval raids.

79. It is estimated that RED will begin to develop large army and air forces in CRIMSON only when the situation at sea is such that reestablishment for transports may be expected in the Western Atlantic. When this situation will be brought about will depend on events early in the war; hence, cannot be predicted in detail. However, for the purposes of estimating the possible development of forces in CRIMSON, it is assumed that within thirty days after war begins the RED Navy will be in position to assure an uninterrupted line of overseas communications between CRIMSON and the United Kingdom. It is further assumed that RED has been able to conclude such alliances and agreements that RED will not fear attack by any European power or group of powers.

ARMY DEVELOPMENT IN CRIMSON.

80. Based on the foregoing general considerations, a table showing the development of Army forces in CRIMSON has been prepared and appears in paragraph 51. The following remarks apply to that Table:

a. The total forces shown at any given date are the number in CRIMSON available for field service on that date, and the difference between this number and the total shown for the last previous date is the increase in available forces during the thirty day period between the dates.

b. It is assumed that RED will despatch approximately eight divisions with the necessary corps and army troops under convoy escort of the RED Navy to Halifax, Montreal, and Quebec at about M plus 15 days. As these troops probably would reach CRIMSON ports very close to M plus 30 days, they would not become available for field service until some date between M plus 30 days and M plus 60 days. The table, therefore, shows that about 148,000 troops from outside CRIMSON probably will be in that country and available for field service by M plus 60 days.

c. It is assumed that CRIMSON can augment her forces after M plus 150 days by 50,000 per month in addition to replacing losses; that 620,000 represents the maximum CRIMSON effort; and that after M plus 450 days, RED must provide replacements for CRIMSON forces.

d. It is assumed that the RED Territorial Army will not become available for service in CRIMSON before M plus 210 days.

but that thereafter it will become available at the average rate of $4\frac{1}{2}$ divisions per month.

g. It is assumed that under the Imperial agreement Colonial divisions will be sent to CRIMSON as follows: four from India, two from Australia, and one each from New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and the Irish Free State.

f. Battle losses have been deducted from CRIMSON forces mobilized and from other Empire forces sent to CRIMSON.

g. With a turn around of forty days, one million tons of shipping are required to transport 100,000 men with initial equipment and two months' supplies, and thereafter, 125,000 tons are required for their maintenance. Five tons per man are required for replacements and seven and one-half tons for animals. No allowance is made for supply of men under treatment in hospitals in the theater of operations, nor for animals under treatment. For the purposes of calculation, tonnages for new armies and all replacements transported are based upon these having been furnished by HED, an error tending to increase her effort.

51. DEVELOPMENT OF ARMY FORCES IN CRIMSON (AVAILABLE FOR FIELD SERVICE)

M PLUS:	CRIMSON		EMPIRE		Total	Troops	Supply	Replacement	Total	
	Days	Forces	Divisions	(less CRIMSON)						
	Forces	Divisions		Forces	Divisions	Tonnage (2)	Tonnage (3)	Tonnage (4)	Tonnage	
15	60,000	11	—	—	60,000	11	2,150,000	—	—	2,150,000
30	120,000	11	—	—	120,000	11	2,900,000	150,000	—	3,050,000
60	120,000	11	146,822	9	268,822	20	1,700,000	336,250	431,625	2,467,575
90	120,000	11	235,797	14	355,797	25	1,150,000	445,000	340,483	1,935,483
120	120,000	11	270,587	17	390,587	26	600,000	448,750	100,242	1,148,992
150	120,000	11	287,982	17	407,982	26	—	510,000	149,342	659,342
180	170,000	11	287,982	17	457,982	26	1,000,000	572,500	—	1,572,500
210	220,000	11	387,982	17	607,982	26	4,000,000	760,000	217,342	4,977,342
240	270,000	11	687,982	21	957,982	32	2,500,000	1,197,500	497,642	4,195,142
270	320,000	11	837,982	25	1,157,982	36	2,500,000	1,450,000	529,870	4,509,870
300	370,000	11	987,982	30	1,357,982	41	2,500,000	1,697,500	563,360	4,760,860
330	420,000	13	1,137,982	34	1,557,982	47	2,500,000	1,947,500	609,240	5,056,740
360	470,000	14	1,287,982	39	1,757,982	53	2,500,000	2,197,500	651,700	5,349,200
390	520,000	16	1,437,982	44	1,957,982	60	2,500,000	2,440,500	686,780	5,627,280
420	570,000	17	1,587,982	48	2,157,982	65	2,500,000	2,697,500	771,560	5,969,060
450	620,000	19	1,737,982	53	2,357,982	72	1,500,000	2,947,500	1,104,210	5,551,710
480	620,000	19	1,837,982	58	2,457,982(1)	77	1,500,000	3,135,000	1,075,175	5,710,000

(1) Strictly speaking development of Army Forces in CRIMSON may be carried slightly further than the figure of 2,457,982 reached on M PLUS 480, but necessity for unusual requirements of coal, heavy railroad supplies, etc., make this increase extremely doubtful. It is believed that the maximum which can be maintained will have been reached at M PLUS 480.

(2) Troops Tonnage refers to the tonnage required, within that available, to transport troops with their initial equipment and supplies for two months.

(3) Supply Tonnage has reference to the tonnage needed for maintenance of supply.

(4) Replacement Tonnage is the tonnage required, within that available, to transport replacements for losses.

The tonnages shown under the above headings do not represent definite allocations of ships for the purposes mentioned, but do serve as a guide for determining what proportion of the aggregate tonnage probably will be required for the purpose indicated by the heading.

NAVY CONCENTRATION IN CRIMSON WATERS.

82. Based upon the estimate of the Mobilization Rate of the RED Empire Naval Forces contained in paragraph 73, the following Table shows the possible rate of concentration of RED Naval Forces in CRIMSON Atlantic Ports. Halifax being selected for the specific purposes of the estimate:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>BB</u>	<u>CG</u>	<u>CV</u>	<u>CL</u>	<u>DL-DD</u>	<u>ES</u>	<u>GM</u>	<u>IS</u>
M PLUS 5 Day	:	0	:	0	:	5	:	2
M PLUS 15 Day	:	13	:	3	:	6	:	57
M PLUS 20 Day	:	13	:	3	:	5	:	20
M PLUS 25 Day	:	13	:	3	:	5	:	26
M PLUS 40 Day	:	14	:	3	:	5	:	36
M PLUS 55 Day	:	14	:	3	:	5	:	37
M PLUS 70 Day	:	15	:	4	:	5	:	37
M PLUS 100 Day	:	16	:	4	:	5	:	38

Additional increments in accordance with paragraph 73.

83. In the above estimate no allowance has been made for necessary detachments to escort troop and airplane transports, train vessels, safeguarding of RED trade routes and attack of BLUE trade. These detachments would operate to reduce the above totals. It must be noted that the RED Fleet would be dependent for fuel upon a great fleet of commercial tankers, the mobilization and loading of which would, for an overseas expedition of such magnitude, require a considerable time.

AIR FORCE DEVELOPMENT IN CRIMSON

84. Based upon the assumed general considerations, the following tables show the possible development of RED Air Forces in CRIMSON, the forces shown at any given date being those in CRIMSON available for field service on that date. To these forces must be added the Fleet Air Arm when the RED Fleet is operating in CRIMSON waters or the vicinity thereof.

TABLE I

Based on the assumption that airplanes will be crated and transported to CRIMSON in cargo vessels.

<u>M plus</u>	<u>Empire</u>	<u>CRIMSON</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>days</u>	<u>(Except CRIMSON)</u>	<u>Land-based Squadrons</u>	<u>Land-based Squadrons</u>
15	:	4	4
30	:	4	34
60	:	4	45
90	:	4	60
120	:	4	78
150	:	4	78
180	:	4	93
210	:	4	

TABLE II

Based on the assumption that available airplane carriers may be used to transport the planes and combat personnel of air force units to CRIMSON immediately after M Day, the following development rate in CRIMSON could be attained without making it necessary to remove the Fleet Air Arm from the carriers. This plan will necessitate previous arrangements on the part of CRIMSON in order to receive and service HED Air Force units. The remainder of the HED Air Force is to be shipped over as cargo under the assumption of Table I, above.

M plus:	Empire (Except CRIMSON)	CRIMSON	Total
days	Land-based Squadrons	Land-based Squadrons	Land-based Squadrons
10	13	4	17
30	30	4	34
60	41	4	45
90	56	4	60
120	74	4	78
150	74	4	78
180	74	4	78
210	89	4	93

By removing all planes required by the Fleet Air Arm from airplane carriers and by using such carriers as airplane transports, the entire available land-based air force could be transported to CRIMSON territory and be in operation by M plus 15 days. Such an operation, however, would jeopardize the carriers and, while possible, is extremely unlikely.

85. Tonnages required for all movements after the initial movement are taken from tonnage not allotted to the Army. Tonnage required for the initial movement and for supply and replacement are included in the table of tonnages needed for the Army.

V. PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION.

CONTROLLING FACTORS.

86. In order to accomplish her war aims against BLUE, HED may elect to pursue any of the following courses:

a. While assuming a passive defense in CRIMSON, utilizing local CRIMSON forces, to conduct offensive operations, chiefly maritime in character, directed against BLUE overseas trade and outlying possessions.

b. While providing for a strong defense in CRIMSON by reinforcing CRIMSON with other Empire forces, to conduct offensive operations directed against the BLUE Navy, Merchant Marine, and outlying possessions, and to conduct a sustained air attack on BLUE vital areas.

c. To conduct a strong offensive from CRIMSON bases directed against BLUE vital areas, employing all available Empire military, naval and air forces.

87. The adoption of course a may be forced upon RED if CRIMSON declares and adheres to neutrality. If CRIMSON is not neutral but remains on the side of the EMPIRE, this course practically abandons that DOMINION to BLUE, since it is apparent that the weak CRIMSON forces will quickly be destroyed by superior BLUE military forces. The conquest of CRIMSON would probably be held by BLUE more than sufficient to offset probable losses elsewhere. It has the further disadvantage that unless the RED naval forces are free to use CRIMSON bases, operations against BLUE seaborne trade are likely to cause no permanent injury to BLUE, and a large dispersion of RED naval strength will be necessary to counter BLUE naval action against RED trade.

88. Course b may be adopted if CRIMSON adheres to the Empire. It has the disadvantage that it will require a major portion of the RED Army as well as a considerable part of the RED Navy on defensive Missions, and will limit Air Force operations to that part of BLUE territory within its radius of action from CRIMSON bases. The adoption of such course will undoubtedly lead to a prolonged and probably indecisive war.

89. The adoption of course c is necessary if RED is to accomplish positive results. It is the strongest of the three courses and the one, which if successful, will insure permanent accomplishment of RED war aims. It has the disadvantage that it will require RED to initiate and maintain a major effort overseas, with all the attendant difficulties of maintaining a long overseas line of communication, but it has the advantage of the initiative and will tend to throw BLUE immediately upon the defensive. Since the adoption of this course is the one having the greatest advantage to RED and is the most disadvantageous to BLUE, it is concluded that RED will adopt it.

90. The prime RED consideration must be the early invasion of BLUE to prevent the full development of BLUE power. In view of this consideration and of the superiority of RED naval strength over that of BLUE, it seems probable that RED will undertake trans-Atlantic transport of troops in force and large elements of air power prior to the destruction or containment of the BLUE Fleet and the actual gaining of control of the Western Atlantic.

91. For the invasion of the BLUE vital area, it seems inevitable that land operations will be based on the Montreal-Quebec line on account of its nearness to the BLUE vital area, the railroad facilities of this region, and the ports of debarkation securely under RED control.

92. It is probable that RED will at the earliest possible date employ her air forces in bombing operations against all BLUE industrial centers which can be reached from air bases in CRIMSON for the purpose of paralyzing BLUE industrial effort and retarding BLUE mobilization. Such an attack will force a concentration of BLUE air forces for the defense of those areas and, thus, force an air combat in which air superiority may be gained by RED and which will clear the air at other critical points. If BLUE air forces cannot be eliminated in this manner, the RED Air Force must then protect the RED naval base and Army debarking area by operations from air bases located in the New Brunswick-McNova Scotia Area.

93. It is estimated from a consideration of tactical mapping done in CRIMSON by CRIMSON personnel and the location of the vital and sensitive areas that the probable initial deployment of CRIMSON Army Forces will be approximately as follows:

Area	Infantry Divisions	Strength (all arms)
Nova Scotia	1	3,900
Quebec-Montreal	3	15,200
New Brunswick or Quebec Province, <u>in Reserve</u> for use in Nova Scotia or the Quebec- Montreal Area	1	2,300
Ontario Peninsula	1	6,000
Sault Ste. Marie	1	5,000
Ontario, Northeast of Georgian Bay, <u>in Reserve</u> for use primarily in the Ontario Peninsula or the Sault Ste. Marie Area	1	7,200
Winnipeg	1	4,900
Vancouver	1	3,900
Western Crimson; <u>in Reserve</u> for use in the Winnipeg or Vancouver Areas	1	3,600

94. It is estimated that these concentrations will contemplate defensive operations within their respective regions and offensive operations against the Great Lakes or route.

95. It is estimated that the first SCARLET troops will be transported to CRIMSON for use in the main RED effort, but that later on new armies from these Dominions and India will probably be used against BLUE outlying possessions in the Pacific.

PROBABLE INVENTIONS.

96. Based on the foregoing considerations, it is estimated that RED will assign to her armed forces missions of the following general character:

a. Mission for the RED Armed Forces:

While protecting RED Empire Territory and interests, to destroy BLUE sea power and capture BLUE outlying possessions, and, to initiate and execute, at the earliest practicable date, a direct invasion of BLUE Territory with the object of capturing or destroying BLUE vital war making industries.

2. Mission for the RED Army:

To provide for the defense of CRIMSON and other RED Empire Territory; to initiate and execute, at the earliest practicable date, with the assistance of the RED Navy and RED Air Force, a direct invasion of BLUE Territory, with the object of capturing or destroying BLUE vital war making industries; and, as soon as forces become available, to cooperate with and assist the RED Navy in the capture of BLUE outlying possessions.

2. Mission for the RED Navy:

To safeguard RED overseas trade routes and line of communications; to gain and exercise control of all sea areas now dominated by BLUE; to cooperate with and assist the RED Army and Air Force in the direct invasion of BLUE Territory; and, as soon as forces become available, to capture, with the assistance of the RED Army and RED Air Force, all BLUE outlying possessions.

4. Mission for the RED Air Force:

To gain at once air superiority at all critical points; to assist the RED Army and the RED Navy in the execution of their missions by attacking BLUE Forces in cooperation with other RED Forces; and to weaken BLUE war-making power by sustained attacks on vital war industrial facilities and on centers of governmental, financial, and industrial administration.

97. It is further estimated that the RED Armed Forces will be assigned the following specific tasks under their joint and respective missions:

3. The RED Army will be assigned the following tasks:

(1) To use the forces in CRIMSON at and shortly after the outbreak of war in the defense of the Montreal-Quebec line, Halifax, vital sections of the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence waterway system, critical points on the trans-continental railways, and Vancouver.

(2) To build up strong forces in CRIMSON as rapidly as practicable and when the situation is favorable to launch a major offensive in the form of an invasion of BLUE, directed toward vital objectives.

(3) To cooperate with the RED Navy and the RED Air Force in gaining control of the Great Lakes.

(4) To cooperate with the RED Navy and the RED Air Force at an early date in the capture of the Philippine Islands, Guam, and Samoa, and when forces become available, in the capture of the Hawaiian Islands and the Panama Canal.

(5) To raise to war strength, on or before H-Day, if practicable, the garrisons of Jamaica, Trinidad, Bermuda, St. Lucia, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

(6) To make necessary provision for the security of parts of the Empire which probably will not be involved in active operations.

b. The RED Navy (including the Fleet Air Arm) will be assigned the following tasks:

(1) To safeguard RED vital overseas trade routes against BLUE Naval attack.

(2) To seize and exercise control of the Great Lakes and to interrupt, with the assistance of the RED Army, the BLUE ore trade.

(3) To establish the RED Fleet in superior strength in the Northwestern Atlantic at the earliest practicable date.

(4) To damage the Panama Canal, with the assistance of RED Air Force, to prevent its use by BLUE Navy and Merchant Marine.

(5) To cooperate with and assist in establishing the RED Army and RED Air Force in CRIMSON and to safeguard their overseas line of communication.

(6) To destroy or contain the BLUE Main Fleet.

(7) To destroy BLUE Overseas trade.

(8) To destroy BLUE Asiatic Naval Forces, and, with the cooperation and assistance of the RED Army and RED Air Force, to capture the Philippine Islands, Guam and Samoa.

(9) To cooperate with and assist the RED Army and the RED Air Force in the invasion of BLUE Territory.

(10) Ultimately, when forces become available, to cooperate with and assist the RED Army and RED Air Force in the capture of Hawaii and the Panama Canal Zone.

c. The RED Air Force will be assigned the following tasks:

(1) To force combat with and to destroy the BLUE air forces at once, i.e., to gain and maintain superiority of the air at all critical points immediately on beginning hostilities.

(2) To cooperate with the RED Navy in safeguarding the arrival on CRIMSON territory of the RED Army.

(3) To cooperate with the RED Navy in obtaining command of the seas. (This may include joint operations to destroy the Panama Canal if the BLUE Fleet is not concentrated in the Atlantic).

(4) To assist the RED Army in the early defense of CRIMSON while awaiting the arrival of RED Army and Air Force reinforcements.

(5) To weaken BLUE war making powers by making sustained attacks on BLUE critical industrial facilities; on governmental financial and industrial administrative centers; and on transportation and communication sensitive points.

(6) To build up strong forces and prepare for joint operations in assisting RED Army and Navy forces in the accomplishment of their missions.

JOINT ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, BLUE-RED

BLUE SITUATION.

JOINT ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, BLUE-RED.

BLUE SITUATION.

I. GEOGRAPHIC.

CONTINENTAL.

1. BLUE continental geographic features are important from two viewpoints, first, as to how they would affect possible RED attempts to invade BLUE, and second, as to how they would affect possible BLUE attempts to invade RED territory.

2. Assuming an attempt on the part of RED to invade BLUE, it is probable that no part of BLUE, except that northeast of the line Norfolk-Chicago, will be the scene of large scale operations. This is occasioned by the fact that in the region indicated are highly important strategic areas and because of its exposed location with reference to operations from CRIMSON territory. Other parts may be subjected to attacks, particularly to raids by sea, land, or air. The regions in which these will most probably occur are along the South Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, and possibly in the Vancouver district.

3. The logical avenues for large hostile forces advancing on the critical area are:

a. From the Atlantic coastline between Chesapeake Bay and Boston directed westward against BLUE vital areas.

b. From Quebec and Montreal southward toward New York City.

4. The coastline near Boston can be reached by sea from Halifax in two days. Norfolk can be reached in four. A RED main expeditionary force can reach Halifax in about twelve days, and reach Boston in about fourteen days. RED expeditions overland from Halifax would have to advance almost five hundred miles over difficult terrain before reaching Portland, Maine.

5. Consideration is given in the next few paragraphs to the landing places on the North Atlantic coastal frontier which are available for large RED forces. RED will naturally select a landing place from which to operate against a port strategically important to BLUE, which port, if secured, will provide RED with base facilities and lead to success against vital industrial areas of BLUE. Such port areas are likely to be either Boston, Narragansett Bay, New York, or Wilmington-Philadelphia.

6. Suitable landing beaches for large forces may be summarized as follows: -

g. For operations against the port area of Boston.

Beach	Characteristics for large landings	Beach covered by fixed harbor defense armament	Facilities for landing heavy equipment	Facilities covered by fixed harbor defense armament	Base available at	Suitability for operations against port area
Several east of Portland	Satisfactory	No	Estuary mouths in vicinity of beaches	No	Portland	Distant from Boston and involving approach through over difficult terrain.
Cape Elizabeth- Old Orchard	Excellent	No	Docks at Portland or Portsmouth; lighter at Biddeford Pool	At Portland and Portsmouth	Advanced, Portland or Portsmouth; ultimately Boston	About 100 miles approach to Boston, with one bad river crossing but fair terrain.
Wells-York Beach	Excellent but limited in extent	No	Portsmouth	At Portsmouth	Advanced, Portsmouth; ultimately Boston	About 70 miles approach to Boston, with one bad river crossing but fair terrain.
New Hampshire Beaches	Excellent	Northern half only by Portsmouth	Portsmouth	At Portsmouth	Advanced, Portsmouth; ultimately Boston	Most suitable for approach to Boston from the north.
Salem area	Poor and limited in extent	All, except vicinity Gloucester, by Boston	Gloucester or Salem	At Boston for Salem	Boston	Too close to Boston and beaches inferior
Boston area	Many. Excellent but limited	At Boston	Boston	At Boston	Boston	Too close to Boston and difficult terrain.

(a - continued)

Beach	Characteristics for large landings	Beach covered by fixed harbor defense armament	Facilities for landing boats equipment	Facilities covered by fixed harbor defense armament	Base Available at	Usability for operations against port area
Plymouth	Excellent	No	Plymouth	No	Boston	Shortest approach to Boston from south.

b. For operations against port area of Narragansett Bay with ultimate objective either Boston or New York.

Sakonnet - Bussards Bay	Excellent	New Bedford	Docks at New Bedford; lighters at Westport and small harbors of Bussards Bay	At New Bedford	Advanced, New Bedford; ultimately Narragansett Bay	Best landing against Bay and excellent for ultimate advance against Boston.
Point Judith to Sakonnet Point	Very limited	Narragansett	Narragansett Bay	At Narragansett Bay	Narragansett Bay	Difficult unless beaches to east or west are used.
New London to Point Judith	Excellent	Western half only by Fort H.G. Wright	Docks at New London; lighters at several small ports	At Fort H.G. Wright for all except Quondochontang	Narragansett Bay	Excellent for operations against Bay and for ultimate advance against industrial New England or New York City.

c. For operations against port area of New York.

Eastern Long Island	Excellent	No	Shelter Island	At Eastern Entrance, L.I. Sound	Advanced, L.I. Sound; ultimately New York	Distant from N.Y. over easily defended terrain; suitable for preliminary operations to open Long Island Sound from east.
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(a - continued)

Beach	<u>Opportunities for large landings</u>	<u>Beach covered by fixed harbor defense armament</u>	<u>Facilities for landing heavy equipment</u>	<u>Facilities covered by fixed harbor defense armament</u>	<u>Base Available at</u>	<u>Suitability for operations against port area</u>
Western Long Island	Excellent beach but difficult approach	Limited long range by New York	New York	At New York	New York	Landing of large force with its heavy equipment involves considerable difficulty.
Long Beach - Sea Girt	Excellent when allows	Limited long range by New York	Sandy Hook - Highlands area	At New York	New York	Most suitable approach to New York; also an approach to Philadelphia.

d. For operations against port area of Wilmington-Philadelphia.

South New Jersey	Excellent	No	Shallow draft at Cape May; lighter at Egg Harbor Bay	No	Delaware River	Direct approach over rather difficult terrain for many miles inland.
Rehoboth	Excellent	No	Cape Henlopen	At Fort Saulsbury	Delaware River	Direct approach over continually narrowing area.
Ocean City, Md.	Excellent	No	Cape Charles	At Cape Henry	Chesapeake Bay	More distant approach than Rehoboth over same area.
Virginia Beach	Excellent	At Cape Henry	Hampton Roads	At Cape Henry and Fort Monroe	Hampton Roads	Primarily either approach to Washington, or as a preliminary operation to the Wilmington-Philadelphia area by taking Norfolk to open Chesapeake Bay.

7. Either because of distance from BLUE strategical areas or because of more favorable beaches better located with respect to such areas, RED landings in force are most improbable on beaches north of Wells and south of Rehoboth. Considering the remaining beaches and assuming the existing harbor defenses of the coastal frontier to be manned and adequately prepared to fulfill their missions, direct landings against New York from the Long Island shore and against Narragansett Bay are difficult, if not impracticable, because of the harbor defenses; harbor facilities for landing heavy equipment come under the fire of existing harbor defense armament except at Biddeford Pool, Gloucester, Plymouth, and Cape May; and all places suitable for bases except Chesapeake Bay also come under such fire. The defenses at the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, although not securing Baltimore and Washington against raids by enemy light naval forces, interfere with the entrance of heavy forces. Railway and tractor artillery can be used without difficulty to reinforce existing harbor defense armament and cover all places which are available for landing heavy equipment.

8. From the above discussion of landing beaches and harbor defense installations, the following general conclusions are reached: - that there are several beaches not under fire of existing harbor defense armament which are suitable for landing large forces; that there are a few places not under fire of existing harbor defense armament which are suitable for landing the heavy equipment of large forces; that mobile artillery can be used without difficulty to cover such beaches and heavy equipment landing localities; that any probable RED landing in force on the North Atlantic coastal frontier will involve RED in operations for the reduction or neutralisation of some existing harbor defense installation.

9. From a consideration, therefore, of all the factors pertaining to possible enemy landing places on the North Atlantic coastal frontier, the following conclusions are derived: A landing at Virginia Beach may give RED Hampton Roads and Chesapeake Bay from which operations against Baltimore and Washington can be undertaken, but BLUE can lose both and not be vitally affected. Landings between Cape Charles and Montauk Point, although directed against BLUE vital areas, are more difficult than those in New England. The loss of Boston, followed by a penetration of BLUE'S vital industrial area, might be the determining factor of the war. The approach to Boston from the south is but little more difficult, if any than from the north and would permit RED to use Narragansett Bay as a base and would give to RED immediate possession of a highly important BLUE industrial area. For these reasons, the landing area most advantageous to RED seems to be that to the east of Narragansett Bay.

10. An attack on the BLUE coast by RED for the purpose of landing strong forces soon after war has begun seems improbable because of the strength of the BLUE fleet as compared with that of RED, the great size of the Army forces requiring transportation, and the distance of the BLUE coast from RED home ports. It is inconceivable that RED would attempt such an operation in force unless she had sufficient control of the North Atlantic to permit her to transport Army forces to CRIMSON and had concentrated there strong Army forces to be used either as a reserve to augment an initial overseas expedition against the BLUE coast, or as an overland expedition against the BLUE vital northeastern area. Minor raids and attacks against the BLUE coast undoubtedly will be delivered in order to lower BLUE morale and to attract to the threatened area BLUE forces needed elsewhere, but attacks with a view to landing in force seem probable only as a means of threatening BLUE vital areas in rear of BLUE Army forces operating near the CRIMSON frontier or of threatening the flank of such BLUE forces; in either case, with a view to assisting major

operations of RED army forces in defense of CRIMSON or in an offensive against the BLUE vital area. With reference to a RED offensive, although it is three hundred miles from the CRIMSON border south of the Montreal-Quebec area to New York City, a RED overland expedition would have to cross only one hundred and eighty miles of BLUE territory to reach Albany where the effect on the BLUE industrial region and system of communication would be far-reaching. It is concluded that no landing in force will be attempted on the BLUE coast in the early stages of the war, but, at some later period, if the BLUE Naval forces are decisively defeated or effectively contained, that such an operation may occur in connection with overland operations from the CRIMSON frontier.

11. Operations by CRIMSON forces to control the passages between the Great Lakes at Buffalo, Sault Ste. Marie, and Detroit and Port Huron, and the important industrial cities of Detroit and Buffalo involve practically no distances.

12. Military operations on a large scale are practicable in all parts of the northeast region except in northern Maine and in the Allegheny Mountains. Natural obstacles and distances to important objectives would make a penetration through Maine very difficult. West of the Hudson River, the St. Lawrence and streams connecting the Great Lakes are critical factors from a military standpoint.

13. In the important northeastern area the winters are severe, particularly in the northern part. Winter operations on a large scale would be attended with tremendous difficulties in that region.

14. A discussion of BLUE continental features which would affect possible operations directed at objectives within RED territory may be limited to a consideration of regions from which invasions of CRIMSON are practicable. BLUE operations directed at objectives in other RED territory would be overseas expeditions, hence would be concerned only with ports of embarkation within BLUE continental limits. For the purposes of this estimate, it may be assumed that BLUE port facilities are or can be made adequate for such overseas expeditions as the resulting plan may require.

15. As already noted, the BLUE northeastern area, which is nearest the most important CRIMSON areas, is, in general, well adapted for troop concentrations and movements. Except for the northern part of Maine, this is a region with adequate communication nets, with extensive supply facilities and with reasonably favorable terrain features. The severe winter climate probably is the most unfavorable factor.

16. Westward of this region, the Great Lakes constitute serious obstacles against operations in either direction. The short rivers connecting these lakes, while strong defensive lines, offer opportunities for invasions and for the establishment of bridgeheads, particularly if prompt advantage be taken of these opportunities before the enemy has been able to prepare to make serious resistance.

17. From the Great Lakes to the Puget Sound region, the frontier generally is thinly settled and lacking in industrial facilities. While both countries have paralleled the border with efficient railroad systems, roads across the border are comparatively scarce. Except on the Pacific coast the winter climate of this border region is severe. The Winnipeg railroad bottleneck is the only objective of military importance near the border on either side. Except for a BLUE operation to secure this area, only minor operations, especially river, by BLUE or by CRIMSON forces are probable along this part of the frontier.

Such minor operations might be valuable in interrupting lines of communication and in lowering enemy morale.

18. The Puget Sound area is important industrially, affords adequate facilities for military operations, and has a favorable climate. While the adjacent CRIMSON area is not of such great importance as is the CRIMSON area near the Atlantic, operations in this region might be found advantageous and, so far as natural and industrial features are concerned, would be practicable if not undertaken on too large a scale.

19. For naval operations directed against CRIMSON ports and RED naval forces in the Northwestern Atlantic, BLUE has satisfactory bases in the Chesapeake Bay and New York-Harrington Bay areas. Boston, Portsmouth and Portland also afford bases for elements of the Fleet and are capable of serving as ports of embarkation for overseas expeditions. For naval operations in the Northwestern Pacific, BLUE has a satisfactory base in the Puget Sound area.

OUTLYING POSSESSIONS

20. Of all the outlying possessions, the one of primary importance to BLUE is the Panama Canal. Its integrity is essential to permit rapid concentration of the United States Fleet and freedom of passage for inter-coastal shipping, which, if interrupted, would throw a tremendous burdon upon the transcontinental railroads. It forms a vital link in the sea route between the Atlantic seaboard and the West Coast of South America. The position of the Canal, together with its present organized defense, reduces the probability of its being attacked initially except by small raiding forces of the RED Navy or the RED Air Force. The vulnerability of its construction makes its complete protection a difficult mission and requires large defensive forces. It is particularly vulnerable to air attack. The importance of the Canal to BLUE is heightened by the extreme importance which RED would attach to its capture.

21. Hawaii is important to BLUE as an excellent naval base from which the Central North Pacific can be controlled. Its distance from RED bases and the strong character of its defenses make an attack against it improbable except in the latter stages of a war in which RED was overwhelmingly successful.

22. The Philippine Islands are important to BLUE as a base for operations against RED commerce in the Far East. So long as BLUE Army and Navy forces remain in the Philippine Islands, control of the Northwestern Pacific will be in dispute. In order to gain control of the seas in this area, it would be of great advantage to RED to attack those Islands and to destroy the BLUE forces based therein. Operations directed toward the capture of the Philippine Islands may therefore be looked for to be undertaken at an early date in the war. RED Asiatic Naval Forces and RED Army and Air Forces in Indochina would be available for such operations. SCARLET forces, particularly SCARLET Naval Forces, might also be employed in such operations. It is probable that RED will also endeavor to gain the support of the native population by offering them independence upon conclusion of the war.

23. The Island of Guam is only of importance to BLUE as a base on the sea route to the Philippine Islands. In connection with a RED attack on the Philippine Islands, operations against Guam looking to its capture and holding as a RED naval base probably will be undertaken.

24. The possession of Samoa is of no great importance to BLUE. Samoa is situated in an area normally dominated by RED. On account of its defenseless condition, it will probably be seized by SCARLET forces (now in occupation of Western Samoa), shortly after the outbreak of war.

25. On account of the remoteness of the Territory of Alaska, its great size, limited population, and generally unfavorable terrain and climatic conditions, military operations therein are unlikely to have any great importance upon the general issue of the war. It is likely that CRIMSON forces along the Alaskan frontier will restrict operations to minor raids against BLUE towns and fisheries. It is probable that, in case RED should be successful in the war, CRIMSON will demand that Alaska be awarded to her.

26. Porto Rico and the Virgin Islands are important, but not vital to BLUE. They offer no important military or naval objectives to RED and their reduction would require military and naval forces which it is believed that RED could not make available in the early stages of the war. It is likely that minor naval raids by forces based on the RED Leeward Islands may be undertaken as diversions to compel BLUE to maintain considerable military and naval forces in these possessions to insure their safety. The ultimate fate of these possessions will depend upon the result of operations in other theaters, particularly upon the outcome of the struggle for control of the seas.

II. POLITICAL.

NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS.

27. BLUE'S national political organization is well adapted to making war. The BLUE nation is essentially homogeneous, confident, aggressive and resourceful. It, however, shares with the RED race a national antipathy toward making large expenditures for military and naval purposes during peace and therefore usually enters upon war in an unprepared state. On the other hand, despite racial affinity, common culture and similar political systems, the great majority of the BLUE nation possesses an anti-RED tradition and it is believed that the BLUE government would experience little difficulty in mobilizing public sentiment in favor of a vigorous prosecution of the war, once hostilities began.

INTERNAL CONDITIONS.

28. So far as the continental United States is concerned, BLUE'S internal situation is excellent. The only considerable minority group, the American Negro, has no political nor racial ties with any other nation and is resistant to foreign propaganda. The large number of RED citizens residing in the United States and a small number of professional pacifists and communists would be the only elements with which it would be necessary to deal internally.

29. So far as the outlying possessions are concerned, the situation is not so favorable, although considered much better than the corresponding RED situation. A strong separatist group exists in the Philippine Islands and this group would probably receive much support from RED. A separatist group exists in Porto Rico but is not believed to have much importance. The large alien groups in Hawaii would be a matter of much concern to BLUE, particularly if ORANGE should intervene in the war on the side of RED.

FOREIGN POLICY AND EXTERNAL CONDITION.

30. The foreign policy of BLUE is guided by the principle of avoidance of military and political alliances with other nations. It is primarily concerned with the advancement of the foreign trade of BLUE and demands equality of treatment in all political dependencies and backward countries, and unrestricted access to sources of raw materials. In this particular it comes in conflict with the foreign policies of RED. Traditionally, BLUE foreign policy has always been directed toward the principle of "Freedom of the Seas", as opposed to domination of the seas by RED.

31. The immigration, tariff and foreign debt policies of BLUE are unpopular in many countries and, in case of war, it may be expected that RED will exploit the feeling raised thereby to the advantage of herself and the disadvantage of BLUE. For this, and the reasons previously mentioned, BLUE cannot expect, at the beginning of the war, to have any European or Asiatic allies.

32. On account of the great importance to BLUE, in a war with RED, of insuring access to the markets of South and Central America, and to the enormous interests of BLUE in the West Indian and Caribbean Sea regions, it is of the utmost advantage to cultivate a feeling of Pan-American solidarity. The probable attitude of Latin America must thus necessarily be examined in detail.

33. The South American countries may be roughly grouped, according to prevailing public sentiment and national policies with respect to BLUE and RED, into the three following classes, in order of importance in each class:

a. Inclining toward BLUE:

- (1) Brazil.
- (2) Peru.

b. Inclining toward RED:

- (1) Argentina.
- (2) Chile.
- (3) Uruguay.

c. Having no decided preferences:

- (1) Venezuela.
- (2) Colombia.
- (3) Bolivia.
- (4) Ecuador.
- (5) Paraguay.

34. The probable attitude of all of the above countries, especially the "A B C" Nations, is of the utmost concern to BLUE. Of these latter it is estimated that Argentina, while initially declaring neutrality, will assume an attitude of hostility toward BLUE, and, on account of the predominant financial and economic position of RED in that Republic, will probably be selected by RED as the base for propaganda in South America. Chile, while inclining toward RED, will probably be less hostile toward BLUE, and on account of the great profits to be expected from her nitrate trade, will probably assume an attitude of strict neutrality. Brazil, on account of economic ties, will probably incline toward BLUE, but may be expected initially to declare neutrality. On the whole, by reason of the mutual jealousy between those nations, and their fear of each other, they may be expected to remain neutral, at least in the early stages of the war.

35. In the Republics of Central America (exclusive of Panama and Nicaragua, to be considered later), BLUE financial and economic interests are predominant and, while hostile groups exist, it is believed that, on the whole, public opinion and national policy toward BLUE. It is estimated that, on account of their military weakness, all will declare neutrality, but that such neutrality will be benevolent toward BLUE. In this connection, it may be expected that the Colony of RED Honduras, if left intact, will become a base for revolutionary groups and bandit elements hostile to the Governments favorable to BLUE established in these countries. For this reason it will be of great advantage to BLUE to seize and occupy this Colony early in the war.

36. In Panama and Nicaragua and in the West Indian Republics of Cuba, Haiti and Santo Domingo, BLUE political, military, financial and economic interests are so predominant that, regardless of the official attitude that they may take, RED probably will treat them as allies of BLUE. For this reason BLUE will be obliged to take measures to insure their internal and external security. Except for Cuba, they may all be regarded as military liabilities for BLUE.

37. The attitude of GREEN will become immediately an object of grave concern to BLUE. On the whole, while hostile toward BLUE, public opinion in GREEN is not favorable toward RED. It may be expected, however, that RED agents will be allowed to circulate freely in GREEN and that it will be the object of such agents to stir up anti-BLUE feeling, thus compelling BLUE to maintain forces along the border to provide against aggression by hostile GREEN forces. However, it is believed that economic advantages and the natural fear of European aggression in case of a RED victory will incline the GREEN government to maintain neutrality.

38. The West Indian and South American possessions of France and the Netherlands will necessarily take the same attitude as the mother countries. Hence, it is assumed that they will be neutral.

39. In conclusion, it obviously becomes a major task for the Civil Power and its diplomatic agencies to prevent any of the Latin-American Nations from affording material assistance to RED or from hampering the belligerent rights of BLUE. It is believed that utmost attention should be directed toward propagandizing these countries in favor of BLUE and toward combating RED propaganda. BLUE should be prepared to exert military and naval pressure against recalcitrant Nations of Central America and the West Indies.

WAR CAUSES AND BLUE WAR AIMS.

40. The probable ultimate causes of war between RED and BLUE have been previously estimated to arise out of BLUE competition and interference with RED foreign trade, although other proximate causes of war may be alleged.

41. It is not believed that BLUE, whom relations become strained, will be likely to take the initiative in declaring war. At the same time, RED, in order to preserve an appearance before the world as a non-aggressor, will likely refrain from declaring war on BLUE and will make every endeavor to provoke BLUE into acts of hostility. For these reasons it is considered probable that neither will issue a formal declaration of war; but, after hostilities break out, each, in accordance with its constitutional procedure, will formally recognize that a state of war exists between them.

42. It is believed that BLUE'S war aims in case of war with RED should be the expulsion of RED from North and South America, including the waters adjacent thereto, and the definite elimination of RED as a strong competitor in foreign trade.

43. On account of the great strength of RED, as well as the possibility that other nations may intervene in the war on the side of RED, the accomplishment of the above war aims will require the maximum effort on the part of the BLUE Army, Navy and Civil Power. Because of the proved tenacity of both the RED and BLUE nations in war, it is concluded that such a war will be one of prolonged duration.

III. ECONOMIC.

GENERAL.

44. BLUE is one of the greatest industrial nations in the world. Its industries are capable of producing almost every essential commodity and it produces within its own territory the bulk of the raw materials consumed. at the same time BLUE is one of the leading agricultural nations and not only feeds its own population, but has a large exportable surplus of foodstuffs. BLUE population, relative to extent of territory, is comparatively small and there is room for considerable expansion. For these reasons primarily, BLUE national wealth is the greatest in world, and the BLUE people have the highest standard of living of any of the principal nations.

FOODSTUFFS.

45. While BLUE produces in general a surplus of foodstuffs, it has no world monopoly in any single essential commodity. On the other hand BLUE lacks entirely, or produces insufficient quantities of certain foodstuffs, the chief of which are: sugar, coffee, tea, cocoa, and pepper and other spices. All of these are imported from overseas. It is known that sugar, to a certain extent, can be produced in the United States in case it were economically profitable. Other products, except tea and spices, can be obtained from Latin-American countries, if BLUE can keep the trade routes to these countries open. For tea and spices BLUE would be dependent upon neutral non-American sources.

R.W MATERIALS

46. While producing the bulk of the r.w materials consumed in industry, BLUE is deficient in certain of those that are essential to the efficient production of munitions of war. Of these deficiencies the chief are: rubber, manganese, tin, nitrates, wool, silk, hides, jute, hemp, sisal, asbestos, nickel, tungsten, chromium, vanadium, platinum and shellac. Of these r.w materials, manganese, nitrates, wool, hides, silk, chromium, vanadium, pl. tinum, and some tin and rubber, are obtainable from Latin-American. Asbestos and nickel are largely produced by CRIMSON. Unless nickel can be obtained from the SUBSIDIARY mines, a serious shortage in that important war-making material will develop in BLUE within a few months after war begins. BLUE would be dependent upon neutral non-American sources for the greater part of the requirements of rubber and tungsten and for all of the requirements of silk; also, in case the sea routes to the Philippine Islands were controlled by RED, for all the requirements of hemp. Jute and shellac, being to all intents and purposes, RED monopolies, would probably be unavailable to BLUE, and substitutes for them would be necessary.

47. BLUE produces the greater part of the world's cotton and petroleum, and a large share of the tobacco and copper. These might be employed in exerting economic pressure in the World market, but, in the case of all these commodities, there are other sources of supply and exploitable areas at present undeveloped. It would be, however, of the greatest advantage to BLUE to prevent any of the cotton and petroleum products reaching RED countries. In this connection, it would be of great assistance to BLUE to gain control of the petroleum output of Mexico, Venezuela and Columbia.

48. The status of BLUE'S supply of certain of the above mentioned strategic raw materials, as well as of certain foodstuffs of which there is a deficiency, is estimated as follows:

	Deficit from M Plus 36 Day.				
Jute	"	"	"	"	45 "
Coffee	"	"	"	"	75 "
Hemp	"	"	"	"	3 Months
Nitrates and Wool	"	"	"	"	5 "
Sisal	"	"	"	"	6 "
Nickel	"	"	"	"	7 1/2 Months
Manganese	"	"	"	"	8 "
Sugar	"	"	"	"	11 "
Shellac	"	"	"	"	18 1/2 "
Silk	"	"	"	"	22 1/2 "
Hides	"	"	"	"	"

FINANCIAL

49. BLUE enjoys probably the strongest financial position of any of the great nations and is believed to be thoroughly capable of financing a long war.

MERCHANT MARINE

50. The BLUE Merchant Marine has a gross tonnage of 14,377,114 (exclusive of insular possessions), in 4,272 ships of 100 gross tons or over. Of this total, 576 ships with a total tonnage of 2,541,938 are on the Great Lakes. Of the total sea-going tonnage, 11,036,240 is in 2,978 steam or motor propelled vessels of which 2,072

with a total tonnage of 10,450,318 tons of 2,000 gross tons or upwards. Of this latter tonnage only 52 ships with a gross tonnage of 355,266 are less than five years of age. There are a total of 381 tankers of 1,000 gross tons or over, having a total tonnage of 2,734,358. Speed classification of steam or motor propelled vessels (exclusive of Lake, and River steamers) of 2,000 gross tons or over follows:

Having a speed of 20 knots or over	8
Having a speed between 17 and 20 knots	36
Having a speed between 14 and 17 knots	90
Having a speed between 12 and 14 knots	120
Total	254

51. Referring to paragraph 49, RED Situation, the following shows, for purposes of comparison, the relation between RED and BLUE Merchant Marine:

Total Tonnage (sougoing only)	BLUE 1.0	RED 1.9
Total Tonnage, Steam and Motor Vessels	BLUE 1.0	RED 2.1
Total of above, 2,000 gross tons and over	BLUE 1.0	RED 1.9
Total of above, less than 5 years of age	BLUE 1.0	RED 12.8
Total Tonnage Tankers 1,000 tons and over	BLUE 1.0	RED 0.9
Number of vessels of 12 knots and over	BLUE 1.0	RED 5.5

52. Shipbuilding has not, in the past sixty-five years, except during the years 1917-1921, been a major industry in BLUE. The vast industry built up during the World War has been allowed to disintegrate and is not in an extremely depressed condition. During the year 1926 only a total of 57 vessels of 100 gross tons and over with a total tonnage of 86,092 were launched (excluding Great Lakes construction). During the same year 89 vessels with a total tonnage of 266,537 were lost or broken up. Measures are now being taken by the BLUE Government to rehabilitate the shipbuilding industry and the BLUE Merchant Marine, but it will probably be several years before positive results are obtained. However, based on the experience of the World War, it is estimated that by M Plus 12 Months, the shipbuilding industry could be expanded to produce naval and merchant vessels on a quantity basis although it would require until M Plus 18 Months to equal RED shipbuilding capacity. After M Plus 18 Months it is believed that BLUE would be capable of outbuilding RED.

BLUE FOREIGN TRADE AND TRADE ROUTES

53. BLUE foreign exports in the year 1927 were valued at \$4,865,375,000; imports were valued at \$4,184,742,000, which represented approximately 15.4% of the total estimated volume of international trade, a greater amount than that of any power except the RED Empire. The proportion of total volume of international trade for the RED Empire was 25.4% of the exports and 28.3% of the imports, of which the United Kingdom and the Irish Free State contributed about half of the exports and something over half of the imports.

54. Principal exports of BLUE, in order of value, were; cotton, petroleum and petroleum products, machinery, automobiles and accessories, wheat and flour, meat and packing house products, iron and steel products,

copper and its manufactures, tobacco, cotton cloth and cotton manufactures. Principal imports, in order of value, were; raw silk, crude rubber, coffee, sugar, paper pulp and newsprint, furs and their manufactures, petroleum, hides and skins, tin, and vegetable oils.

55. The value of BLUE trade with the RED Empire is shown in the following table, arranged in order of total volume of trade with the principal portions of the Empire (000 omitted, value being in thousands of dollars):

<u>Division of the Empire</u>	<u>Exports to:</u>	<u>Imports from:</u>
CRIMSON	845,015	484,094
UNITED KINGDOM	840,059	357,931
MALAYA	13,624	277,784
SCARLET DOMINIONS	191,641	51,298
INDIA	68,297	131,003
RED AFRICA	71,106	34,301
CEYLON	2,674	40,846
RED WEST INDIES	21,937	21,542
HONG KONG	18,866	14,785
IRISH FREE STATE	19,882	1,597
PALESTINE (including SYRIA)	3,636	4,232
RED HONDURAS	2,061	3,749
IRAK (including ARABIA)	1,039	4,379
BERMUDA	9,774	1,107
ADEN	587	3,060
RED GULAN	1,501	981
RED OCEANIA (excluding SO. ISLES)	1,156	1,069
GIBRALTAR	1,450	53
MALTA AND CYPRUS	1,112	226
FALKLAND ISLANDS	67	---
 Totals	 \$2,095,484	 \$ 1,434,037

56. The value of BLUE trade with other Grand Divisions of the World, exclusive of elements of the RED Empire, is shown in the following table (000 omitted, value being in thousands of dollars):

<u>Name of the Grand Division</u>	<u>Exports to:</u>	<u>Imports from:</u>
<u>NORTH AMERICA</u>		
MEXICO	109,148	137,815
CENTRAL AMERICA	74,287	36,681
WEST INDIES	196,513	300,065
Other NORTH AMERICA	292	405
 Total	 380,240	 474,966
<u>SOUTH AMERICA</u>		
CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES	84,760	117,859
EAST COAST COUNTRIES	278,599	312,075
WEST COAST COUNTRIES	73,232	87,360
 Total	 436,591	 517,294

<u>Name of the Grand Division</u>	<u>Imports to</u>	<u>Imports from</u>
<u>EUROPE</u>		
NORTHWESTERN and CENTRAL	\$ 1,125,437	\$ 691,338
NORTHEASTERN	92,000	31,056
SOUTHWESTERN	216,046	149,700
SOUTHEASTERN	24,797	44,566
Total	\$ 1,460,279	\$ 916,659
<u>ASIA</u>		
WESTERN	\$ 2,216	\$ 15,203
SOUTHERN and SOUTHEASTERN	35,568	92,274
EASTERN	348,574	557,211
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS	69,522	115,980
Total	\$ 455,860	\$ 780,668
<u>AFRICA</u>		
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES	\$ 25,145	\$ 39,338
OTHER AFRICA	10,837	19,616
Total	\$ 35,982	\$ 58,954
<u>OCEANIA</u>		
FRENCH OCEANIA	Total \$ 917	\$ 2,164
Grand Total	\$ 2,769,889	\$ 2,750,705

57. The above tables show that about 43% of all BLUE exports go to the RED Empire, and that about 34% of all BLUE imports are received therefrom. It is also apparent that BLUE enjoys a highly favorable balance of trade with the RED Empire and with Europe as a whole, but that BLUE trade balances with all other Grand Divisions of the world are unfavorable. It is concluded that war between RED and BLUE would be economically disastrous to both, but that the effect on BLUE trade would be much greater than upon RED trade. It is further concluded that such war would have a profound effect upon all other commercial nations and would gravely disturb, if not completely upset, the whole world economic structure.

58. During the calendar year 1927, a total of 45,459 vessels with a total gross tonnage of 74,309,813 entered at BLUE custom houses, and 43,619 vessels with a total tonnage of 75,440,332 cleared therefrom. Of the total entries, 15,271, with a total tonnage of 26,920,507, and, of the total clearances, 14,592, with a total of 27,031,253 tons, were RED Merchant vessels. A total of 7,003 other foreign vessels with a total tonnage of 18,100,618 entered, and 7,213, with a total tonnage of 18,615,478, cleared. Principal foreign tonnage, other than RED, consisted of: Norwegian, Japanese, German, Italian, French, Dutch, and Danish, in order of total amounts.

59. BLUE Merchant vessels are engaged in trade with nearly every portion of the world. The greatest density of BLUE shipping at any one time will be found in the Intercoastal Trade via the Panama Canal. The next greatest density is found in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, followed, in order by: the Gulf and West Indies; the

North Pacific; the South Atlantic; the South Pacific; and the Indian Ocean. Established lines, on regular schedules, have been provided, primarily by BLUE Government aid, to nearly all the important geographical divisions of the world. Some of the most important of these trade routes are:

- a. EAST COAST to NORTHERN and CENTRAL EUROPE.
- b. WEST COAST to EASTERN ASIA.
- c. EAST COAST to WEST INDIES and CARIBBEAN.
- d. EAST COAST to MEDITERRANEAN and SOUTHERN EUROPE.
- e. EAST COAST to EAST COAST of SOUTH AMERICA.
- f. AROUND THE WORLD, via PANAMA and SUEZ.
- g. WEST COAST to AUSTRALASIA.
- h. EAST COAST to WEST COAST of SOUTH AMERICA.
- i. WEST COAST to WEST COAST of CENTRAL and SOUTH AMERICA.
- j. EAST COAST to WEST COAST of AFRICA.

60. Considering the relative strengths of the RED and BLUE Fleets, and their probable distributions at the outbreak of war, it is concluded that RED will at once be able to interrupt routes a, d, f, g, and i. RED further will probably be in position to dispute BLUE control of routes b and c. BLUE should be able to control routes c, h and i. This particularly indicates the necessity for BLUE to gain and exercise at the earliest practicable date, a working control of the waters of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, and of the desirability of extending such control as soon as possible to include the Western South Atlantic.

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION.

61. The Great Lakes waterway carries 87% of BLUE iron ore to smelters, besides moving a large tonnage of grain, coal and other important commodities. Its control is vital to BLUE'S war-making power. Railroads and roads are more numerous and in better condition in northeastern BLUE than in any other part. While in all parts of the country they are capable of sustaining limited operations, in the northeast, except in northern Maine, they are ample for any probable action. This very complete net makes possible rapid movement of strategic reserves. The commercial telegraph and telephone systems in this section of the country are, in general, ample to carry any load thrown upon them incident to military operations. As a rule, these facilities are most extensive where the road and railroad nets are best developed. With respect to world communications, BLUE is at a disadvantage as compared to RED whose control of international cables, as shown in the RED situation, is very extensive. BLUE'S high-power radio stations, however, will greatly reduce this disadvantage. Cable communications with BLUE'S outlying possessions are exposed to interruption early in the war by reason of their proximity to RED'S many overseas bases.

WAR INDUSTRIES AND MUNITIONING CAPACITY.

62. A great portion of the facilities for manufacture of war supplies are located in the northeastern part of the country. However, except for the highly important airplane and motor industries located at Detroit and Buffalo and the hydro-electric plant at Niagara Falls, most of the essential industries lie at some distance from the CANADIAN frontier. By far the greater part of them are situated south of the line of Oswego, N.Y., - Saratoga, N.Y. - Portsmouth, N.H. This concentration of war industries facilitates supply as long as there is no interference by the enemy, but any material hostile advance towards the New York or Pittsburgh areas would seriously hamper BLUE supply.

63. On account of the vast industrial development of BLUE, it is believed that, with unrestricted access to supplies of strategic raw materials, BLUE'S capacity to provide munitions of war for the Army and Navy in any probable major effort is unquestioned. It is estimated that, including reserves now on hand, munitions, with certain exceptions to be noted later, can be provided as fast as BLUE man power can be mobilized and trained.

64. BLUE'S shipbuilding industry is, as has been previously stated, in a very depressed state, and it will take a considerable time to revive it, even under the spur of war necessity. BLUE is further, compared with RED, very deficient in commercial and naval dry docking facilities, but the existing facilities are believed to be sufficient for probable war needs in case of war with RED.

65. The BLUE aircraft industry is now undergoing rapid expansion and is at present probably the most extensive in the world. While it is probable that the industry is at present somewhat over extended, it is believed that this condition is temporary, and that eventually the industry will be placed on a sound economic basis. It is now estimated that airplanes could be produced as fast as pilots could be trained to handle them, and that, after about ~~M~~ Plus 9 Months, production on a quantity basis could be reached.

IV. MILITARY

ARMY

66. Within the Continental BLUE area, the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reserve forces are organized into infantry and cavalry divisions, and General Headquarters Reserve, Army, Corps, harbor defense, communications zone, and zone of the interior units with a view to expansion for war.

67. In the continental ~~area~~ of BLUE, exclusive of Alaska, the Regular Army contains about 102,700 officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, including three infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and the principal components of three additional infantry and two additional cavalry divisions. Air Corps units included are as follows: pursuit aviation, one group of three squadrons; bombardment aviation, one group but with airplanes for only two squadrons; attack aviation, one group of two squadrons; observation aviation, one group and six squadrons.

68. The National Guard in this area consists of approximately 175,000 officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men, including eighteen infantry divisions, and the principal components of nine cavalry brigades. Air Corps units included consist of eighteen observation squadrons, each with three service airplanes.

69. In this area, the Organized Reserves consist of about 113,000 officers and 5,000 men. The divisional organization consists of the assignment of personnel to twenty-seven Organized Reserve infantry divisions, to six Organized Reserve cavalry divisions, and to Regular Army and National Guard divisions to provide for expansion to war strength.

70. The War Department General Mobilization Plan, 1928, provides for the maximum effort by mobilizing and raising to war strength all active and inactive units and organizing such new units as are required to complete six field armies and necessary supporting and auxiliary troops, reinforcements for overseas garrisons, and replacements. It is assumed that a Selective Service Law will be enacted on M-Day and will be in operation within thirty days thereafter. Prior to the latter date, the voluntary enlistment rate is assumed as 25,000 men per day. It is estimated that when Selective Service begins to operate the rate of induction will be 25,000 men per day. The mobilization will be divided into four periods. During the first period, estimated as lasting at least sixty days, there will be mobilized three field armies (nine corps, including nine Regular Army and eighteen National Guard Infantry Divisions), the corresponding Communications Zone and Zone of the Interior troops, and certain minor Regular Army colored units; in addition, the Harbor Defense troops will be raised to war strength. During the other three periods there will be mobilized the remaining three field armies and the necessary supporting troops for each, at an assumed rate of one per month.

71. In general, the location of units of the Regular Army is based upon the availability of shelter and training facilities, and not upon ease of concentration. The location of units of the National Guard is based on local considerations and is a function of the states to which units are allotted by the War Department.

72. Taken as a whole, the distribution is such that light covering forces can be available on all frontiers on M-Day, relatively strong covering forces can be concentrated by M plus 4 Days and all initially available forces can be concentrated within frontier commands by M plus 10 Days.

73. The initial garrisons of the Harbor Defenses will be composed of the existing Regular Army garrisons, augmented by the active Coast Artillery units of the National Guard, at peace strength. This will fall far short of fully manning all the Harbor Defenses. To bring them all up to war strength before men become available from Selective Service can only be done at the expense of serious inroads on the recruits otherwise available for the forces in the field. However, if the allocation to Harbor Defense units of men obtained prior to Selective Service be limited to those required to bring these units along the most critical section of the Atlantic coast, say from Boston to the Chesapeake inclusive, to a strength permitting the repelling of fleet attacks, and those along the remainder of the coast of the United States to a strength permitting the repelling of light cruiser attacks only, the number of men required would not constitute a serious drain on the reinforcements for the field forces.

74. It is evident that the Air Corps units can provide only a very weak air force with which to meet a major emergency. However, it will be possible to organize a fairly adequate force for such initial operations as may be undertaken, and at the same time, by making a maximum use of converted commercial equipment, start the intensive training necessary in expanding to meet later requirements.

75. There are at present in BLUE overseas possessions approximately the following forces:

Location	Officers, warrant officers, and enlisted men.			Officers of Reserve Corps		Total	
	Regulars		Philippine Scouts				
	Army	Guard					
Panama Canal Department	6,800			350		9,150	
Hawaiian Department	14,200	1,500		500		16,200	
Philippine Department	4,800		6,500	400		11,300	
U.S.A.F. in China	950					950	
Porto Rico	1,250	1,475				2,725	
Alaska	275					275	

Note: In addition, there are in the Philippines about 5,000 native Constabulary.

76. While shortages in equipment and supplies should not prevent the rapid concentration of such troops as will be initially available, they do constitute serious problems in a war involving a maximum effort. The most serious deficiencies are in animals, ordnance equipment and ammunition, Air Corps equipment, evacuation and hospitalization.

77. These deficiencies are real liabilities and cannot be disregarded. However, to balance them it is permissible to take into account BLUE'S practically unlimited resources and the marked ability of BLUE to improvise in time of need. Hence, while problems of supply will seriously affect details of execution, as contained in subordinate plans, for the purposes of an estimate upon which a joint plan is to be based it may be assumed that supply problems can be solved. However, shortage of supplies and equipment will limit the possible scope of initial operations, and especially of initial air operations.

NAVY

78. Relative strengths on 1 July, 1929, of RED and BLUE Navies in effective combatant tonnage are shown in the following table. Only first line vessels built and building are considered. Vessels authorized but not yet begun are excluded.

Type	RED	BLUE
BB (Battleships)	16	18
CG (Battle Cruisers)	4	0
CL (First Line Cruisers)	62	18
CV (Aircraft carriers)	6	5
CM (Mine Layers, First Line)	1	0
DL and DD (Destroyers and Destroyer Leaders)	175	221
SF and SS (Submarines and Fleet Submarines)	68	57
DM (Light Mine Layers)	0	10

In second line vessels, such as old cruisers, old destroyers, and old mine layers, BLUE has a great superiority over RED. BLUE also has 52 second line submarines, of which 29 may be considered as fairly effective vessels.

79. It will be noted that RED has a distinct superiority in capital ships and a great superiority in cruisers over BLUE. While RED is superior in numbers in aircraft carriers, BLUE actually has more fleet aircraft than RED. BLUE has a distinct superiority in destroyers and submarines. Failure, however, on the part of BLUE to initiate and carry out a reasonable program of replacement results in BLUE units having a greater average age and probably less effectiveness than corresponding RED units. BLUE is now taking measures to bring about a closer equality in cruisers. In brief it may be stated that the RED Navy is superior in gun vessels and that BLUE Navy is superior in torpedo vessels and probably in fleet aircraft.

80. The following table shows the present distribution of BLUE effective combatant vessels, excluding vessels to be scrapped, but including Coast Guard vessels:

TYPE:	ATLANTIC			PACIFIC			ASIATIC			Build-
	Vessels in:		Vessels not in:	Vessels in:		Vessels not in:	Vessels in:		Vessels not in:	
	Commission	Commission	Commission	Commission	Commission	Commission	Commission	Commission	Commission	
BB	4		2	12		0	0		0	
OCA	1		1	0		2	1		0	
CL	9		6*	1		2*	0		0	
OCL	2		0	0		0	0		0	
CV	0		0	2		0	0		0	
OCV	0		0	1		0	0		0	
HD	53		11	43		45	19		0	
DM	15		8	0		0	0		0	
OCM	1		1	1		1	0		0	
HM			2	2		2	2		0	
AM	14		2	10		7*	5		0	
DP	0		341*	4		1	0		0	
DS	21		3	12		0	12		0	
DMH	9		13	20		0	0		0	
PE	12		5	5		3	0		0	
PG	13		1	7		0	7		3	

• Building

Vessels not in commission include vessels in reduced commission. In addition to the above there are large numbers of small patrol and district craft, mostly Coast Guard, the bulk of which are stationed in the Atlantic.

81. Of the above vessels in commission stationed in the Atlantic, 2 OCL, 2 PG, 9 SS and 1 AM are normally stationed at the Canal Zone. Of the vessels in commission stationed in the Pacific, 2 DM, 3 AM and 20 OSS are normally stationed at Hawaii. Of the vessels in commission stationed on the Asiatic Station, 1 AM is normally based on Guam. Of the vessels not in commission in the Pacific, 1 OCM, 2 DM, and 6 AM are at Hawaii.

82. On 31 August, 1929, there were on hand in the naval service the following numbers of serviceable aircraft:

TYPE	SERVICE	EXPERIMENTAL	IMPROVISED	OBsolete	TOTALS
VF	159	4	50	21	234
VO	261	2	20	32	316
VT	187	4	20	21	232
VP and Transport	15	7	0	8	30

There were on order, but not yet delivered, a total of 43 VF, 56 VO and 66 VP and Transport airplanes.

83. The naval air forces on 31 August, 1929, were organized as follows (excluding training squadrons, regular and reserve):

Station	Number of Squadrons	Type	Total number of planes Allowed	Actual	
Battle Fleet	5	VF - VB	135	83	
	7	VO - VB	102	61	
	2	VT	54	37	
	2	VP - VJ	27	22	
		VO - VJ	18	24	
	<u>Unorganized</u>		<u>336</u>	<u>217</u>	
	<u>Totals</u> 16				
Scouting Fleet	4	VO - VB	51	26	
	1	VT	18	12	
	2	VP - VJ	18	10	
		VO - VJ	3	2	
	<u>Unorganized</u>		<u>90</u>	<u>50</u>	
	<u>Totals</u> 7				
Asiatic Fleet	2	VB - VT	18	9	
Hawaii	2	VT	27	17	##
	2	VP	18	7	
		VJ	3	6	
	<u>Unorganized</u>		<u>48</u>	<u>30</u>	
	<u>Totals</u> 4				
Canal Zone	2	VT	18	12	
	1	VP	9	5	
		VJ	3	3	
	<u>Unorganized</u>		<u>30</u>	<u>20</u>	
	<u>Totals</u> 3				
Marine Corps (UNITED STATES)	3	VF & VP(t)	30	24	
		VO & VP(t)	29	38	
	1	VJ	3	0	
			<u>62</u>	<u>62</u>	
	<u>Totals</u> 7				
(NICARAGUA)	1	VO	9	21	
	1	VJ	5	10	
	<u>2</u>		<u>14</u>	<u>31</u>	
(HAITI)	1	VO & VH	9	6	
(GUAM)	1	VO	6	12	
Grand Totals	<u>45</u>		<u>613</u>	<u>437</u>	

In addition, approximately 89 airplanes at San Diego for overhaul and repair and storage.

In addition approximately 24 airplanes at Hampton Roads for overhaul and repair.

In addition approximately 11 VT undergoing overhaul and in storage.

84. On 30 June, 1928, personnel of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard, regular and reserve, numbered as follows:

Branch	Officers			Enlisted	Totals
	Commissioned	Warrant	Nurses		
<u>Regular</u>					
Navy	7,476	1,430	488	85,284	94,678
Marine Corps	1,050	151	---	17,615	18,796
Coast Guard	380	697	---	8,479	9,556
Totals	8,886	2,278	488	111,378	123,030
<u>Reserve</u>					
Navy	5,949	89	---	28,821	34,859
Marine Corps	442	16	---	9,146	9,604
Totals	6,391	105	---	37,967	44,463
Grand Totals	15,277	2,383	488	149,345	167,493

85. Of the above personnel, the following were qualified naval aviators or aviation pilots:

Branch	Naval Aviators	Aviation Pilots		Totals
		Regular	Reserve	
Navy	520	173	1	693
Marine Corps	63	22	1	86
Coast Guard	5	0	1	5
Totals	588	195	3	783
<u>Reserve</u>				
Navy	416	3	1	419
Marine Corps	45	0	1	45
Totals	461	3	1	464
Grand Totals	1,044	198	5	1,247

86. So far as training and morale are concerned, it is estimated that the regular naval forces of BLUE and RED are substantially on an equality. The standards of both are high and are lived up to. It is believed however that RED naval reserves are superior in training to those of BLUE, although the latter are fully as good in general intelligence and education.

87. So far as material is concerned it is believed that BLUE active seagoing units are maintained in as good a condition as those of RED. In the case of inactive units it is known that BLUE ships, particularly the submarines and a large number of the destroyers, are in poor material condition and would require extensive repairs and alterations to place them in efficient condition for war operations. The material condition of RED reserve ships is believed to be better than that of BLUE.

88. Upon Mobilization, it is estimated that all BLUE active seagoing units, less those undergoing extensive repairs or alterations, could be made ready for war service by M Plus 10 Day. Mobilization of inactive units will be slow on account of the inferior material condition of the ships and the deficient training of the reserve personnel. The following table shows the estimated Mobilization Rate of BLUE Naval vessels:

By M Plus 10 Day.

All active units less approximately 10% undergoing repair.
2 DD at Pearl Harbor.

By M Plus 30 Day.

Remainder of active units.
19 DD at San Diego
1 OCM at Philadelphia
1 OCA at New York
All inactive AM's.

By M Plus 40 Day.

19 DD at San Diego.

By M Plus 45 Day

24 DD at Philadelphia.

By M Plus 50 Day.

12 DD at Philadelphia.

By M Plus 60 Day.

6 DD at Philadelphia.
2 DD at Philadelphia.

By M Plus 70 Day.

7 DD at San Diego.

By M Plus 75 Day.

6 DD at Philadelphia.

By M Plus 85 Day.

1 OCM at Philadelphia.

By M Plus 90 Day.

13 DD at Philadelphia.

By M Plus 120 Day.

2 OCA at Puget Sound
8 ODD at Philadelphia
1 SF at Norfolk.

By M Plus 180 Day.

2 EB East Coast Navy Yards..
1 SS at Norfolk.
8 OSS at Norfolk

By M Plus 210 Day.

8 OSS at Norfolk.

By M Plus 240 Day.

7 OSS at Norfolk.

By M Plus 270 Day.

18 OSS at Norfolk

Remaining units of the above classes will, it is estimated, require more than 270 Days to mobilize.

It is estimated that sufficient naval forces can be made available by M PLUS 4 DAY to escort an overseas expedition against Halifax, and that merchant shipping sufficient for the transport of 25,000 troops plus one month's supplies can be assembled at Boston between M and M PLUS 2 DAY.

89. BLUE naval forces are now unfavorably distributed strategically for war with RED, in that the bulk of the most modern and most effective units are normally based in the Pacific. Should the present distribution exist on M-Day, it is estimated that the battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers and destroyers of the BLUE Battle Fleet, if at that time in the San Pedro - San Diego Area, could not arrive in the Narragansett Bay Area prior to M Plus 23 Day. In case the Battle Fleet should be in the Puget Sound Area on M-Day, such arrival could not occur until M Plus 30 Day. It is obvious that such concentration will depend upon maintenance of the integrity of the Panama Canal and its facilities. It is assumed that when it becomes apparent that war with RED is possible, the larger portion of the U.S. Fleet will be transferred to the Atlantic. It is probable that such transference, if made during the period of strained relations, would probably precipitate war. For the purpose of this estimate it will be assumed that BLUE Battle Fleet, on M-Day, is in the vicinity of the Canal Zone. In such case it is estimated that the U.S. Fleet, less certain submarines and slow auxiliaries, could be concentrated in the New York - Narragansett Bay Area by M Plus 8 Day.

90. The RED Navy is better balanced than is the BLUE; it also has greater speed and gun range. However, the inferior radius of action of RED capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, and destroyers will constitute a serious handicap to their employment in operations at a distance from adequate naval bases. In fighting strength, the fleets vary at different ranges. At maximum range RED has the advantage, while at slightly lesser ranges, the advantage would be with BLUE. At short ranges, main batteries of both fleets are equally effective. In aircraft capable of being launched from ships at sea, the BLUE Fleet has a great superiority, which would be further increased in the case of engagement sufficiently near the BLUE coast to permit the employment of shore-based aircraft. RED'S four fast battle cruisers give an advantage of a strong force which may be used as a raiding force, as well as a fast wing in Fleet action. An additional RED strength lies in its many well located, fortified naval bases and in the large and efficient naval reserve. CRIMSON naval forces are negligible.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.

91. BLUE, initially, will have on the North American continent a preponderance of available military forces. RED has within her Empire a much stronger trained military force which it probably will seek to establish permanently on CRIMSON territory. At the outbreak of war, BLUE will be unprepared and unable to place in the field at once any but hastily organized forces, with many skeletonized units. BLUE also will be lacking in defensive strength on both coastal and land frontiers. However, at this time CRIMSON will be far worse off and practically will be unaided by RED. While BLUE is perfecting offensive and defensive forces, RED will be coming to the assistance of CRIMSON. CRIMSON is the only RED territory so situated as to afford BLUE an opportunity to strike a vital blow on land.

92. The RED Navy is somewhat more powerful than the BLUE but not enough so as to prevent BLUE engaging in offensive operations, particularly if this superiority be partially neutralized by so staging the operations that RED is at a disadvantage with respect to bases. This is difficult to accomplish due to the number and distribution of RED bases. On the other hand, the extent of RED bases and sea-lanes constitute a RED element of weakness in the resulting defensive requirement.

V. SUMMARY

POLITICAL.

93. It will be of the greatest importance for BLUE to prevent any strong power from intervening in the war on the side of RED. This particularly applies to ORANGE which is indicated as the most probable strong military ally of RED. The accomplishment of this task will largely rest with the Civil Power.

94. Hardly of less importance is the necessity of obtaining and maintaining BLUE ascendancy in Latin-America, to insure that these countries afford no material assistance to RED and preserve at least a benevolent neutrality toward BLUE. The accomplishment of this task is also one to be undertaken by the Diplomatic and other Civil Powers of the Government, assisted in the case of certain West Indian and Caribbean countries by the military and naval forces.

95. At the same time BLUE should take measures designed to guard against and promptly suppress all separatist movements in the insular possessions and territories, particularly those which may be expected to be supported by enemy agents in the Philippine Islands, Porto Rico and Hawaii.

ECONOMIC

96. BLUE will be obliged to maintain access to and uninterrupted transportation from sources of supply of certain strategic raw materials and foodstuffs such as sugar, coffee, rubber, manganese, nitrates, certain textile and other fibers, and non-ferrous alloy metals.

97. The integrity of the Panama Canal and its facilities must be maintained, not only to permit rapid concentration of the U.S. Fleet, but to prevent interruption of BLUE inter-coastal and West Coast of South America trade routes.

98. Control of West Indian and Caribbean waters is essential to BLUE in order to safeguard BLUE seaborne trade in these areas and to protect BLUE trade routes to the Caribbean and East Coasts of South America.

99. It will be essential for BLUE to maintain control of the Great Lakes waterways over which 87% of BLUE iron ore is transported. It is likewise imperative that the vital air, rail, motor and other essential industrial centers lying close to CRIMSON territory, particularly those of Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit and the hydro-electric plants at Niagara Falls be safeguarded.

100. It would be particularly advantageous to BLUE to seize at an early date in the war the Sudbury nickel mines in CRIMSON in order to provide a sufficient supply of this most important alloy metal as well as to deny this supply to RED.

101. Every effort must be made by BLUE to inflict economic injury on RED. This can be accomplished best, of course, by securing alliances with powers whose economic resources are of primary importance to RED. Other means are to secure the benevolent neutrality of such countries; to foster separatist movements in RED dependencies; to apply pressure on neutrals by proper trade measures, notably restrictions on exports of BLUE products essential to them, and, therefore, to prevent their furnishing RED with the sinews of war; and to restrict RED'S use of neutral shipping by outbidding her for its use.

102. The control of neutral shipping by lease, charter, or otherwise is feasible if ships be taken early in the war; it will be very costly if initiated later. The shipping which may be deflected from the use of RED is that of Japan, Germany, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.

103. The general economic situation of BLUE as compared to RED is favorable to BLUE. In addition to the present peacetime planning for industrial mobilization and procurement, which is designed to exploit this advantage, the development of the inland waterways is a matter of pressing importance. With the burden thrown upon all means of communication by the necessities of mobilization, concentration and maintenance of the forces in the field for this war, it is imperative that these waterways be used to the maximum.

MILITARY.

104. Measures must be taken to prevent RED invasion of BLUE continental territory and to deny or defeat RED naval and air raids directed against BLUE seaports, industrial areas and shipping.

105. The safety and integrity of the Panama Canal is of vital importance to BLUE.

106. So far as practicable, provision should be made for insuring the safety of BLUE non-contiguous territory, particularly the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippine Islands, Porto Rico, Alaska, the Virgin Islands and Guam.

107. It is of vital importance to BLUE to concentrate the United States Fleet, or the major portion thereof, in the Atlantic prior to M-Day.

108. The Army and Navy, including the air components thereof, should be mobilized for the maximum effort at the fastest possible rate.

109. The accomplishment of BLUE war aims, as well as the safety and integrity of BLUE territory and BLUE seaborne trade, demand that BLUE establish and maintain a working control of Western North Atlantic waters at the earliest practicable date.

110. The separation of CRIMSON from RED would seriously impair RED'S war making power, and the occupation of CRIMSON territory would secure to BLUE a counterbalance against possible territorial losses elsewhere. Important steps towards accomplishing these results would be:

a. Seizing CRIMSON maritime territory and seaports, particularly Halifax, before CRIMSON forces therein could be reinforced. If successful, this would deprive RED of the most suitable base from which to operate by sea against BLUE territory, seaports, industries and shipping, and an important ice-free port through which RED Army forces could reach CRIMSON throughout the year. Also, it would give BLUE an advantageous base for operations against RED sea power. If Halifax could not be captured, its denial to RED as a base, by means of air and naval operations, should be attempted.

b. The occupation of certain areas vital to the CRIMSON effort to sustain the war, and the destruction of enemy forces employed in their defense. Control of the Montreal-Quebec area would cut off practically all of CRIMSON from RED and would deprive the Maritime Provinces of support and supplies from the rest of CRIMSON. Combined with the control of the Great Lakes waterways, including their narrow passages, it would reduce by ninety per cent the munitioning capacity of CRIMSON. Control of the Great Lakes waterways would permit BLUE to continue to receive from BLUE sources by the most practicable route, important supplies of grain, and of raw materials required in the production of munitions. Control of the Winnipeg area would separate eastern and western CRIMSON. The importance of the Sudbury nickel mines has been indicated. Their distance from vital CRIMSON areas, and comparative inaccessibility from logical BLUE concentration areas, tend to make their early capture impracticable. Rather than have them fall into the hands of BLUE, CRIMSON probably would render them unworkable. BLUE may be able to prevent the delivery of their output by the enemy, and eventually capture them, if successful in other CRIMSON operations. The occupation by BLUE of CRIMSON territory other than the areas enumerated in this subparagraph would not be sufficiently advantageous to offset the disadvantages inherent in the dispersion of effort involved. If initial operations in CRIMSON are successful, BLUE may extend operations to other CRIMSON territory. The direction and extent of such operations will depend upon the situation at the time.

VI. COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO BLUE

ARMY.

III. The following general plans of operations are available to the BLUE Army forces:

a. Plan I. To initiate an immediate general offensive against CRIMSON with a view to penetrating vital CRIMSON areas, preventing mobilization of CRIMSON forces, and disrupting CRIMSON economic life.

b. Plan II. To initiate promptly operations to separate CRIMSON from RED through the destruction of enemy forces in CRIMSON and the seizure of vital CRIMSON areas. This plan contemplates:

(1) Preparation for a joint overseas expedition against Halifax, which will be dispatched in case the situation at the outbreak of war indicates the practicability of the operation, otherwise Halifax will be neutralized by air operations;

(2) An early advance to seize the Montreal-Quebec area;

(3) Measures to defend all sensitive points along the Great Lakes waterways, including minor operations in adjacent CRIMSON territory;

(4) An operation to cut CRIMSON railroad communications at Winnipeg;

(5) Initially, conduct of an active defense on other fronts.

c. Plan III. Same as Plan II, except that there will be no provision for a joint overseas operation against Halifax.

d. Plan IV. To assume the strategic defensive against the enemy along the CRIMSON frontier, and to concentrate the Army effort initially in cooperating with the Navy in driving RED from the Caribbean area.

e. Plan V.. To assume the strategic defensive on all fronts. This plan contemplates deploying such troops as may be necessary for covering missions; reinforcing overseas garrisons; and building up in the meantime forces suitable to a major offensive. This is in reality the taking up of a position in readiness pending the building up of strong forces.

112. The above plans have the following advantages and disadvantages:

b. Plan I. - A general offensive

Advantages.

- (1) It has all the advantages of initiative.
- (2) CRIMSON may be crushed before RED can reinforce her.
- (3) Early air operations by either RED or CRIMSON will be made difficult.
- (4) It renders difficult for RED the establishment on CRIMSON territory of forces suitable for invasion of BLUE.

Disadvantages.

- (1) Dispersion of effort without direction to a decisive objective.
- (2) The BLUE best units will become involved immediately and perhaps suffer such losses that the subsequent development of larger forces and more important operations will be seriously affected.
- (3) It will require a reduction of security measures at other points.

b. Plan II. - To initiate promptly operations to separate CRIMSON from RED through the destruction of enemy forces in CRIMSON and the seizure of vital CRIMSON areas; preparations being made to despatch a joint overseas expedition against Halifax.

Advantages.

- (1) It has all advantages of the initiative.
- (2) The initial concentration and direction of advance cover the BLUE vital northeast area.
- (3) It strikes at the vital CRIMSON area.
- (4) It provides a plan for the quickest method of capturing the principal ice-free port of CRIMSON.
- (5) It may permit combined action and co-operation of the Army and the Navy.

Disadvantages.

- (1) The operations must be pushed rapidly to be successful.

(2) If a joint expedition against Halifax be included, it will involve all difficulties of joint operations and forced landings on hostile shores, intensified by the menace of a powerful hostile fleet.

(3) Plan III. Same as Plan II, except that there will be no provision for a joint overseas expedition against Halifax.

Advantages.

(1) It has all the advantages of the initiative.

(2) The initial concentration and direction of advance cover the BLUE vital Northeast area.

(3) It strikes at the vital CRIMSON area.

(4) It permits the use of a stronger initial force in the advance against the Montreal-Quebec area than would be the case if an expedition were sent against Halifax.

(5) It is largely independent of naval action, and thus frees the Navy for other operations.

Disadvantages.

(1) It leaves Halifax available to the enemy for use as a naval base and as a port of debarkation for reinforcements and supplies unless neutralized by air attacks.

(2) The neutralization of Halifax by air attacks would require the use of so much of the BLUE air force as to prevent sufficient attacks against other important objectives.

4. Plan IV. - To assume the strategic defensive along the CRIMSON frontier and to concentrate the Army effort initially in the Caribbean area.

Advantages.

(1) It would insure a prompt and complete control of the Caribbean area.

(2) It is the best method of defending the Panama Canal.

(3) If the outbreak of war occurred in winter, it would permit active operations at a time when such operations in CRIMSON territory would be attended with great difficulty.

Disadvantages.

(1) It would ~~not~~ permit RED to reinforce CRIMSON and, when ready, to launch a major offensive against BLUE from CRIMSON.

(2) It would not secure for BLUE any objective which would seriously cripple RED.

(3) It would not be taking advantage of BLUE'S immense man power, since operations in the Caribbean area would not require large land forces.

2. Plan V. - To assume the strategic defensive.

Advantages.

(1) It provides for the immediate protection of the BLUE frontier.

(2) It permits the orderly organization and training of large BLUE forces.

(3) It permits the organization of BLUE war industrial effort.

(4) It assures a heavy and concentrated blow when adequate forces become available.

Disadvantages.

(1) It surrenders, initially, the advantages of the initiative.

(2) It permits the systematic strengthening of CRIMSON defenses.

(3) It permits the uninterrupted concentration of large RED forces in CRIMSON.

(4) It makes possible launching of a major offensive by RED against BLUE before BLUE is prepared.

(5) It places no immediate pressure on RED to come to the assistance of CRIMSON with land forces.

(6) It fails to take advantage of the initial superiority of BLUE in the Western Hemisphere, and may result in a longer and more costly war.

(7) Much popular clamor would probably be raised against this lack of aggressive measures.

NAVY.

113. The following general plans of operations are available to the BLUE Naval forces:

a. Plan I. To adopt the strategic offensive with the BLUE Main Fleet and seek out and engage the RED Main Fleet decisively while conducting secondary operations in other theaters for the purpose of weakening RED'S economic power.

b. Plan II. To establish the BLUE Main Fleet in the Western North Atlantic in sufficient strength to dominate sea communications between RED and CRILSON, while conducting secondary operations in other theaters for the purpose of weakening RED economic ability to support the war and of dispersing her naval power. The above operations to be undertaken with a view toward attacking in force the RED Fleet or detachments thereof whenever a favorable opportunity arises.

c. Plan III. To assume the strategic defensive with the major units of the U.S. Fleet, seizing any favorable opportunity that may arise to defeat RED Naval forces in detail, and to exert the main naval effort against RED overseas commerce and seaborne trade.

114. The above plans have the following advantages and disadvantages:

a. Plan I. To adopt the strategic offensive with BLUE Main Fleet and seek out and engage the RED Main Fleet decisively, while conducting secondary operations in other theaters for the purpose of weakening RED'S economic power.

Advantages.

(1) It retains the initiative.

(2) It insures a quick decision at sea.

(3) If successful, it insures immediate effective control of the sea.

Disadvantages.

(1) It risks the BLUE Fleet against the stronger RED Fleet under conditions which may be disadvantageous to BLUE.

(2) If unsuccessful, it gives RED almost undisputed control of the sea and practically isolates BLUE.

(3) If unsuccessful, it gives RED access to the products of the world.

(4) In case of BLUE initial defeat, RED could thereafter for a long time exceed BLUE in sea power.

b. Plan II. To establish the BLUE Main Fleet in the Western North Atlantic in sufficient strength to dominate sea communications between RED and CRIMSON, while conducting secondary operations in other theaters for the purpose of weakening RED economic ability to support the war and of dispersing her naval power. The above operations to be undertaken with a view toward attacking in force the RED Fleet or detachments thereof whenever a favorable opportunity arises.

Advantages.

- (1) The BLUE Fleet is near home bases.
- (2) It preserves the integrity of the BLUE Fleet, while awaiting favorable opportunity to strike the RED Fleet.
- (3) It automatically forces RED to maintain an extremely expensive convoy system.
- (4) It compels RED to retain assembled a fleet superior to BLUE.
- (5) The BLUE Fleet is strategically located to exercise control of the Western Atlantic.
- (6) It permits an opportunity for gradual attrition of RED Naval forces.

Disadvantage.

- (1) It delays the ultimate decision on the sea.

c. Plan III. - To assume the strategic defensive with the major units of the U.S. Fleet, seizing any favorable opportunity that may arise to defeat RED Naval forces in detail and to exert the main naval effort against RED overseas commerce and seaborne trade.

Advantages.

- (1) It maintains the BLUE Fleet as a "Fleet in being".
- (2) It directly exerts economic pressure against RED by threatening her vital sea communications.
- (3) It will cause wide dispersion of RED Naval forces to safeguard trade.

Disadvantages.

- (1) It surrenders the initiative to RED.
- (2) It risks defeat of BLUE Naval forces in detail.
- (3) It provides for no cooperation with the army.
- (4) It will probably involve diplomatic difficulties with other nations and alienate foreign support of BLUE.
- (5) As a method of warfare, it has uniformly failed in the past.

THE DECISION.

115. To adopt Army Plan II, and Navy Plan II, and to base the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Red, thereon.

~~SECRET~~

JOINT ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION. BLUE-RED.
ANNEX "A"

~~SECRET~~

JOINT ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, BLUE-RED
ANNEX "A"

Symbols and Type Designation of Naval Surface, Sub-surface and Aircraft as used in this Estimate.

<u>Symbol</u>	<u>Type</u>
BB	Battleship
CC	Battle Cruiser
OCA	Armored Cruiser
CL	Cruiser, 1st line
OCL	Cruiser, 2d line
CV	Airplane carrier, 1st line
OCV	Airplane carrier, 2d line
OM	Mine layer, 1st line (cruiser type)
OCM	Mine layer, 2d line (cruiser type)
DM	Mine layer, (destroyer type)
DL	Destroyer Leader
DD	Destroyer, 1st line
ODD	Destroyer, 2d line
SF	Fleet Submarino
SS	Submarine, 1st line
OSS	Submarine, 2d line
PG	Gunboat (includes Coast Guard Cruising Cutter type)
PE	Eagle Boat
VF	Fighting Plane (Pursuit type)
VT	Torpedo and Bombing Plane
VO	Observation Plane
VP	Patrol Plane (Flying Boat)
VP(T)	Transport Plane
VJ	Utility Plane (usually amphibians)
VH	Ambulance Plane
AM	Mine Sweeper
AV	Airplane Tender

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE.

26 September 1929

ESTIMATE OF MOBILIZATION RED NAVY.

Assumptions.

1. The Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets, ships in Home Waters, and the North American and West Indies Station will be mobilized as a Grand Fleet.
2. The Australian, New Zealand, China and South African stations will be mobilized as an Asiatic Fleet at Singapore.
3. That the number of ships undergoing overhaul will be the same as the usual number, which is assumed to be the number shown in the August 1929 Navy List.
4. That during the period of strained relations no change will be made in the usual distribution of ships (that shown in August 1929 Navy List, corrected in case of battleships for announced changes) with the following exceptions: Mediterranean Fleet will be concentrated in the vicinity of Gibraltar instead of Malta, South African station will be concentrated at the Cape, American and West Indies station ships will be concentrated at Bermuda, New Zealand and Australian ships will be concentrated at Auckland and Sydney respectively, ships on East Indies station will be concentrated at Colombo and ships on China station will be concentrated at Singapore instead of Hongkong.
5. That ships will proceed at their best individual speeds without waiting to convoy slower ships and that all ships can proceed from point of concentration to point of mobilization without refueling.

Assumptions (1) and (2) account for all ships on Red Navy List and allows none to be retained for protection of Mediterranean and other trade routes, policing of mandated islands, South African protectorates, protection of Dominions and Colonies or any other purposes.

It is believed that this estimate does not underestimate Red's mobilization on the given assumptions.

Table of Distances

Gibraltar to Plymouth	1060
Malta to Plymouth	2060
Suez to Plymouth	3073
Hongkong to Plymouth	9476
Colombo to Plymouth	6484
Bermuda to Plymouth	2851

Table of Distances (cont'd)

Sydney to Singapore	4264
Auckland to Singapore	5135
Cape Good Hope to Singapore . .	5655
Colombo to Singapore	1585

Battleships

On M Day the six battleships in full commission in the Atlantic Fleet would be mobilized. In addition there would be in Home Waters two battleships engaged in training of boys, shown in the Navy List as in reduced commission. These two battleships have sufficient complements to accompany the Fleet on Winter maneuvers and could probably be completed to complement in M plus 5 days.

There are three battleships undergoing overhaul or modernization. The rate at which these ships can be made ready depends on the state of the overhaul. The overhaul periods of Red ships are generally less frequent and of longer duration than United States battleships. It is assumed that the battleships undergoing overhaul can be made ready in M plus 30, M plus 60 and M plus 90 days respectively.

The four battleships in full commission in the Mediterranean can be mobilized in home ports in M plus 5 days.

Summary of Battleship Mobilization in Home Ports.

M plus 0	6
M plus 5	13
M plus 30	14
M plus 60	15
M plus 90	16

Battle Cruisers

Of the total of four battle cruisers, one is usually refitting. The "HOOD's" refit now underway has lasted about ten months. It is assumed that one battle cruiser will be undergoing overhaul and that she can be ready in M plus 60 days. All battle cruisers are in Home Waters.

M plus 0	3
M plus 60	4

Summary of Capital Ship Mobilization

M plus 0	6 BB	3 CC
M plus 5	13 BB	3 CC
M plus 30	14 BB	3 CC
M plus 60	15 BB	4 CC
M plus 90	16 BB	4 CC

Aircraft Carriers

There are six aircraft carriers, of these the HERMES is in China, the EAGLE and COURAGEOUS in the Mediterranean and the FURIOUS and ARGUS in Home Waters. The GLORIOUS is under reconstruction, but will be finished late in 1929 or early in 1930. It is assumed that all aircraft carriers will be in full commission.

Rate of Mobilization in Home Waters.

M plus 0 days	8
M plus 5 days	5

Rate of Mobilization, Singapore.

M plus 0 days	1
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Cruisers

Total number built	52
Total building	7
Total appropriated for	3

	Type	Built	Unit Displ.	Speed	Guns
10	10,000 ton	10,000		31.5 to 38	8-8"
4	HAWKINS	9,750		30	7-7.5"
24	"C"	3,750 to 4,190		29	4 to 5-6"
8	"D"	4,650 to 4,765		29	6-6"
4	"E"	7,550		33	7-6"
4	ADELAIDE	5,250 to 5,400		25 to 28.5	8 to 9-6"
	LOWESTOFF				
	DARTMOOR				

The distribution of the above 52 cruisers is:

Atlantic Fleet - Full commission	1 HAWKINS, 4 "C"
In reduced commission - Home Waters	2 "C"
In reserve - Home Waters	4 "C", 1 DARTMOOR
Undergoing overhaul - Home Waters	4 "C", 4 "D", 1 HAWKINS
Mediterranean - Full commission	3-10,000 tonners, 1 HAWKINS, 6 "
America and West Indies - Full commission	2 "D", 3 "C".
China - Full commission	5-10,000 tonners
Australia - Full commission	2-10,000 tonners
Australia - Reduced commission	1 ADELAIDE
Australia - Undergoing overhaul	1 BRISBANE
New Zealand - Full commission	2 "D"
East Indies - Full commission	1 HAWKINS, 2 "E"
South Africa - Full commission	1 "C", 1 LOWESTOFF

The cruisers overhaul periods vary in length but are generally from three to six months duration. It is assumed that three of the cruisers undergoing overhaul can be made ready in M plus 15 days, five in M plus 30 days and one in M plus 45 days.

Ships in reduced commission have in general about 50% of complement
Ships in reserve have about 10% in complement.

It is estimated that ships in reduced commission can be completed to
complement, shaken down and mobilized in 30 days.

Ships in reserve can be mobilized in 45 days.

On M day there could be mobilized in Atlantic ports

1 HAWKINS 4 "C"

Assuming:

1. Red concentrates in home waters all cruisers in the Atlantic
Fleet, Mediterranean Fleet and America and West Indies Station, plus
those in reserve, reduced commission, etc. plus all cruisers undergoing
overhaul in Home Waters, and utilizes those in China, Australia, New
Zealand and South Africa as a Pacific Fleet and for patrol of trade
routes, commerce raiding, etc.

2. That nine cruisers undergoing overhaul which normally lasts
from three to six months can be completed and shaken down as follows:
3 in 15 days, 5 in 30 days and 1 in 45 days.

3. That cruisers in reduced commission (about 50% complement) can
be completed to complement and shaken down in 15 days.

4. That cruisers in reserve (about 10% complement) can be mo-
bilized in 30 days.

5. That cruisers from the Mediterranean and America and West
Indies Stations will return at 20 knots and will be ready 24 hours
after arrival.

The following is the rate of cruiser mobilization:

		Total
M plus 0 days	1 HAWKINS, 4 "C"	5
M plus 5 days	3-10,000 tonners, 2 HAWKINS, 10 "C"s	15
M plus 7 days	3-10,000 tonners, 2 HAWKINS, 13 "C"s, 2 "D"s	20
M plus 15 days	3-10,000 tonners, 2 HAWKINS, 18 "C"s 2 "D"s,	25
M plus 30 days	3-10,000 tonners, 2 HAWKINS, 23 "C"s 6 "D"s, 1 DARTMOORTH	35
M plus 45 days	3-10,000 tonners, 3 HAWKINS, 23 "C"s 6 "D"s, 1 DARTMOORTH	36

Assuming the cruisers on the China, East Indies, Australian, New
Zealand and South African stations would be mobilized at Singapore for
control of the main trade route, as a counter force for the Asiatic Fleet,
etc. All ships proceed to Singapore at 20 knots except cruisers of 25
knot maximum speed which proceed at 15 knots.

		Total
M plus 0 days	6-10,000 tonners	5
M plus 5 days	5-10,000 tonners, 1 HAWKINS, 2 "E"	8
M plus 10 days	7-10,000 tonners, 1 HAWKINS, 2 "L"	10
M plus 15 days	7-10,000 tonners, 1 HAWKINS, 2 "E", 2 "D"	12
M plus 20 days	7-10,000 tonners, 1 HAWKINS, 2 "E", 2 "D"	14
	1 "C", 1 LOWSTOFT	
M plus 25 days	7-10,000 tonners, 1 HAWKINS, 2 "E", 2 "D", 1 "C", 1 LOWSTOFT, 1 BRISBANE	15
M plus 40 days	7-10,000 tonners, 1 HAWKINS, 2 "E", 2 "D", 1 "C", 1 LOWSTOFT, 1 BRISBANE, 1 ADELAIDE	16

Destroyer Types

Total built	156 (153 less than 16 years old, 3 over 16 years old)
Total building	20
Total appropriated for	9

The distribution of the 156 built follows:

Full commission - Atlantic Fleet	19
Reduced commission - Atlantic Fleet	3
Reduced commission - Home Waters	22
Out of commission and in maintenance	
reserve	45
Refitting	6
Full commission - Mediterranean	36
Reduced commission - Mediterranean	2
Full commission - China	9
Full commission - Australia	3
Reserve - Australia	9
Full commission - Canada	2
	156

Of the 156 destroyers built two are of post war design, the remainder were laid down during the War.

The 45 destroyers out of commission and in maintenance reserve are in practically the same status as our out of commission destroyers at San Diego and Philadelphia. It is assumed they can be made ready and mobilized in 45 days.

It is assumed that destroyers in reduced commission Mediterranean can be completed to complement, shaken down and mobilized in ten days. Assumed two Canadian destroyers can be mobilized in 15 days. Destroyers refitting can be mobilized two in 15 days, four in 30 days.

Rate of Mobilization in Home Ports.

M plus 0 days	19
M plus 5 days	55
M plus 10 days	82
M plus 15 days	86
M plus 30 days	90
M plus 45 days	135

The destroyers in Australia and New Zealand could be mobilized at Singapore at the following estimated rates:

M plus 0 days	9
M plus 10 days	12
M plus 20 days	21

Submarines

The total number of submarines built is 50, building 14, authorized 6. The 50 built are composed of 14 "H" boats of 440 tons each, 1 "R" boat of 420 tons, maximum surface speed 8 knots, 26 "L" boats of 890 to 960 tons similar to our "S" boats, 1 "K" boat, steam driven, of 2,140 tons, 1 "X" boat of 2,750 tons, and 5 "O" boats of 1,345 to 1,540 tons displacement (the last 6 boats are of pre war design, others are war design).

These 50 boats are distributed as follows:

Full commission - Home Waters	13 "H", 1 "R", 9 "L", 2 "M", 1 "O".
Reserve commission - Home Waters	5 "H", 1 "R"
At home fitting out for China station	2 "O".
Out of commission - Home waters	1 "L".
Full commission - Mediterranean	1 "X", 1 "K", 5 "L"
Full commission - China	6 "L"
Full commission - Australia	2 "O".

"L" boats on China Station will be relieved by "O" boats as they are finished, and "L" boats are to be brought home.

Of the 26 submarines listed as in full commission in Home Waters 7 are engaged in training and 5 are organized into an experimental flotilla.

The six submarines in reserve have one full crew divided to each three boats. It is assumed these vessels could be completed to complement and shaken down in 15 days. Mediterranean submarines could be mobilized in Home Ports, refueled and stored in 10 days.

Assuming no submarines are reserved for training of crews for new boats and none under repairs the following is the estimate rate of mobilization:

	Total	
M plus 0 days	13 "H", 1 "R", 9 "L", 2 "M", 3 "O"	28
M plus 10 days	13 "H", 1 "R", 14 "L", 2 "M", 3 "O", 1 "K", 1 "X"	35
M plus 15 days	14 "H", 1 "R", 19 "L", 2 "M", 3 "O", 1 "K", 1 "X"	41
M plus 20 days	14 "H", 1 "R", 20 "L", 2 "M", 3 "O", 1 "K", 1 "X"	42

Of the above boats the "H"s and the "R" would probably not be used in an overseas expedition.

Rate of mobilisation, Singapore

M plus 0 days	6 "L"
M plus 15 days	6 "L", 2 "O"

Monitors

The monitors of Red were built for the specific purpose of bombardment of the Belgian coast, three might be mobilized for coast defense, one of these, the MARSHAL SAULT, has a designed maximum speed of 6.7 knots and a cruising radius of 1,490 miles. The other two, the ERREBUS and TERROR, have a cruising radius of 1500-1700 at 12 knots, each of these three mount 2-15" guns. The ERREBUS is attached to the Devonport Gunnery School, the TERROR to the Gunnery School Portsmouth and the MARSHALL SAULT to the Gunnery School Nore. It is estimated these ships could be mobilized in M plus 20 days.

M plus 20 - 3

Other small monitors of less than 1000 tons displacement have been converted to other uses.

Airplane Tenders

Total Built 2. ARK ROYAL of 7,000 tons in reserve serving as depot ship for reserve minesweepers, ALBATROSS of 5000 tons, 20 knots speed in commission in Australia. These vessels are not fitted with flying on deck and recover planes by use of cranes.

It is estimated the ARK ROYAL could be completed to complement and shaken down in 20 days.

The ALBATROSS could arrive Singapore from Australia and be ready in

M plus 15 days.

Minelayers

The ADVENTURE is in full commission Atlantic Fleet and would be ready on

M plus 0 days.

Sloops

Sloops are vessels of about 1200 tons displacement, 15 knots speed armed with one or two 4" guns, cruising radius at 15 knots about 1900 miles. They are used as gunboats in West Indies, China, South Africa, New Zealand, Red Sea, etc. for target towing, for survey vessels, for fishery protection, and some are attached to various shore establishments such as the submarine schools.

Their value in an overseas campaign is problematical, but might be utilized as minesweepers. The total of 33 built is distributed as follows:

In commission - Home Waters (Fishery Protection, etc)	4
In commission - Atlantic Fleet (Target Towing)	1
Out of commission - Home Waters	3
In commission - Mediterranean	2
In commission - Red Sea	2
In commission - West Indies	2
In commission - South Africa	4
In commission - China	4
In commission - East Indies	3

In commission - New Zealand	2
Reduced commission - Australia	1
Out of commission - Australia	2
In commission - India (Royal Indian Mariner)	3

Assuming that all vessels in Home waters, Mediterranean, West Indies and Red Sea be mobilized in home waters, none under overhaul, following is the rate of mobilization in Atlantic ports, and vessels out of commission or in reduced commission can be completed to complement, stored and shaken down in 20 days.

M plus 0 days	5
M plus 5 days	7
M plus 10 days	14
M plus 20 days	17

Assuming sloops in China, East Indies, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa be concentrated at Singapore, although probably some of these would be retained on police duties where normally stationed, following is the estimated rate of mobilizations:

M plus 0 days	4
M plus 5 days	10
M plus 15 days	14
M plus 30 days	21

Minesweepers

There are 33 minesweepers, 28 of 800 tons displacement, designed speed 16 knots, cruising radius about 1000 miles, and 5 of about 600 tons displacement. The present distribution is as follows:

In full commission - Home waters	8
In reduced commission - Home waters (at various schools, etc.)	5
Out of commission (normally in reserve) Home waters	4
Reserve commission - Mediterranean	9
In commission - China	2
In commission - India (Royal Indian Mariner)	4

Estimated ships in reduced commission can be completed to complement in ten days. Ships out of commission can be completed to complement and mobilized in fifteen days, ships in Reserve - Mediterranean completed to complement and mobilized in fifteen days. Estimated rate of mobilization in home ports:

M plus 0 days	8
M plus 10 days	14
M plus 15 days	27

At Singapore:

M plus 0 days	2
M plus 10 days	6

Submarine Tenders

There are seven submarine tenders officially called Submarine Depot Ship. Of these seven, one, the MEDWAY, is designed as a tender, the remaining six converted vessels. The CYCLOPS, 11,300 tons, is in full commission, Mediterranean; the LUCIA, 6000 tons; and DOLPHIN, 4530 tons is in commission Atlantic; the TITANIA, 5,470 tons, is in commission China; the AGRAMANT, 935 tons and VULCAN, 6,600 tons, are in commission home waters tending shore based submarines.

The estimated rate of mobilization home waters is

M plus 0 days	4
M plus 5 days	5
M plus 15 days	6

The estimated rate of mobilization, Singapore is

M plus 0 days	1
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Destroyer Tenders

Destroyer tenders are designated as destroyer depot ships, all four are converted vessels. Of these four, two, the AMBROSE and GREENWICH, are out of commission, the AMBROSE acting as an "overflow" ship to accommodate excess personnel for out of commission (maintenance reserve destroyers) and the GREENWICH as a tender for the out of commission destroyers. The SANDHURST is in active commission in the Mediterranean. The PLATYPUS of about 3,500 tons acts as tender to the Australian destroyers and submarines.

The rate of mobilization in home ports is estimated as follows:

M plus 0 days	0
M plus 5 days	1
M plus 15 days	3

Australian PLATYPUS could reach Singapore in not less than 15 days. Rate of mobilization Singapore

M plus 0 days	None
M plus 15 days	1

Repair Ships

There are two, the converted ASSISTANCE, at present in the Mediterranean, and the nearly completed RESCOURSE. Rate of mobilization:

M plus 0 days	1
M plus 5 days	2

Hospital Ships

There is one hospital ship, the MAINE (donated to the British Navy during the Boer War by funds raised in the United States) in commission in the Mediterranean. She could be mobilized in M plus 5 days.

Oilers

There are 38 oilers in the Red Navy manned by civilian personnel in a status similar to our old Naval Auxiliary Service, there are 28 others with no personnel attached. Of the 38 in commission the majority are engaged in freighting of oil to England from Persia and other oil fields. Part of these are on charter to commercial firms.

It is estimated that the rate of mobilization would be

M plus 0 days	19
M plus 10 days	25
M plus 15 days	38
M plus 20 days	64

Commercial oilers could be commandeered and used as necessary.

Store Carriers.

There are only two store carriers whose displacement exceeds 500 tons, the BISON of 760 tons and the FORTRESSHIRE of 9,336 tons. These could be ready on M plus 0 days. Other store carriers would have to be commandeered.

Patrol Boats

Trawlers, whalers and drifters could be mobilized as necessary, but would be of small use except for coast patrol against submarines.

RATE OF BUILDING

Capital Ships

There are no capital ships building. The minimum time required to build a capital ship during the World War was in the case of the battle cruisers RENOWN and REPULSE as follows: Outline plans for these ships were prepared in ten days, and builders received sufficient details to start construction January 25, 1915 although full designs were not finished and approved till April 1915. It was intended that they should be built in fifteen months but this time was exceeded. The REPULSE was finished in about 19 months and the RENOWN in 20 months. From this it appears that no additions to number of Red capital ships can be expected before M plus 570 days.

Cruisers

Red has seven cruisers building, the names and the estimated dates of completion follow:

SHROPSHIRE	September 1929
DORSETSHIRE	July 1930
YORK	March 1930
NORFOLK	May 1930
EXETER	March 1931
SURREY	May 1932
NORTHUMBERLAND	May 1932

Assuming the time to complete the above cruisers could be cut in half under pressure of war, the estimated date of completion would be

SHROPSHIRE	M plus 15 days
YORK	M plus 75 days
NORFOLK	M plus 105 days
DORSETSHIRE	M plus 150 days
EXETER	M plus 255 days
SURREY	M plus 465 days
NORTHUMBERLAND	M plus 465 days

The time required to build cruisers in war based on the minimum time to build during the World War follows:

The type of cruisers nearest to the 10,000 ton 8" gun type constructed during the war was the "HAWKINS" of which the VIMICITIVE was built in the shortest time. She was laid down June 29, 1916, launched January 17, 1918 and completed in about 9 months from the date of launch and 26 months from date of laying down.

Such of the "D" class cruisers of 4,650 tons completed during the war were completed on an average of 18 months from date of laying down.

The "C" class cruisers of 3,750 to 4,190 tons were completed in about 15 months from date of laying down. Hence aside from cruisers on the stocks on M day there would probably be no additions to cruiser strength for at least 15 months and more probably 18 months after M day.

Destroyers

There are 20 destroyers building which it is estimated could be completed considering their present state of completion as follows:

M plus 60	4
M plus 90	8
M plus 120	8
M plus 180	20

It is estimated that additional destroyers could be built in not less than M plus 240 days.

Submarines

There are 14 submarines under construction which could be completed in the following periods:

M plus 30	2
M plus 60	4
M plus 90	10
M plus 300	14

Taking the average of ten "L" boats of 890 tons laid down and completed during the war gives an average rate of building of 19.5 months. The shortest time for any one boat of this class was 16 months. It is assumed that except for boats under construction that no additions can be made for M plus 16 months.

The number of each class of vessel which may be built will depend on the nature of the war. The following table showing the tonnage completed by the Red Empire during the war is inserted as an estimate of their maximum effort.

Due to the amount of naval construction in hand during the years prior to the World War Red was in at least as good, if not better, position to rush naval construction as at present.

NUMBER OF TONNAGE OF EACH TYPE OF WARSHIP
COMPLETED

	No.	Approximate Displacement Tonnage
<u>Warships</u>		
Battleships	14	394,750
Battle Cruisers	8	81,500
Cruisers	8	56,300
Light Cruisers	36 ^a	143,050
China Gunboats	28	9,308
Coast Defence Vessels	2 ^b	11,400
Monitors	38 ^c	114,255
Sloops	124	156,430
Flotilla leaders	20 ^d	45,565
Torpedo boat destroyers	255 ^e	272,895
Submarines	146	151,380
Aircraft Carriers	6 ^f	67,457
P. and P.C. Boats	63	39,957
Repair Ships	2 ^g	9,538
Depot Ships	3 ^h	40,645
Coastal Motor Boats	85	660
Total H. M. Ships	842	1,602,090

(e) Includes two purchased from Turkey and one purchased from Chile.
 (a) Includes one built for Royal Australian Navy and two purchased from the Hellenic Government.
 (b) Purchased from the Norwegian Government.
 (c) Includes three purchased from Brazilian Government.
 (d) Includes four purchased from the Chilean Government.
 (e) Includes one purchased from the Portuguese Government. Four purchased from the Hellenic Government. Three ex-Turkish vessels. Three built for the Royal Australian Navy.

(f), (g) and (h) Includes merchant vessels purchased and reconstructed.

In addition to the above, 2,356,201 tons of auxiliary tonnage was completed for the British Navy.

SUMMARY OF MOBILIZATION (INCLUDING SHIPS BUILDING)

DAYS AFTER M DAY

	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M
	plus	plus	plus	plus	plus															
	0	5	10	15	20	25	30	45	60	75	90	105	120	150	180	255	300	465		
Battleships	6	13	13	13	13	13	14	14	15	15	16	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	No further additions until M plus 570 days	
Battle Cruisers	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	
Aircraft Carriers	3	5	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	No additions until conversion or further building has taken place.	
Cruisers	5	15	20	26	26	36	37	37	38	38	39	39	40	40	41	41	41	43(a)		
Destroyers	19	55	82	86	86	86	90	135	139	139	143	143	144	144	155(b)	"	"	"		
Submarines	28	28	35	41	42	42	44	44	46	46	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	56(c)		
Minelayers	1	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	No further additions until new minelayers have been converted or laid down and built.	

(a) Estimated additional cruisers if laid down on M day can be completed in M plus 450 to M plus 540 days.

(b) If additional destroyers are laid down on M day they will complete in M plus 210 days.

(c) If additional submarines are laid down on M day they will complete in M plus 480 days.

EXPLANATION

	M plus 0	M plus 5	M plus 10	M plus 15	M plus 20	M plus 25	M plus 30	M plus 40
Cruisers	0	8	10	12	14	15	15	16
Destroyers	0	9	9	12	12	21	21	21
Submarines	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
Aircraft Carriers	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Aircraft Tenders	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR PLANS DIVISION
Washington

July 23, 1950.

Received from the Secretary Joint Board forty copies
of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Red, as approved,
and forty copies of the Estimate of the Situation.

R. S. Pratt
R. S. PRATT,
Lieut. Colonel, U.S. ARMY.

Re: new part

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON


~~SECRET~~
W. P. D. G.

September 5, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, THE JOINT BOARD:

Subject: Joint Army and Navy Basic War
Plan Red.

By direction of Lieutenant Colonel C. L. Sampson,
General Staff, eight copies of Joint Army and Navy Basic War
Plan Red have been destroyed by burning, leaving 32 copies
of this document chargeable to the War Department.



J. P. Green
J. P. GREEN,
Chief Clerk, W.P.D.

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE 1-7-87-74

~~SECRET~~

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WAR PLANS DIVISION
Washington

July 25, 1950.

Received from the Secretary Joint Board four copies
of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Red, as approved,
and four copies of the Estimate of the Situation.

M. G. Cook
M. G. COOK,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
WAR PLANS DIVISION
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1930.

DECLASSIFIED BY:
JCS DECLASSIFICATION BRANCH
DATE.....4/24/74.....

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUTLER:

Reference Joint Estimate of the Situation Blue-Red: I have found several clerical errors in the Army mobilization rate as given on page 18. It is not necessary to correct the copies now in the hands of The Joint Board. It will be sufficient for you to make the necessary corrections after the Estimate is approved by The Joint Board and before it is issued.

The corrections are as follows:

EMPIRE, EXCEPT CRIMSON

"15 days' strength - 337,928,"
should be 337,926.

TOTAL


"80 days' strength - 848,587,"
should be 848,587.

"450 days' strength - 4,625,318,"
should be 4,625,418

"510 days' strength - 5,551,698,"
should be 5,552,198.

"570 days' strength - 6,119,758,"
should be 6,199,748.

R. S. Pratt
R. S. PRATT,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.



fm

~~SECRET~~